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ABSTRACT 
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has established four major programs 
for the security of mass transit against terrorism. This thesis examined how these 
programs can be improved to address the terrorism security needs of the nation’s 51 
transit agencies in urban areas classified as Tier II.  
Homegrown terrorism represents a new and changing threat to Tier II regions. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and The National Research Council 
(NRC) of the National Academies examined the DHS risk analysis methodology. Both 
identified problems with the risk analysis methodology used for the distribution of TSA’s 
security program resources. 
This thesis used the interview and policy options methodologies to find ways to 
improve these security programs.  The focus of the study was on high level strategic 
goals of increasing law enforcement officers, and increasing explosives detection canine 
teams for Tier II transit agencies.  Strategic recommendations for achieving these goals 
and other tactical considerations are enumerated.  These recommendations and 
considerations will be forwarded to the Transit Police and Security Peer Advisory Group 
(PAG) that advises the TSA on these types of issues.  If the PAG finds them to be of 
merit, it may choose to present them to the TSA.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
On March 11, 2004, radical extremists in a spectacular attack bombed Madrid’s 
National Rail System in Madrid Spain.  On July 22, 2004, The 9/11 Commission Report 
on the terrorist attacks upon the United States released its report and noted that terrorist 
opportunities to do harm were as great or greater in the mass transit mode as the aviation 
sector, and questioned the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) spending of 
over 90 percent of its annual budget of $5.3 billion on the aviation sector, and its overall 
lack of planning for the security of mass transit (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks, 2004).  On December 5, 2006, Executive Order 13416, issued by the President, 
set policy that recognized the security of the surface transportation system as a national 
priority (Bush, George W, 2006). Then on August 3, 2007, the 110th Congress passed 
Public Law (PL) 110-53, known as the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007.  The 9/11 Commission Act established the framework for 
TSA’s four major security programs for mass transit.  Most of the security programs’ 
resources have been focused on protecting against another spectacular attack on a 
transportation system in a major U.S. city; however, these security program investments 
have been based on a faulty risk assessment model and a complex and changing threat 
environment.  This may leave the United States’ smaller region’s transportation systems 
vulnerable to terrorism.   
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
1. Background 
Terrorism has long been a threat to mass transit, and attacks after September 11, 
2001 have been particularly deadly.  As Bhatt and Silber reported in their 2007 study 
entitled Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, on March 11, 2004, 
terrorists detonated 10 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on four commuter trains of 
the national rail system, in Madrid, Spain.  Three other bombs were discovered by 
Spanish police in their largest and busiest rail station before they had a chance to explode.  
 2
The incident resulted in the death of nearly 200 people and the injury of another 2,050 
(Bhatt & Silber, 2007, pp. 23–56).  On July 7, 2005, a series of coordinated suicide 
bombing attacks were carried out on London’s transit system during the morning rush 
hour.  Three bombs exploded on three London underground trains.  A fourth bomb 
exploded an hour later on a bus.  Fifty-six people were killed, including the bombers, and 
about 700 were injured. (Bhatt & Silber, 2007, pp. 23–56).  On July 11, 2006, a series of 
seven bombs exploded on the suburban railway in Mumbai, India.  Two-hundred-nine 
people were killed (GAO, 2009b, p.1).  
According to the Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Report of the Future, 
Terrorism Task Force, there is every indication that the number of planned attacks in the 
United States will increase (Homeland Security Advisory Council [HSAC], 2007, p. 2).  
On September 20, 2009, in an announcement that received wide media attention, the U.S. 
Department of Justice revealed on its website, the arrests of three men in New York and 
Colorado in a case of homegrown terrorism.  The three men were alleged to have been 
involved in a plot to detonate improvised explosives devices (IEDs) on the New York 
public transit system (U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ], 2009h). In that same matter, on 
February 22, 2010, Najibullah Zazi pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court in the Eastern 
District of New York to charges of conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction 
(explosive bombs) against persons on property in the United States, conspiracy to commit 
murder in a foreign country and providing material support to al-Qaeda (U.S. Department 
of Justice [DOJ], 2010i). Zazi is a resident of Aurora, Colorado (DOJ, 2010i). He and 
others traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan and were recruited by al-Qaeda to return to the 
United States to conduct suicide operations (DOJ, 2010i). Zazi returned to the United 
States in January 2009 and moved to Denver, Colorado (DOJ, 2010i). Zazi intended to 
conduct a bombing attack on the New York Subway system (DOJ, 2010i).  He planned 
for the attack in the Denver area and bomb-making residue was found in hotel rooms 
where he stayed near Denver, Colorado before he was arrested (DOJ, 2010i).  
Noteworthy in this case is the fact that the terrorists’ activities were not limited to New 
York City, and they could have just as easily targeted a smaller more  
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vulnerable region. Rail and mass transit systems are vulnerable targets to terrorists 
because they are vast, open, easily accessible, and they operate on fixed schedules (GAO, 
2009b, p. 8). 
2. Situation  
As noted in the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report of June 
2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) has been given the mandate for security of the transit industry 
under the Transportation Security Act of 2001 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, [GAO], 2009a, p. 7). TSA’s efforts to provide 
for the security of the industry are conducted in large part through four major security 
programs.  These programs are the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP), the National 
Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP), the Surface Transportation 
Security Inspection Program (STSIP), and the Visible Intermodal Prevention and 
Response Team Program (VIPR).  
The purpose of the TSGP is to provide funds to protect critical infrastructure and 
the riding public (GAO, 2009a, p. 2). Between fiscal years (FY) 2006–2009 inclusive, 
$1.156 billion was allocated to transit agencies for security (GAO, 2009a, p. 7).  The 
DHS designates eight major urban areas with mass transit systems as Tier I and the rest 
of the country’s urban areas as Tier II (Office of the Inspector General [OIG], 2008, p. 2). 
All transit agencies then fall into these Tiers I or II, based on their terrorism risk scores to 
determine initial TSGP funding allocations (GAO, 2009a).  DHS determines the regions 
it considers at the highest risk of a terrorist attack and selects transit agencies within those 
regions eligible to receive Tier I funding (GAO, 2009a).  Each Tier I region is given a 
target allocation based on its share of risk as determined by DHS’ risk model (GAO, 
2009a, pp. 1–18). 
Lower-risk regions and certain transit agencies in those regions make up the Tier 
II group (GAO, 2009a).  Eligible Tier II transit agencies are determined by using Federal 
Transportation Administration (FTA)’s National Transit Database, which identifies 
transit agencies by ridership (GAO, 2009a).  Transit agencies that are not in the top 100 
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for passenger trips are not eligible for funding (GAO, 2009a). The Tier II allocation is a 
set amount of funding allocated for all Tier II regions combined, and Tier II mass transit 
agencies apply for funding in competition with other Tier II agencies (GAO, 2009a, 
p. 12). 
Based on this system, 90 percent of the $1.156 billion was awarded to transit 
agencies in eight Tier I urban areas (GAO, 2009a, p.18).  The remaining 10 percent of the 
funds were allocated between 51 transit agencies in Tier II urban areas on a competitive 
basis (GAO, 2009a, pp. 17–18).  In FY 2008, $13.7 million was transferred from Tier II 
back to Tier I transit agencies (GAO, 2009a, pp. 17–18).  Transit agencies that are not in 
the top 100 for passenger trips are not eligible for funding (GAO, 2009a, pp. 1–18).   
The application of TSA’s other major security program resources to Tier II mass 
transit agencies is similarly skewed, particularly in the case of explosives detection 
canine teams (EDCTs).  Surface Transportation Security Inspector (TSI) positions are 
understaffed, and VIPR operations are conducted at Tier II mass transit agencies on a less 
frequent basis than desired.   
3. Problem and Central Causes  
The June 2009 GAO report noted that the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 required 
that TSGP recipients be selected based on risk (GAO, 2009a, p. 8).  The risk model used 
by the TSA as a component of the DHS is calculated as a function of threat, vulnerability, 
and consequences (GAO, 2009a, p. 16), or expressed as a mathematical formula, R = f(T 
x V x C). The rail mode and bus mode risk scores are combined to determine the total 
risk for the region (GAO, 2009a, p. 51).  Within each mode, the threat index, which is 
classified, accounts for 20 percent of the total risk score, while the vulnerability and 
consequence indexes for each mode account for 80 percent (GAO, 2009a, p. 51).  In the 
rail mode, the consequence score is based on a population index (40 percent) plus a 
national infrastructure index including underground track miles and underwater structures 
(40 percent) (GAO, 2009a, p. 52).  In the bus mode, the consequence mode is based on 
passenger trips (GAO, 2009a, pp. 51–52).  As a result of the TSGP risk model, total  
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transit risk, and therefore security funding, is weighted toward urban areas with high 
ridership combined with rail modes with underground track, and underwater structures 
(GAO, 2009a, pp. 51–52). 
The GAO report cited a number of weaknesses in the TSGP.  Notable was the fact 
that the TSGP risk model does not measure variations in vulnerability, which limits the 
model’s overall ability to assess risk (GAO, 2009a, pp. 16–17).  The GAO further noted 
that DHS has not produced performance measures and therefore cannot assess the 
effectiveness of the TSGP in protecting critical transportation infrastructure and the 
traveling public from acts of terrorism (GAO, 2010a, pp. 13–14). 
In addition to the GAO’s findings, the National Research Council (NRC) of the 
National Academies reviewed the DHS risk methodology and concluded that DHS 
practices related to risk analysis have been flawed (National Research Council [NRC], 
2010, p.11).  The DHS has not been following critical scientific practices of 
documentation, validation, peer review by technical experts external to DHS, and 
publishing (NRC, 2010, p. 3).  Given this lack of a disciplined approach it is very 
difficult to know with precision how DHS risk analyses are being done and if their results 
are reliable and useful in decision making (NCR, 2010, pp. 1–12).  The NRC concluded 
that until deficiencies in the methodology are improved, only low confidence should be 
placed in most of the risk analyses conducted by DHS (NCR, 2010, p. 11).  Moreover, 
the DHS does not appear to be on a path for development of those methods and capability 
(NRC, 2010, pp. 2–4). 
4. The Changing Threat   
The NRC reported that in relation to the risk from terrorism, defining the threat 
and estimating probabilities are inherently challenging because of the lack of experience 
with such events, the associated absence of data on which to base reliable estimates of 
probabilities, and the effect of an intelligent adversary that may seek to defeat 
preparedness and coping measures (NRC, 2010, p. 4). The NRC noted that there has been 
a lack of terrorism threat data for consideration in the risk analysis model (NRC, 2010, 
p. 4). 
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However, the threat data has been accumulating and a clearer picture of the threat 
is emerging.  On September 22, 2010 Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, appeared before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs.  Secretary Napolitano indicated that homegrown terrorists 
represent a new and changing facet of terrorist threat (DHS, 2010).  She defined 
“homegrown” as terrorist operatives who are U.S. persons who were radicalized in the 
United States and who learned terrorist tactics either in the United States or in foreign 
training camps) (DHS, 2010). She noted that terrorist organizations are continuously 
looking for operatives who are familiar with the United States or the West, and who can 
be of assistance to foreign terrorists (DHS, 2010). Secretary Napolitano observed that 
now, virtually anything is a potential target, including mass transit and passenger rail 
(DHS, 2010). 
A cursory review of recent terrorism cases in the United States reveals significant 
numbers of cases of terrorism activity in and around Tier II regions.  A review of the DOJ 
data between December 2008 and December 2010 revealed 11 terrorism cases in addition 
to the Najibullah Zazi—“Times Square Bomber” case that have ties to Tier II regions. A 
brief summary of those cases is provided in the appendix of this thesis. 
5. Possible Consequences  
In March 2010, the Mineta Transportation Institute published a report entitled, 
Terrorist Attacks on Public Bus Transportation: a Preliminary Empirical Analysis. The 
authors, Brian Michael Jenkins, Bruce Robert Butterworth, and Karl S. Shrum, reported 
that domestic radicalization and recruitment in the United States are on the increase) 
(Mineta, 2010, p. 15).  Between September 12, 2001 and the end of 2009, 44 cases of 
domestic radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism were reported in the United 
States (Mineta, 2010, p. 15).  32 cases were reported between 2002 and 2008, an average 
of four a year (Mineta, 2010, p. 15).  By contrast, in 2009 there were 12 cases, a 
considerable increase (Mineta, 2010, p. 15).  In the 150-year history of pubic 
transportation, terrorist attacks were infrequent between 1920 and 1970, with only 15 
recorded, mostly targeting trains with bombs (Mineta, 2010).  Terrorist attacks on public 
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transportation intensified in the early 1970s and have been on the increase since then.  Of 
the 1,399 recorded attacks on mass transit since 1970, 51.1 percent have been against bus 
targets, 35.7 percent have been against train targets (Mineta, 2010, p. 19).  No cases of 
bus bombings have been recorded in the United States (Mineta, 2010, p. 22).  When 
explosives and incendiaries are involved, the highest incidences of bus attacks have been 
in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa (Mineta, 2010, p. 22).Western Europe 
ranks fifth for bomb attacks against bus targets (Mineta, 2010, pp. 15–23). 
The authors of the Mineta report, Jenkins et al., considered whether the nation 
should be concerned about the possibility of public bus transportation becoming a 
potential target for terrorist attacks, and whether the authorities should be eager to protect 
it.  They concluded that it is difficult to provide a firm answer to the question, but that a 
public bus, bus station, or bus stop in the United States is: 
 A target containing a sufficient number of people to provide an adequate 
body count for terrorists.   
 A target that has been attacked repeatedly elsewhere with a high degree of 
success, creating a kind of menu of successful and relatively simple attack 
methods.   
 A target that, although it has not yet appeared in jihadist plots to attack 
targets inside the United States, can be an important part of an urban mass 
transit system that has been targeted and might reasonably appear on the 
radar screens of radical jihadist groups seeking an operational success, 
particularly if heavy rail mass transit targets become hardened in 
anticipation of attacks or in response to them. (Mineta, 2010, p. 16)  
The report noted that it is important that government officials, mass transit 
operators and employees not take false comfort in the lack of attacks in the U.S (Mineta, 
2010, p. 16).  Tier II transit agencies are more likely to be focused on bus operations, but 
have less security resources at their disposal, and have less eligibility to receive grant 
funding to enhance security.  If U.S. bus transit systems become the target of terrorist 
attacks, the Tier II agencies that operate them may not be prepared to address the threat. 
 8
B. RESEARCH QUESTION(S) 
1. Primary Questions 
1. What support does the TSA currently provide to meet the terrorism 
security needs of mass transit agencies classified as Tier II agencies? 
2. How can TSA’s four major security programs for mass transit be 
improved to address the security of Tier II mass transit agencies? 
2. Secondary Questions  
1. How do Tier II transit agencies assess their current state of terrorism 
security preparedness? 
2. How do Tier II transit agencies assess the TSA’s performance in 
addressing its mandate to provide for Tier II security needs? 
3. How can the security gaps be filled? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
1. Literature 
Currently, there is no literature on the specific question of whether the TSA is 
meeting the terrorism security needs of Tier II transit agencies.  Therefore, from this 
perspective alone this research will be instructive.  There is only limited literature on the 
TSA’s four major security programs for mass transit, particularly the TSA’s National 
Explosives Detection Canine Team Program.  This thesis will consolidate whatever 
information is available, and develop new information specifically related to Tier II 
agencies.   
2. Future Research Efforts 
The thesis will serve as a baseline of research specifically related to Tier II transit 
agencies.  The research can be used as a springboard to increase the effectiveness of each 
of TSA’s four major security programs for mass transit and develop new security 
concepts for Tier II agencies.   
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3. The Immediate Consumer 
The immediate consumer of this information is the TSA and mass transit 
agencies.  This research will bring to the forefront information that has not yet been 
recognized as a problem.  Early identification of the issue will allow for the timely 
development of program modifications to enable security gaps to be filled by Tier II 
transit agencies.   
4. Homeland Security Practitioners and Leaders Nationally 
Identification and recognition of the problem, followed by the development of 
program enhancements to fill security gaps will result in improved programs to address 
Tier II homeland security practitioner’s needs.  This research will assist national leaders 
who may be unprepared for the potential threat against Tier II mass transit agencies and 
also unaware of the security gaps facing those agencies.   
D. METHODOLOGY: INTERVIEW AND POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
This thesis was conducted using the interview and policy options analysis 
methodologies.  The manner in which these methodologies were used is described in this 
section. 
1. Interview Methodology and Criteria 
The interview methodology was chosen largely to solicit relevant data from 
professional security practitioners in the field of mass transit.  These security 
professionals provided information that was unavailable from open sources of data alone. 
As subject matter experts, their opinions expanded upon the open source data. Chiefs of 
Police from Tier I and Tier II mass transit agencies were selected for interview because 
they could be expected to have the most current, relevant, first-hand subject matter 
knowledge.   The interviews provided context to the U.S. government reports and other 
open source data, and helped in developing the policy options presented in this thesis. 
Chiefs of Police from both Tier I and Tier II mass transit agencies were identified from 
the ranks of those who had attended Transit Safety and Security Roundtables sponsored 
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jointly by the Department of Transportation-FTA and DHS- TSA.  These roundtables are 
considered to be the cornerstone in the federal effort to support safety, security and 
emergency preparedness in our nation’s public transportation industry.  Chiefs of Police 
who had attended these roundtables were chosen to be interviewed because they were 
considered to have a combination of specialized knowledge relating to their respective 
mass transit agency’s security needs, the overall threat environment, an understanding of 
the difference between the two tiers of mass transit agencies, and up-to-date knowledge 
of the TSA’s major security programs for mass transit.  Three Tier I Chiefs of Police 
were interviewed, representing 37 percent of the eight Tier I mass transit urban areas.  
Seven Tier II Chiefs of Police were interviewed, representing 13 percent of the 51 Tier II 
mass transit urban areas.  Combined, these 10 chiefs represent 10 percent of the nation’s 
top 100 mass transit agencies.  All of the Chiefs of Police were provided with anonymity, 
to assuage any concerns over providing constructive comments about TSA’s 
administration of its four major security programs for mass transit.     
The specific questions (see below) were asked of the Chiefs of Police of the Tier I 
mass transit agencies. The questions were designed to be general to allow the chiefs to 
provide their broad perspective on the specific programs.  Follow up questions were 
asked essentially to maintain the focus of the interview and to expand on the chiefs’ 
responses, or for clarification. 
1. Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s National 
Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) to your agency’s 
security efforts.  What is good about the program, and how can it be 
improved?  What recommendations can you make to Tier II mass transit 
agencies concerning this program? 
2. Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s Surface 
Transportation Security Inspector Program (STSIP) to your agency’s 
security efforts.  What is good about the program, and how can it be 
improved?  What recommendations can you make to Tier II mass transit 
agencies concerning this program?   
3. Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s Visible 
Intermodal Prevention and Response Team Program (VIPR) to your 
agency’s security efforts.  What is good about the program, and how can it 
be improved?  What recommendations can you make to Tier II mass 
transit agencies concerning this program?   
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4. Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s Transit 
Security Grant Program (TSGP) to your agency’s security efforts.  What is 
good about the program, and how can it be improved?  What 
recommendations can you make to Tier II mass transit agencies 
concerning this program?   
The same questions were asked of the Chiefs of Police of the Tier II mass transit 
agencies, without asking for the recommendation that was asked of the Tier I police 
chiefs.  As with the Tier I questions, the Tier II questions were designed to be general to 
allow the chiefs to provide their broad perspective on the specific programs.  Follow up 
questions were asked essentially to maintain the focus of the interview and to expand on 
the chiefs’ responses or for clarification. 
1. Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s National 
Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) to your agency’s 
security efforts.  What is good about the program, and how can it be 
improved?  
2. Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s Surface 
Transportation Security Inspector Program (STSIP) to your agency’s 
security efforts.  What is good about the program, and how can it be 
improved?   
3. Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s Visible 
Intermodal Prevention and Response Team Program (VIPR) to your 
agency’s security efforts.  What is good about the program, and how can it 
be improved?   
4. Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s Transit 
Security Grant Program (TSGP) to your agency’s security efforts.  What is 
good about the program, and how can it be improved?  
2. Policy Options Methodology 
The policy options methodology was chosen because it lends itself to the specific 
objectives of this thesis research.  Through this methodology it is possible to delineate a 
set of discrete policy options that have not been attempted and that may provide solutions 
to the existing problems.  Accordingly, this research will identify, explain, and compare 
policy options for improving TSA’s major security programs for Tier II mass transit 
agencies.  Each of TSA’s major security programs can be improved.  This thesis 
identifies two specific high level areas to focus on for their significant broad potential 
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impact.  They are first, increasing the number of law enforcement officers (LEOs) for 
Tier II mass transit agencies and; second, increasing the number of Explosives Detection 
Canine Teams (EDTCs) for Tier II mass transit agencies.     
The policy options for accomplishing these two separate goals, which will be 
examined, were derived from the literature review, open sources of data, and the 
interviews of Chiefs of Police from Tier I and Tier II mass transit agencies.  These policy 
options generally include program options now available only to Tier I mass transit 
agencies; options that have been available to Tier II mass transit agencies on a one time 
basis, but with limitations; modifications of practices within existing programs; and the 
introduction of new types of programs.  These alternatives will be compared, contrasted, 
and evaluated and provide the rationale for choosing this methodology.   
At the outset, three policy options will be introduced for increasing the number of 
LEOs for Tier II mass transit agencies.  The policy options will be described in detail and 
evaluated on the basis of the following criteria: 
First, effectiveness will be evaluated in relation to the increase in the number of 
LEOs or explosives detection canines that can be produced based on a given budget. 
Second, cost will be evaluated in relation to the estimated monetary expense associated 
with implementing the recommended changes. Third, level of effort will be evaluated in 
relation to whether energy or exertion is required to implement the recommended 
changes.  This will be estimated on the basis of two factors.  First, will the policy option 
work within the existing legal framework, or will it require new legislation? Second, will 
the policy option add increased administrative burden on the Tier II mass transit agency?  
Lastly, political acceptability will be evaluated in relation to the acceptability of any 
proposed options to the mass transit industry, the TSA, and the Congress.   
A detailed explanation and analysis of each of the three policy options for 
increasing LEOs within the evaluative criteria is undertaken in the policy options analysis 
and Evaluation chapter. The results will be compared and detailed in a policy options 
matrix and these results will then be summarized.  Finally, a recommendation will be  
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made to adopt a policy option that best addresses the high impact security improvement 
of increasing LEOs for Tier II mass transit agencies. 
The same evaluative process will be followed and presented for increasing 
EDCTs for Tier II mass transit agencies.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This literature review is centered on the primary research question of what 
support the Transportation Security Administration provides to meet the terrorism 
security needs of mass transit agencies classified as Tier II agencies. This review will 
seek to explore the subfields of literature on the topic of mass transit security thereby 
encompassing the primary research question.  
There has been no literature that addresses the basic question of whether the TSA 
is meeting the terrorism security needs of mass transit agencies classified as tier II 
agencies.  There are however, a variety of related subfields of literature on the topic of 
TSA, its security responsibilities for mass transit, including Tier I and Tier II agencies, 
and mass transit security in general.  These subfields of the literature can be grouped into 
five general categories.  First is the federal government legislation, 9/11 Commission 
recommendations, and Executive Order, which created the TSA and set forth its 
responsibilities for securing the transportation industry, including mass transit.  The 
second subfield in the literature is TSA’s own documents defining its vision for securing 
mass transit.  The third subfield in the literature can be found in U.S. government reports, 
which document the performance of some of the programs that the TSA carries out in 
support of its mandate for the security of mass transit. The fourth subfield of the literature 
is security reports generated by the public transportation industry.  The fifth subfield of 
the literature is reports on mass transit security prepared by accredited scholars and 
researchers.   
B. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION, 9/11 COMMISSION ACT 
RECOMMENDATONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
A review of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 reflects that the 
TSA was created out of Public Law 107-71, by the 107th Congress, on November 19, 
2001. The first written line in the act reads, “to improve aviation security, and for other 
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purposes” (Aviation, Transportation Security Act [ATSA], 2001, p. 1).  The Act makes 
clear however that the TSA shall have security responsibility for all modes of 
transportation including those exercised by the U.S. Department of Transportation 
(DOT).  With that said, the only substantive reference to surface transportation that could 
be found in the Act is in relation to national emergencies.  There is no mention of mass 
transit in the Act, and from the reading it is clear that the Act was not written from the 
perspective of securing mass transit. Therefore, it is apparent that at the genesis of TSA’s 
formation its support of mass transit in general was lacking, including of course, support 
for Tier II mass transit agencies.  On the other hand, there were additional duties imposed 
on the TSA by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act that had the potential to 
impact on modes of transportation beyond aviation, including mass transit (ATSA, 2001, 
Sec. 114 f, 5). Under this act, the TSA was placed within the DOT.   
A review of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) offered no further 
clarification than the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 on the role of the 
TSA in securing mass transit in the immediate aftermath of its formation.  This Act was 
also passed by the 107th Congress, on November 25, 2002, under Public Law 107-296.  
The over-riding purpose of the legislation was to create the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security.  TSA was transferred from the DOT, and maintained as a distinct 
entity within the DHS, reporting to the Under Secretary for Border Protection 
Transportation and Security (Homeland Security Act [HSA], 2002, Sec. 424, a).    
A deeper review of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 provided insights into the 
mandates of the TSA’s parent organization, the DHS, a department that oversees the TSA 
in providing for the security of mass transit.  For example, this Act mandated the creation 
of components within the DHS such as the Office of Science and Technology to serve as 
a focal point for work on law enforcement technology; the creation of an Office for 
Domestic Preparedness (ODP) to manage security grants and other responsibilities; the 
creation of the Office for State and Local Government Coordination to oversee and 
coordinate programs for, and relationships with, state and local governments; and to 
facilitate information sharing with state and local agencies.  Each of these components 
has the potential of supporting the TSA in is mission of securing mass transit.   
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On July 22, 2004, The 9/11 Commission Report on the terrorist attacks upon the 
United States was released.  The commission recognized the inherent difficulty in 
protecting surface transportation due to its size and accessibility.  The commission also 
noted that terrorist opportunities to do harm were as great or greater in this mode of 
transportation as the aviation sector, and took note of the fact that despite congressional 
deadlines, the TSA had not developed an integrated strategic plan for the transportation 
sector, or specific plans for the various modes (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks NCTA, 2004, p. 391).  The commission also questioned the TSA’s allocation of 
its resources with over 90 percent of its annual budget of $5.3 billion going to the 
aviation sector NCTA, 2004, p. 391).  Without a strategic plan, the commission seems to 
be justified in questioning whether our transportation security resources were being 
allocated cost effectively toward the greatest risks. 
The Executive Order 13416 issued by the President on December 5, 2006 set 
policy that recognized the security of the surface transportation system as a national 
priority.  This order also placed the requirement on TSA for the implementation of a 
security program to protect surface transportations against terrorist attacks (Bush, 2006, 
Sec. 1). This document appears to be what finally expanded TSA’s focus beyond aviation 
security to mass transit.   
On August 3, 2007 the 110th Congress passed Public Law 110-53, known as the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.  The Act 
authorized the TSA to develop Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams 
(VIPR).  The TSA was authorized to use any asset of the department including Surface 
Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs,) canine explosives detection teams and 
advanced screening teams. The Act also authorized the TSA to train, employ, and use 
STSIs to assist surface transportation entities in enforcing security regulations and 
directives.  Concerning EDCTs, the TSA was authorized to increase the number of these 
teams for the purpose of transportation-related security (IRCA, 2007, Sec. 1303, 1304, 
1307).  The Act made no reference to either TSA focusing or being required to focus 
these programs on rail operations to the exclusion of bus operations. 
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C. TSA PRODUCED LITERATURE DEFINING ITS VISION FOR 
SECURING MASS TRANSIT  
The Transportation Sector: Specific Plan, Mass Transit Modal Annex issued in 
May 2007 (DHS, 2007, p. 1), appears to be TSA’s response to criticisms of the 9/11 
Commission and the directive of Executive Order 13416, and in anticipation of the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.  The document 
describes the use of a risk management system to reduce risk and deploy assets to areas 
where they can be most effective in relation to specific and general threats (DHS, 2007, 
p. 1).  A plan to coordinate security efforts between the government and industry is also 
set forth.  The plan recognizes an ever changing threat environment and the need for 
intelligence and proactive security measures.  Emphasis is placed on TSA’s Surface 
Transportation Security Inspection Program (STSI) and the Baseline Assessment and 
Security Enhancement (BASE) program.  This document is revealing for its description 
of TSA’s emphasis on its risk based risk management program, emphasis on TSIs and 
willingness to extend itself to the industry to develop security plans.   
The document revealed TSA’s emphasis on six transit security fundamentals.  
Recognizing what the TSA considers to be a security fundamental is important because it 
is predictive of where the TSA will direct its security resources.  It follows that if these 
fundamentals are correct and complete, then TSA’s allocation of resources will be well 
directed.  If not correct and complete the TSA’s allocation of resources may be 
misdirected.  Therefore, the six fundamentals are noteworthy not only for what they 
include, but also for what they exclude, and are listed as follows: 
1. Protection of high-risk underwater / underground assets and systems 
2. Protection of other high-risk assets that have been identified through 
system- wide risk assessments.   
3. Use of visible, unpredictable deterrence 
4. Targeted counter-terrorism training for key front-line staff. 
5. Emergency preparedness drills and exercises 
6. Public awareness and preparedness campaigns. (DHS, 2007, p. 3) 
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D. U.S. GOVERNMENT REPORTS 
U.S. government reports in the field can be grouped into two categories: reports 
issued by the United States Government Accountability office (GAO) and reports issued 
by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG).  Combined, 
this literature paints a picture of TSA mass security programs focused on the largest mass 
transit properties operating underground rail service, with significantly less TSA 
controlled resources directed at other mass transit agencies.  
One report issued by the DHS, OIG report of June 2008, OIG-08-66 addressed the 
TSA’s Administration and Coordination of Mass Transit Security Programs.  The focus 
in this report was TSA’s management of its four major assistance programs for mass 
transit and the performance of these programs in meeting the needs of the five largest 
mass transit rail systems (OIG, 2008, p. 1).  What is not said in this report is as important 
as what is said.  In other words, the fact that the needs of the five largest transit systems 
were reviewed, and none of a medium sized transit agency, infers that the needs of Tier II 
agencies were not important enough to even be considered for review.  
Other reports reviewed included the February 2009, DHS, OIG report OIG-09-24, 
on the Effectiveness of TSA’s Surface Transportation Security Inspectors, and the June 
2009 GAO report, GAO-09-491, entitled Transit Security Grant Program, DHS Allocates 
Grants Based on Risk, but its Risk Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant 
Oversight Can be Strengthened. Lastly, the GAO in June 2009 issued a report, GAO-09-
678, entitled Transportation Security, Key Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Mass 
Transit and Passenger Rail Security, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Federal 
Strategy and Programs.  GAO noted that transit agencies had been conducting risk 
assessments of their own properties since 2004, and TSA could benefit from combining 
this information to conduct a risk assessment of the mass transit system. Furthermore, 
that TSA could also benefit from updating its strategy to include characteristics of other 
successful national strategies.  These reports also revealed that TSA can improve certain 
aspects of each of its mass transit security programs. Significant weaknesses were found 
in TSA’s STSIP and TSGP.  It can also be concluded, in some instances or inferred in 
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other instances that TSA’s four programs are weighted significantly in favor of the Tier I 
agencies.  The weakness in this sub literature is that these government studies focused on 
large mass transit agencies with significant rail systems and deliberately did not include 
bus systems that more typically fall into the Tier II category, thus we must rely on 
inferences.   
E. SECURITY REPORTS DEVELOPED BY THE PUBLIC 
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 
A body of relevant literature on the topic of mass transit security has existed for at 
least a decade before the creation of the TSA and the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act of 2001.  The Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) is a key 
instrument for conducting transportation security research.  The TCRP was proposed by 
the U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and established under the Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA) sponsorship in July 1992.  The TCRP was authorized as part of the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA).   
More recently in 2007, the TCRB published Report 86, Public Transportation 
Security, volume 13, entitled, Public Transportation Passenger Security Inspections: a 
Guide for Policy Decision Makers.  In 2009, the TCRB published Synthesis 80, Transit 
Security Update a Synthesis of Transit Practice.  TCRB’s publications provide a very 
basic description of terminology, security practices, and equipment applicable to mass 
transit security.  This literature is not strategically oriented, has limited tactical 
applications, and does little to advance the primary research question.  
F. WORK OF ACCREDITED SCHOLARS AND RESEARCHERS 
The Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy 
Studies (MTI’s) transportation policy work is centered on research, including 
transportation security, education, information, and technology transfer.  MTI has 
conducted research on transportation security on topics ranging from passenger screening 
to designing and operating safe and secure systems, as well as protecting against 
terrorism and serious crime.  MTI Report 04-05 entitled Designing and Operating Safe 
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and Secure Transit Systems: Assessing Current Practices in the United States and 
Abroad is an informative study of contemporary terrorist incidents, including the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) bombing campaign in London prior to 2005, the Sarin chemical 
agent attack in Tokyo, and the attack on the Renfe subway system in Madrid among 
others.  The work provides a chronology of terrorist events, describes lessons learned, 
and reports on transit security strategies in Paris, Tokyo, London, and Madrid.  
Particularly relevant to Tier II agencies, the report notes that, while the most dramatic 
attacks on mass transit have indeed occurred on major systems, this does not mean that 
local bus service or smaller cities are safe from attack (MTI, 2005, p. 7).  This work is 
geared toward design and operations considerations and its focus is on rail systems 
security.   
An earlier work by MTI, Report 01-07 dated September 2001, entitled, Protecting 
Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing 
Research on Best Security Practices, reported on assaults on public transportation that 
were characterized at that time as continuing without indication of abatement (Jenkins & 
Gersten, 2001, p. 1).  It examined security practices in Tokyo and London and in two 
California transit agencies (MTI, 2001, pp. 1–3).  The strength of this study is the 
emphasis placed on the United Kingdom’s (UK) history of addressing terrorism, which 
until the date of this study, was conducted primarily at the hands of the IRA and the need 
to adopt best practices.  The weakness in the study is that even with the UK’s exhaustive 
experience in dealing with the threat of terrorism it was unable to prevent the attacks on 
their system in 2005.   
G. CONCLUSION 
The literature reveals that the TSA was slow in shouldering its mandate for 
securing mass transit.  Legislation was passed in 2001 and 2002 assigning the TSA 
responsibility for securing all modes of transportation.  Still, 90 percent of TSA’s budget 
was expended on aviation security (NCTA, 2004, p. 391).  Acclaimed scholars had 
published in September of 2001 that terrorist assaults on mass transit were continuing 
without abatement.  The 9/11 Commission Report, published in July 2004, noted that 
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despite deadlines, TSA had not developed an integrated strategic plan for the 
transportation sector, or specific plans for the various modes, such as mass transit (IRCA, 
2007).  Attacks on mass transit continued, including Madrid in March 2004, London in 
July 2005, and Mumbai in July 2006.  TSA’s efforts to secure mass transit were 
reactionary, and at the urgings of the Administration and Congress, rather than based on 
its own vision and strategy.  Based on a review of the related subfields in the literature, it 
can reasonably be concluded that the programs the TSA has put into place to secure mass 
transit have been troubled in their own right, but are also geared in favor of a handful of 
Tier I transit agencies.  Therefore, the literature indicates that the TSA is likely not 
meeting the terrorism security needs of mass transit agencies classified as Tier II 
agencies. 
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III. THE TRANSIT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into 11 sections.  Section A is the introduction, and 
Section B is intended to provide the reader with an explanation of the origins and 
administration of the Program.  The requirements placed on the DHS-TSA for the TSGP 
under the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 is 
explained in Section C.  Section D provides an explanation of the TSGP risk analysis 
model as a function of threat, vulnerability and consequence, the establishment of Tier I 
and Tier II regions based on the risk model, and challenges facing the TSGP revealed in 
the DHS OIG’s June 2008 report.  The DHS OIG’s June 2009 report to the Congress that 
revealed an inability of the risk model to measure differences in vulnerability across 
regions is discussed in Section E.  Section F describes the results of National Research 
Council of the National Academies review of the DHS’ approach to risk analysis and its 
conclusion that only low confidence should be placed in most of the risk analysis 
conducted by the DHS.  Interviewing data of Chiefs of Police of Tier I mass transit 
agencies is provided in section G. Section H is policy implications attributable to the Tier 
I Chiefs.  Interviewing data of Chiefs of Police of Tier II mass transit agencies is 
provided in section I. Section J is policy implications attributable to the Tier II chiefs.  
Finally, Section K is a chapter summary, discussion and conclusions. 
B. BACKGROUND 
DHS began providing grant funding specifically for transit security in 2003 
through the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program (GAO, 2009a, p. 2).  In 
2003 and 2004, the UASI program distributed $65 million and $50 million, respectively 
in grant funds to mass transit and passenger rail agencies (GAO, 2009a, p. 2).  In 2005, 
DHS established the TSGP to address the security needs of transit systems (GAO, 2009a, 
p. 2). The purpose of the TSGP is to protect critical surface transportation infrastructure 
and the traveling public from acts of terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies 
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(GAO, 2009a. 2).  The TSA assumed responsibility for the policy aspect of the program, 
such as establishing priorities in the fiscal year 2006 grant cycle (GAO, 2009a, p. 4).  
TSA initially allocated funds to a metropolitan region based primarily on that region’s 
ridership (OIG,, 2008, p. 21).  TSA then moved to a competitive process for mass transit 
agencies (OIG,, 2008, p. 21).  The TSGP distributes funds to owners and operators of 
mass transit systems, which include intracity bus, commuter bus, ferries and all forms of 
passenger rail, including Amtrak and other systems.  TSGP funding allocations for mass 
transit security have increased each year from 2006 to 2009, inclusive and totaled $1.156 
billion (GAO, 2009a, p. 7).  In FY ’10, the TSGP funding allocation was $288 million, 
with $253 million to be distributed in FY 2010. (DHS, 2009, p. 7). 
Responsibility for the administration of the TSGP has changed several times since 
2003.  From FY ’03–FY ’09, the DHS’ Office of Domestic Preparedness administered 
the UASI grant program (GAO, 2009a, p. 8).  During FY ’06, the administration of the 
TSGP was transferred to the TSA and the Office of Grants and Training within DHS’ 
Preparedness Directorate (GAO, 2009a, p. 8).  TSA was responsible for establishing 
security priorities and developing the criteria for evaluating applications, while DHS’ 
Office of Grants and Training was responsible for grant management (GAO, 2009a, p. 8).  
Under the Post- Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2007, most offices 
within DHS’ Preparedness Directorate were transferred to the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) (GAO, 2009a, p. 8).  In FY ’08, FEMA’s Grants Program 
Directorate became responsible for the administration of the TSGP (GAO, 2009a, p. 8). 
There are three stages of the TSGP grant cycle: allocation, award, and distribution 
(GAO, 2009a, p. 10).  TSA grant guidance is created annually by the TSA and FEMA.  
The guidance provides an overview of the TSGP, the application materials needed to 
apply for funding under the program, and DHS management requirements (GAO, 2009a, 
p. 10).  
It is too soon to judge the effectiveness of the TSGP.  The GAO issued a report to 
Congress in April 2010, entitled Surface Transportation Security, TSA Has Taken Actions 
to Manage Risk, Improve Coordination, and Measure performance, but Additional 
Actions would enhance its Efforts.  The report acknowledged the need for the TSA to 
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develop or enhance performance measures for the TSGP (GAO, 2010a).  The TSGP 
lacked a plan and milestones for developing measures to track progress in achieving 
program goals (GAO, 2010a).  Even though FEMA, who administers the grant program, 
reported that it was beginning to develop measures and that the agency had not 
collaborated with the TSA to produce performance measures for assessing the 
effectiveness of security projects funded by the TSGP (GAO, 2010a).  The GAO 
suggested that effectiveness would include how the funding is used to help protect critical 
infrastructure and the traveling public from possible acts of terrorism (GAO, 2010a).  The 
GAO recommended that the TSA and FEMA collaborate in developing such a plan to 
include milestones (GAO, 2010a, pp. 13–14). 
C. IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 
COMMISSION ACT OF 2007 
Public Law 110-53, enacted on August 3, 2007, also known as Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, placed several requirements on 
the DHS Secretary, and the TSA Administrator.  Requirements included the 
establishment of a program for making grants to eligible public transportation agencies 
for security improvements (GAO, 2009a, p. 8).  The DHS fulfilled this requirement by 
establishing the TSGP (GAO, 2009a, p. 8).  The Act created requirements for the TSGP, 
including that recipients of public transportation funds be selected based on risk and that 
TSGP projects address items identified in security assessments or plans (GAO, 2009a, p. 
8).  The Act also outlined permissible use of the funds and limited the percentage of 
funds used for operational costs to 20 percent (IRCA, 2007).  Lastly, the Act required 
reporting on how the TSGP awards address national transportation security goals (OIG, 
2008, p. 21).  
D. DHS’ JUNE 2008 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL’S (OIG) REPORT 
The DHS OIG reviewed TSA’s TSGP and identified challenges with the TSGP in 
its June 2008 report entitled TSA’s Administration and Coordination of Mass Transit 
Security Programs. The review focused on how well the program was meeting the needs 
of the nation’s five largest mass transit agencies (OIG, 2008, p. 1).  The OIG found that 
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the TSA and mass transit agencies disagree on the best approach for allocating funds and 
prioritizing projects (OIG, 2008, p. 21).  The result has been that the TSA has made many 
changes to the program and has been unable to develop a workable solution (OIG, 2008, 
p. 21).  Consequently, mass transit agencies have become frustrated and raised concerns 
over the TSA’s inconsistent and unpredictable processes (OIG, 2008, p. 21).The TSA’s 
solution has been negotiated agreements with stakeholders (OIG, 2008, p. 21). The OIG 
noted that the TSA’s current strategy of negotiated agreements may not provide sufficient 
documentation to evaluate the basis for TSA’s grant decisions (OIG, 2008, p. 21). 
The OIG noted as an example of the TSA’s inconsistent priorities, in 2006, after 
mass transit agencies submitted their FY ’06 TSGP grant applications the agency 
changed its priorities (OIG, 2008, p. 22).  Due to the changed priorities the TSA denied 
projects that fell within the original application guidelines.  Furthermore, some partially 
completed security projects from previous grant cycles were unfunded because of the 
changes.  Changing priorities also made security planning more difficult (OIG, 2008, p. 
22). 
Mass transit agencies also complained about the TSA’s unreasonably short 
deadlines for submitting grant proposals and an unrealistic performance period of 36 
months for spending the award money (OIG, 2008, p. 22). They also complained about 
the TSA’s slow award process (OIG, 2008, p. 22). The FY ’06 TSGP was also plagued 
with other problems.  Tier I Regional Transit Security Working Groups did not allocate 
spending decisions based on risk and project proposals did not reflect the TSA’s priorities 
(OIG, 2008, p. 23).  Many Regional Transit Security Working Groups simply divided 
funds, so that most systems regardless of size or risk, received at least one funded project.  
The TSA did not integrate asset-specific information into grant guidelines and priorities.  
Many mass transit officials said that TSA’s risk management approach did not take into 
account the differences in the infrastructure and needs of cities and their transit agencies 
(OIG, 2008, p. 23). 
The TSA modified the TSGP grant approval process somewhat for FY ’07, but 
many of the old problems remained (OIG, 2008). The ’07 process may not have 
generated an adequate written record of how grants were prioritized or awarded (OIG, 
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2008).  Awards may not have been based on objective grant eligibility criteria, resulting 
in personality-driven decisions, or no decisions at all (OIG, 2008, p. 25).  Without 
objective criteria for grant awards or a transparent process, the OIG noted that it would be 
difficult for an outside observer to determine how and why a grant decision was 
determined (OIG, 2008, p. 25).    
The OIG recommended that the TSA adopt a process for incorporating asset 
specific risk and vulnerability assessments into grant decisions and a forum for 
stakeholders to evaluate whether TSA’s grant strategy addresses mass transit agency’s 
highest priority security needs (OIG, 2008, p. 25). The OIG opined that this would enable 
the TSA to develop a more objective and responsive grant process (OIG, 2008, p. 25).  
The OIG also recommended that the TSA report to Congress on each grant recipient’s 
assessment of the grant application and award process (OIG, 2008, p. 26). The TSA 
concurred with the first recommendation and concurred in part with the second (DHS, 
2008, p. 26). 
E. GAO’S JUNE 2009 REPORT ON THE TSGP AND RISK 
METHODOLOGY 
In June 2009, the GAO issued a report entitled, Transit Security Grant Program, 
DHS Allocates Grants Based on Risk, but its Risk Methodology, Management Controls, 
and Grant Oversight can be Strengthened.  Among other items the report addressed the 
extent to which TSGP funds are allocated and awarded based on risk (GAO, 2009a, p. 3).  
The GAO reported that the DHS develops risk scores using the TSGP risk analysis model 
in order to identify the highest-risk regions and the transit agencies within those regions 
that are eligible for funding (GAO, 2009a, p. 12).  The National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan (NIPP) updated in 2009, defines risk as a function of three elements: threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence GAO, 2009b, p. 14).  Threat is an indication of the 
likelihood that a specific type of attack will be initiated against a specific target or class 
of targets (GAO, 2010a, pp. 3–4). Vulnerability is the probability that a particular 
attempted attack will succeed against a particular target or class of targets (GAO, 2010a, 
pp. 3–4).  Consequence is the effect of a successful attack (GAO, 2010a, pp. 3–4).  The 
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TSGP risk model accounts for risk to both intracity rail, subway and commuter rail and 
bus systems (GAO, 2009a, pp. 51–52).  The rail and bus scores are combined to 
determine the total risk for the region (GAO, 2009a, pp. 51–52).  Within each mode, the 
threat index, based upon classified data, accounts for 20 percent of the total risk score and 
the vulnerability and consequence indexes account for 80 percent (GAO, 2009a, pp. 51–
52).  In the rail mode, the vulnerability and consequence index is divided equally between 
the population index, a function of passenger trips, and the national infrastructure index, 
which is a function of underground track miles and underwater structures like tunnels 
(GAO, 2009a, pp. 51–52).  In the bus mode, the vulnerability and consequence index is a 
function of the population index / passenger trips (GAO, 2009a, pp. 51–52). 
These regions are either placed into Tiers I or II, based on their risk scores, to 
determine initial TSGP funding allocations (GAO, 2009a, p. 12).  The allocations may 
change based upon DHS’ review of the projects submitted for award.  DHS determines 
the regions at the highest risk of a terrorist attack and selects transit agencies within those 
regions eligible to receive Tier I funding (GAO, 2009a, p. 12).  Each Tier I region is 
given a target allocation based on its share of risk as determined by DHS’ risk model 
(GAO, 2009a, p. 12). 
Lower-risk regions and certain transit agencies in those regions make up the Tier 
II group (GAO, 2009a, p. 12). Eligible Tier II transit agencies are determined by using 
FTA’s National Transit Database, which identifies transit agencies by ridership (GAO, 
2009a, p. 12).  Transit agencies that are not in the top 100 for passenger trips are not 
eligible for funding (GAO, 2009a, p. 12).  The Tier II allocation is a set amount of 
funding allocated for all Tier II regions combined (GAO, 2009a, p. 12). Tier II mass 
transit agencies apply for funding in competition with other Tier II agencies (GAO, 
2009a, p. 12). 
Using the TSGP risk model, mass transit agencies were grouped as either Tier I or 
Tier II, based on the risk of a terrorist attack occurring within a region.  Funding was 
allocated to the regions based upon risk (GAO, 2009a, p. 18)  In FY ’07, Tier I 
represented approximately 80 percent of the total risk of all regions.  Tier II represented 
the other 20 percent (GAO, 2009a, p. 18).  In FY ’08, Tier I represented 93 percent of the 
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total risk of all regions, and Tier II represented 7 percent (GAO, 2009a, p. 18).  The GAO 
analysis showed that for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, almost 90 percent of TSGP funds 
were allocated to Tier I agencies (GAO, 2009a, p. 18).  Tier II mass transit agencies 
received approximately 10 percent of the TSGP funds (GAO, 2009a, p.18).  TSA worked 
closely with Tier I mass transit agencies to develop security projects (GAO, 2009a, p. 
18).  TSGP grant guidance permits TSA to transfer funds between Tier I regions if one 
region’s security projects are superior to another (GAO, 2009a, p. 18).  The guidance also 
enables the TSA to transfer TSGP funds from Tier II to Tier I regions if the TSA is not 
satisfied with the quality of the grant proposals submitted by Tier II agencies (GAO, 
2009, p. 18).  TSA reported to the GAO that many Tier II agencies’ grant proposals were 
denied due to the poor quality of the proposals (GAO, 2009a, p. 18).  In FY ’08, Tier I 
gained an additional $13.7 million from Tier II regions (GAO, 2009a, p. 19).  In FY ’10, 
TSGP funding was allocated with $225.7 million for eight mass transit agencies in eight 
Tier I urban areas, and $27.3 to be competed for by mass transit agencies in 51 urban 
areas (DHS, 2010, p. 7). 
TSGP projects are prioritized based on six transit security fundamentals that form 
the foundation of a successful security program. They include:  
1. Protection of high risk underwater / underground assets and systems    
2. Protection of other high-risk assets that have been identified through 
system wide risk assessments  
3. Use of visible unpredictable deterrence    
4. Targeted counterterrorism training for key frontline staff  
5. Emergency preparedness drills and exercises; and  
6. Public awareness and preparedness campaigns (GAO, 2009a, p. 9). 
GAO’s report to Congress expounded on Risk Management practices associated 
with the TSGP.  The report noted that Congress, the President, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, GAO and others have endorsed Risk Management as a way to direct 
finite resources to areas that are most at risk of terrorist attack (GAO, 2009a, p. 9). The 
GAO reported that DHS uses a risk model to help determine which mass transit agencies 
are eligible for TSGP funds (GAO, 2009a, p. 9).  Furthermore, that TSA and FEMA 
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share responsibility for the TSGP risk model, with TSA providing most of the data inputs 
to the model, which is managed by FEMA (GAO, 2009a, p. 9). The TSGP’s risk 
methodology is similar to the methodology used to determine eligibility for other DHS 
state and local grant programs (GAO, 2009a, p. 9). 
Concerning the first question posed by the Congress on the extent to which TSGP 
funds are allocated and awarded based on risk, the GAO reported that the TSGP 
incorporates elements of risk (GAO, 2009a, p. 16). However, the GAO said that the risk 
model could be strengthened to measure variations in vulnerability (GAO, 2009a, p. 16).  
Not measuring differences in vulnerability, limits the model’s ability to assess risk (GAO, 
2009a, p. 16). The report noted that the DHS did not measure vulnerability for each 
region and the associated transit agencies in the model (GAO, 2009a, p. 16). The DHS 
said it did not measure regional and transit agency vulnerability because it lacked data on 
the differences in vulnerability among transit agencies (GAO, 2009a, p. 16). Therefore 
the DHS decided to hold this variable constant in the risk formula (GAO, 2009a, p. 16).  
The GAO noted that holding vulnerability constant may be problematic and it gave an 
example where a region may be highly vulnerable to one mode of attack but have a low 
level of vulnerability to another depending on a variety of factors such as 
countermeasures already in place (GAO, 2009a, pp. 16–17). 
TSA officials acknowledged the shortcoming in their risk model but cautioned 
that measuring variations in vulnerability would require time and resources (GAO, 
2009a, p. 17). TSA officials said that they were considering using vulnerability 
assessments conducted by transit agencies as the source of the vulnerability data (GAO, 
2009a, p. 17).  To do this it was acknowledged that TSA must be able to consistently 
compare assessments across agencies and regions (GAO, 2009a, p. 17). This would be 
difficult given the variations in scope and methodology of these assessments (GAO, 
2009a, p. 17). A TSA official indicated that the TSA is considering looking into past 
vulnerability assessments and its Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) 
reviews for vulnerability information that might be used in the model (GAO, 2009a, p. 
17).  TSA officials also acknowledged that they consider ridership to be the major known 
vulnerability factor (GAO, 2009a, p. 17).  The GAO reported that one TSA official 
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remarked that ridership represents the number of people exposed to an attack, which is a 
proxy for the openness of the system, station, or both (GAO, 2009a, p. 17).  However, the 
risk model also uses ridership to measure consequence, so its link to vulnerability does 
not add additional information about how risk may vary across regions (GAO, 2009a, p. 
17).  The GAO pointed out that without accounting for variations in vulnerability, the 
effectiveness of the risk analysis model may be limited in that it may not fully consider 
important differences in regions and transit systems that could affect their vulnerability to 
attack and the risk scores may not be as precise (GAO, 2009a, p. 17).  The GAO went on 
to say that a more precise risk analysis could affect the allocations of funds to Tier I or 
Tier II regions because allocation is determined in part by the risk share (GAO, 2009a, p. 
17). 
A key recommendation of the GAO’s report was that in order to strengthen DHS’ 
methodology for determining risk, the Secretary of Homeland Security should develop 
cost effective methods for incorporating vulnerability information into future iterations of 
the TSGP risk model (GAO, 2009a, p. 40).  The DHS concurred with the 
recommendation and said that it would make appropriate adjustments in the fiscal year 
2010 grant cycle (GAO, 2009a, pp. 40, 41). 
F. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 2010 REVIEW OF DHS APPROACH 
TO RISK ANALYSIS 
Pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 the U.S. Congress 
requested the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies to review and 
assess the activities of DHS related to risk analysis (NRC, 2010).  Over a 15 month 
period, the NRC’s full committee met five times and subgroups of the committee met 
another 11 times with DHS officials and representatives of a variety of organizations to 
gather information (NRC, p. vii) Specifically, the purpose of the committee was to review 
the DHS’ approach to risk analysis to assess how the department is building its 
capabilities in risk analysis to inform decision-making (NRC, 2010, p. 1). 
The NRC noted that DHS leadership made a stated commitment to processes and 
methods that feature risk assessment as a critical component for improved decision-
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making (NRC, 2010). However, the difficulties in developing a risk-based framework 
and activities for decision making across DHS are daunting, largely due to the great 
uncertainties in understanding the suite of threats (NRC, 2010).  The NRC also took note 
of the fact that DHS is responsible for all hazards including natural disasters like 
hurricanes, but focused its report on terrorism because that is where DHS’ efforts are 
weighted (NRC, 2010, p. vii).  
At DHS, risk analysis is used to inform decisions ranging from high-level policy 
choices to small scale protocols that guide the minute by minute actions of DHS 
employees. (NRC, 2010, p. 1)  The results of the NRC’s review indicates that DHS 
practices related to risk analysis have been flawed (NRC, 2010).   The NRC ultimately 
concluded that until DHS’ deficiencies are improved, only low confidence should be 
placed in most of the risk analyses conducted by DHS (NRC, 2010, p. 11). 
With the exception of risk analysis for natural disaster preparedness, which is near 
state of the art, the committee did not find any DHS risk analysis capabilities and 
methods that are yet adequate for supporting DHS decision making, because their validity 
and reliability are untested (NRC, 2010).  Nor does the DHS appear to be on a path for 
development of those methods and capability (NRC, 2010, pp. 2–4). 
The NRC supported its conclusion on the fact that the DHS has not been 
following critical scientific practices of documentation, validation, peer review by 
technical experts external to DHS, and publishing (NRC, 2010).  With this lack of a 
disciplined approach it was very difficult to know with precision how DHS risk analyses 
are being done and if their results are reliable and useful in decision-making (NRC, 
2010).  Furthermore, the NRC stated that there is little understanding of the uncertainties 
in DHS risk models other than those for natural hazards, and in addition there is a 
tendency toward false precision (NRC, 2010).  The committee found that in general the 
models it reviewed did not have the capability to appropriately represent and analyze 
risks from across the department’s spectrum of activities and responsibilities (NRC, 
2010).  The committee often found that little direct effective attention was paid to the 
features of the risk problem that are fundamental to the homeland security modeling 
purview (NRC, 2010).  The committee was concerned about the lack of a state-of-the-art  
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risk modeling for addressing key homeland security issues such as vulnerability, 
intelligent adversaries, and the range of socioeconomic consequences (NRC, 2010, pp. 
11, 12). 
With regard for Infrastructure Risk Analysis in relation to the risk from terrorism, 
defining the threat and estimating probabilities are inherently challenging because of the 
lack of experience with such events; the associated absence of data on which to base 
reliable estimates of probabilities; and the effect of an intelligent adversary that may seek 
to defeat preparedness and coping measures (NRC, 2010, p. 4).  The committee 
recommended that DHS consider the adaptability of intelligent adversaries, consistently 
include evaluation of non-physical vulnerabilities, and characterize sources of 
uncertainty, working toward verification and validation of models, improving 
documentation, and by submitting models and analyses to external peer review (NRC, 
2010, p. 5).  In 2007, TSA initiated but then discontinued an effort to conduct a 
comprehensive risk assessment for the entire transportation sector (NRC, 2010).  The 
effort was known as the National Transportation Sector Risk Analysis (NRC, 2010).  
TSA intended to estimate the threat, vulnerability, and consequence of a range of 
hypothetical attack scenarios and integrate these estimates to produce risk scores for each 
scenario that could be compared between each of the modes of transportation (NRC, 
2010).  TSA discontinued the work due to difficulties in estimating the likelihood of 
terrorist threats (GAO, 2010a, p. 5). 
With regard to Homeland Security Grants the committee concluded that 
population counts serve, for the most part, as the surrogate measure for risk (NRC, 2010).  
Some of the grants programs are moving toward risk-based decision support, but the 
various approaches and formulas are still evolving (NRC, 2010).  The committee 
recommended that FEMA undertake an external peer review by technical experts outside 
DHS of its risk informed formulas for grant allocation to identify any logical flaws with 
the formulas, evaluate the ramifications of the choices of weightings and parameters in 




(NRC, 2010).  The committee further recommended that FEMA become explicit about 
using population density as the primary determinant for grant allocations (NRC, 2010, 
p. 6). 
G. INTERVIEWS OF CHIEFS OF POLICE FROM TIER I MASS TRANSIT 
AGENCIES  
In order to conceptualize the issues associated with this program, Chiefs of Police 
from Tier I and Tier II mass transit agencies were interviewed for their first hand subject 
matter knowledge.  These security professionals provided information and expert opinion 
that expanded upon what was available from open source materials. The interviews 
provided context to the U.S. government reports and open source data, and helped to 
shape the policy options presented in a later section of the thesis.  
The three Chiefs of Police of Tier I transit agencies were asked the following 
questions during their interviews: 
Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s Transit 
Security Grant Program (TSGP) to your agency’s Security efforts.  What 
is good about the program, and how can it be improved?  What 
recommendations can you make to Tier II mass transit agencies 
concerning this program? Follow up questions were asked as appropriate 
for clarification and/or expansion of the Chief’s response.  Responses 
were grouped into broad categories, including: Application of the program 
to their own agencies; Positive aspects of the program; Recommendations 
for Tier II agencies; Program criticisms; and Recommendations for overall 
program improvement. 
First, on the broad question of how the agency applies the TSGP to its own 
security efforts, the three Tier I chiefs who were interviewed all participate in the TSGP. 
They participate successfully and have made significant security improvements for their 
mass transit agencies through funding provided by the TSGP.    
One chief was able to hire 12 new law enforcement officers through operations 
packages offered as part of the TSGP and the supplemental TSGP ARRA funding.  
Veteran law enforcement officers were assigned to new anti-terrorism teams and the 
veterans were replaced with new hires.  A top TSGP priority now is security hardening of 
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bridges and tunnels and previously was training of front line employees.  Therefore, 
employee security training and hardening of infrastructure security were also 
accomplished. 
A second Tier I chief reported that the TSGP enabled his mass transit agency to 
receive funding for 20 new law enforcement officers for newly formed anti-terrorism 
teams to perform high-visibility patrols.  The TSGP has worked extremely well for this 
chief’s mass transit agency. The mass transit agency has used the BASE reviews and 
threat and vulnerability studies to provide support and justification for TSGP security 
improvement projects.  The outcome is that the TSGP has contributed to improving the 
security of the mass transit agency. Specific security improvements include infrastructure 
hardening by enhanced lighting, installation of security cameras and chemical detection 
systems, employee training, and the development of emergency procedures. According to 
the chief, the nucleus of the improvements have been training for front line employees, 
reimbursement for backfilling employees and employee overtime, drills exercises, and 
EDCTs. 
A third Tier I chief reported that the TSGP worked well for his mass transit 
agency, and overall, he is very pleased with the program. The bulk of his mass transit 
agency’s TSGP funding has been applied to infrastructure security improvements.  
Specific improvements include perimeter fencing, security cameras, lighting, underwater 
protection, and employee training.  The chief noted that his mass transit agency transports 
large numbers of passengers through underwater tunnels.   
This chief was also able to hire 12 new law enforcement officers through 
operations packages (OPacks) for anti-terrorism teams offered as part of the TSGP.  One 
six-officer team is used to conduct high visibility random patrols.  The other six-officer 
team is used to for security inspections.   
Despite the positive aspects of the TSGP, there were also criticisms or concerns 
about the program.  One Tier I chief is concerned about the inconsistency of the TSGP. 
He noted that the urban area never knows how much funding will be allocated per year, 
and TSA’s priorities change quickly.  The inconsistency causes mass transit agencies to 
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be reluctant to start a long-term project.  The priority now is hardening bridges and 
tunnels, but previously it was front line training.  The chief would like to see funding 
amounts and priorities more predictable to better enable project planning.  Sustainability 
of these security projects over the long-term is another concern. in addition, the chief is 
concerned that the TSA has placed so much emphasis on protection of infrastructure that 
the human elements for security, which the operational packages for anti-terrorism teams 
provide, have become secondary.  The chief noted, in his opinion, that uniformed law 
enforcement officers are the best deterrence against terrorism.      
A second chief advised that the most difficult aspect of the TSGP is moving the 
security project from award to project completion in a reasonable time period.  Historical 
Preservation and Environmental Impact reviews, coupled with the routine procurement 
process, make the timely completion of projects challenging.  There have been times 
when the mass transit agency has been criticized for being unable to spend its grant 
money within a reasonable period; however, the TSA has taken measures to improve the 
process by distributing funds directly to the mass transit agency rather than through a 
state administrative agent.  With that change, the chief expects that concern to be 
somewhat lessened.   
A third Tier I chief considers bureaucracy in the program as a continuing 
problem.  It takes much too long to take a project from concept to reality.  Contributory 
factors include the environmental impact and historical preservation statutory 
requirements.  It can take two or three years to complete these reviews, and therefore, 
painstaking to spend the TSGP funds. 
The Tier I chiefs had recommendations for improvement of the TSGP on the 
whole rather than specifically for Tier II agencies.  One chief would have the TSGP 
allocate more funding for human security than is allocated currently. The chief does not 
recommend allocating more funding for human resources than physical security 
improvements, but he does recommend investing more into human resources than is now 
being invested. He noted that the TSA also needs to recognize that when crime is 
prevented, terrorism is also prevented.  To focus only on terrorism is not facing reality.  
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He deeply appreciates the federal assistance and enjoys a good relationship with the TSA, 
but it needs to begin thinking out of the “bureaucratic box.”  
A second Tier I chief is concerned with the idea of allocating all of the TSGP 
funds for 62 critical national assets across the country as the basis for all of the FY 2011 
funding.  This would leave little to no funding for Tier II mass transit agencies.  He 
believes that not only Tier II regions should be concerned about the idea but Tier I 
regions as well.  This chief is of the opinion that terrorists will seek to penetrate the 
weakest link in the security chain and all of the mass transit agencies are linked.  With 
this in mind, the chief believes the TSA needs to move more to a regional approach for 
mass transit security and consider more deeply the security of the smaller agencies that 
are linked to larger mass transit agencies.   
The same chief believes that investing in people is a better security investment 
than investing in infrastructure protection.  Specifically, he noted that employee training; 
public awareness campaigns, and security drills are a better investment of TSGP funds 
than infrastructure protection.  The chief advised that a good public awareness campaign 
is like adding hundreds of thousands of security partners. He noted that recently a Times 
Square street vendor was the first to detect an improvised explosives device threat in New 
York City. 
A third Tier I chief reported that he the TSA would improve the TSGP by making 
the grants more flexible, by making them more specific to the individual mass transit 
agencies.  Furthermore, he noted that TSGP could be improved to more fully address 
sustainment of security improvements.  In these tough economic times, the mass transit 
agencies do not have discretionary funds for sustainment.  He further advised that 
security will always take a back seat to transportation in rank of priority for mass transit 
agencies when there is competition for funds.  TSGP grant guidance needs to address this 
reality. He understands that the grand money is not guaranteed for the long-term and the 
federal government would prefer to wean mass transit agencies off the grant funds; 
however, there needs to be some balance on this issue.   
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This chief advised that the TSA espouses the philosophy that high visibility 
unpredictable deterrence as the number one means of protection from terrorism.  With the 
current economic conditions transit agencies cannot afford to hire law enforcement 
officers to support this philosophy.  The chief is of the opinion that the TSA needs to 
stand up for what it believes in and support the deployment of more law enforcement 
officer for high visibility unpredictable patrols for mass transit agencies.  The Chief noted 
that presently TSGP funds are allocated 90 percent toward infrastructure and 10 percent 
toward operations support based on congressional mandate.  This needs to change, and 
the TSA needs to convey this philosophy to the Congress to make it happen.  In light of 
this idea, the chief recommends that the TSA develop its own community oriented 
policing (COPS) style grant for mass transit agencies, similar to, but separate from the 
COPS grant administered by the U.S. Department of Justice.  
H. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO INTERVIEWS OF TIER 
I CHIEFS OF POLICE 
1. Implications for TSGP Effectiveness for Tier I 
Policy implications associated with the overall effectiveness of the TSGP for Tier 
I agencies are evident from the interview data, even though all three Tier I mass transit 
agencies reported successful participation in the TSGP, from infrastructure security 
improvements to the hiring of law enforcement officers (LEOs) for human security.  
Administrative problems contribute toward diminished effectiveness.  The inconsistency 
of the TSGP causes mass transit agencies to be reluctant to start long-term projects. 
Urban areas never know how much funding will be allocated per year, and TSA’s 
priorities change quickly.  Sustainability of these security projects over the long-term is 
also a concern, and the TSGP could be improved to more fully address this concern.  The 
most difficult aspect of the TSGP is moving security projects from award to project 
completion in a reasonable time period.  Historical Preservation and Environmental 




completion of projects challenging and bureaucracy in the program is a continuing 
problem.  It can take two or three years to complete this review, and therefore, much too 
long to take a project from concept to reality.    
2. Implications for Increasing LEOs 
Policy implications associated with increasing the number of LEOs are also 
evident from the interview data.  The data calls into question whether the balance of 
funding investments between infrastructure security improvements and investments in 
human security is appropriate. Between the three chiefs, they had hired 44 additional 
LEOs by taking advantage of operations packages (OPacks) that are offered only to Tier I 
mass transit agencies.  Notably, each Tier I chief expressed concerns over the emphasis 
placed on infrastructure security improvements in contrast to investments in human 
capital, and all agree that more funding should be allocated toward investments in human 
security.  One chief was concerned that human elements for security have become 
secondary.  Another chief would recommend increasing funding for human security 
beyond current allocations.  A third noted that high visibility unpredictable patrols are a 
top priority of the TSA and are considered to be the number one protection from 
terrorism.  With current economic conditions, mass transit agencies cannot afford to hire 
LEOs.  Therefore, the TSA needs to convey this message to Congress and should develop 
its own COPS style grant program for mass transit on the order of the COPS grant 
program administered by the DOJ. 
3. Implications for the STSIP 
One chief noted that his mass transit agency has used the BASE reviews and 
threat and vulnerability studies to provide support and justification for TSGP security 
infrastructure projects.  The implication is that BASE reviews and vulnerability studies 
are important contributing factors toward TSGP security infrastructure projects. 
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I. INTERVIEWS OF CHIEFS OF POLICE FROM TIER II MASS TRANSIT 
AGENCIES 
Of the seven Chiefs of Police of Tier II transit agencies who were interviewed, all 
were asked the following question: 
Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s Transit 
Security Grant Program (TSGP) to your agency’s Security efforts.  What 
is good about the program, and how can it be improved? Follow up 
questions were asked as appropriate for clarification and/or expansion of 
the Chief’s response.  Responses were grouped into four broad categories: 
Application of the program to their own agencies; Positive aspects of the 
program; Program criticisms; and Recommendations for overall program 
improvement. 
First, on the broad question of how the agency applies the program to its own 
security efforts, five of the seven Tier II chiefs who were interviewed reported successful 
participation in the TSGP.   
Concerning the positive aspects of the program, at the low end of success one 
reported some improvements in security as a result of the TSGP.  Another described the 
TSGP as helpful, but not in delivery of its full potential impact.  A third chief 
acknowledged that the TSGP has enabled his department to make security upgrades that 
the agency would otherwise have been unable to make.  Another chief advised that the 
TSGP has enabled his mass transit agency to advance its security posture to a level that 
would have never been achieved without the program.  The fifth chief advised that 
overall the TSGP has improved the security of his mass transit agency by providing 
funding for training, exercises and equipment.  The agency has also significantly 
increased its numbers of security cameras. 
While most of the chief’s reported some success with the TSGP, there were also 
significant criticisms of the program. A chief expressed exasperation at seeing most of 
the TSGP funding allocated to Tier I agencies.  This chief is concerned over the 
possibility that the next terrorist attack will be against mass transit in a Tier II region 
where the security infrastructure is not in place, due to a lack of TSGP assistance.  A 
second chief was of a similar view indicating, that the current allocation of resources 
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between Tier I and Tier II mass transit agencies is neither fair nor equitable.  Two other 
chiefs were of the opinion that the funding available to Tier I regions versus Tier II is out 
of balance. 
A chief advised that the TSGP has provided his mass transit agency with the 
opportunity for security improvements on the technical side such as security cameras and 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) detection equipment.  The TSGP has enabled his 
mass transit agency to procure cameras to a level that the agency can no longer provide 
technical support.  The security functions the agency can no longer support include the 
viewing, maintenance, and downloading of data with the existing personnel staffing 
levels.  All of these security systems require human support; however, because of the 
harsh economic conditions and a cutback in personnel resources, his agency’s executive 
management has advised against the procurement of additional security systems without 
funding for personnel to support the security systems.  The chief is left with the choice of 
either no additional technical security improvements or trading police officer positions 
for security technician positions in order to operate and maintain current and additional 
technical security systems.  The chief advised that he could not justify trading police 
officer positions for technical support positions.   
Another chief described the TSGP administrative process as cumbersome, 
difficult, and lengthy.  Due to limited personnel resources, the chief functions as his 
departments only grant writer.  TSA’s priorities change from year to year making it 
difficult for him to follow through on security projects initiated with TSGP grant funding.  
He expressed concern over security priorities being set at the federal level.  He believes 
that his agency’s security priorities should be addressed first, rather than national 
priorities.  Other TSGP requirements like environmental and historic preservation issues 
are overly burdensome requiring excessive proof of compliance even with simple 
projects like changing the locks on doors.  He believes that the TSA needs to reduce the 
TSGP’s administrative burden and make it a less complex and more streamlined process. 
This chief was also highly critical that OPacks are not available to Tier II mass transit 
agencies, and the one time that they were, under the TSGP American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) grant, they were required to have 100 sworn law enforcement 
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officers in order to compete for the OPacks that fund the hiring of police officers for 
antiterrorism initiatives. Another chief noted that the short lead-time for responding to the 
TSGP grant application deadline is a problem.  If a mass transit agency does not have a 
project ready for proposal, it is very difficult to formulate one by the deadline. If more 
grant funding was available to his agency, he would use more to improve his security 
capacity. 
Another chief advised that the TSGP’s relatively small allocation of funding to 
Tier II mass transit agencies, in contrast to what is allocated to Tier I regions, limits the 
overall utility of the program within Tier II agencies.   The chief credits TSA 
representatives to mass transit agencies with giving Tier II agencies some flexibility 
within the TSGP guidelines, but overall, the TSGP could better serve Tier II mass transit 
agencies with a larger allocation of funds.  
This chief was particularly dismayed with the 2009 TSGP ARRA grant, which 
enabled the hiring of law enforcement officers for anti-terrorism, but limited participation 
to transit agencies with departments of 100 or more sworn law enforcement officers.  The 
chief’s transit agency is growing significantly.  The chief is attempting to expand his 
police department to service his growing transit agency, but he does not have 100 officers 
at this time.  Therefore, his mass transit agency was restricted from participating in the 
ARRA grant even though he considers his agency to be very much in need of the anti-
terrorism resources.  The chief questioned why the TSGP makes it difficult to help a 
smaller agency.  The chief noted that although his transit agency does not transport as 
many passengers by rail as a Tier I transit agency, his transit agency’s train cars are filled 
with passengers nonetheless, and they therefore also offer an attractive target to terrorists, 
like any Tier I mass transit agency. 
The Tier II chiefs had recommendations for improvement of the TSGP.  Five of 
the seven chiefs interviewed recommended that the pre-condition for Tier II transit 
agencies to have police departments composed of at least 100 officers in order to apply 
for OPacks (anti-terrorism teams consisting of 4 law enforcement officers) be 
discontinued.  When authorized, OPack should be extended from 36 months to 60 
months.  Furthermore, one chief recommended authorizing grant funding not only for 
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police officers but also for personnel to provide support to technical security systems like 
WMD detection equipment and security camera systems. Five Tier II chiefs also 
recommended that the allocation of funding to Tier II mass transit agencies be increased.  
Likewise, five of the seven chiefs suggested ideas for improving the 
administrative aspects of the TSGP to better serve the needs of Tier II mass transit 
agencies.  One chief is of the belief that because of the administrative burdens, many Tier 
II agencies do not apply for the funding they otherwise would apply for. Three chiefs 
recommended that national priorities not be changed so often to enable mass transit 
agencies to plan their security improvements in advance and for the long-term.  They 
noted that prior to each year’s TSGP introductory grant guidance mass transit agencies do 
not know what the grant priorities will be. Therefore, it is difficult to plan and prepare 
security improvements and grant projects in advance.  Another chief recommended that 
Tier II mass transit agencies should be treated more like Tier I regions by being assigned 
a specific grant award, rather than competing for the award. This may result in smaller 
more consistent awards year in and year out but would enable the Tier II agencies to plan 
for the long-term.  Presently, Tier II regions have less time to develop projects, without 
knowing what the priorities will be, no guarantee of being awarded the grant, and no 
guarantee they can build on to a project in follow up years.  Therefore, the TSGP is very 
difficult for Tier II agencies to plan for and work with over the long-term, and should be 
modified to enable Tier II agencies to build security capacity on a consistent long-term 
basis.   
J. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO INTERVIEWS OF TIER 
II CHIEFS OF POLICE 
1. Implications for TSGP Effectiveness for Tier II 
Policy implications associated with the overall effectiveness of the TSGP for Tier 
II agencies are evident from the interview data.  Most Tier II mass transit agencies also 
reported successful participation in the TSGP. The TSGP has been used for security 
improvements that would otherwise been unachievable; however, most Tier II chiefs 
were frustrated over the imbalance in funding between Tier I and Tier II mass transit 
 44
agencies and concerned that terrorists could also target their regions, and they may not be 
adequately prepared.  They would like to see TSGP funding increased for Tier II mass 
transit agencies. 
Administrative problems contribute toward diminished effectiveness.  Tier II 
chiefs voiced concerns over the TSGP that were consistent with Tier I chief’ s concerns 
and those reported by the DHS OIG in its 2008 report, including a cumbersome, difficult, 
and lengthy process; an inconsistent and unpredictable process; inconsistent priorities; 
and unreasonably short deadlines. 
2. Implications for Increasing LEOs 
Policy implications associated with increasing the number of LEOs are also 
evident from the interview data.  There was large frustration that OPacks were made 
available to Tier II mass transit agencies only on a one time basis under the ARRA 
supplemental grant, but that even then the OPacks were limited to Tier II mass transit 
agencies with at least 100 LEOs.  Tier II chiefs would like to see OPacks available to Tier 
II mass transit agencies with no restrictions on the basis of size of the sworn security 
forces.  Tier II chiefs that are attempting to expand their departments in spite of staff 
reductions are frustrated over these restrictions. 
Mass transit agencies have reached the point where they can no longer invest in 
infrastructure security improvements without increasing human resources.  Because of 
the harsh economic conditions and a cutback in personnel resources, one agency’s 
executive management has advised against the procurement of additional security 
systems without funding for personnel to support the security systems.  The chief is left 
with the choice of either no additional technical security improvements or trading police 
officer positions for security technician positions in order to operate and maintain current 
and additional technical security systems.  The chief advised that he could not justify 
trading police officer positions for technical support positions. The implication here again 
is that more resources need to be directed toward human sources of security including 
LEOs.   
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K. CHAPTER SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The TSGP was established by the DHS in 2005 for the purpose of addressing the 
security needs of transit systems, even though the DHS had been providing grant funding 
for transit security since 2003 through the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant 
program GAO, 2009a, p. 2).  The purpose of the TSGP is to protect critical surface 
transportation infrastructure and the traveling public from acts of terrorism, major 
disasters, and other emergencies GAO, 2009a, p. 2).  Funding allocations for mass transit 
have increased each year from 2006 to 2009, inclusive, and totaled $1.156 billion (GAO, 
2009a, p. 7).  In FY ’08, FEMA’s Grants Program Directorate became responsible for the 
administration of the TSGP, and grant guidance is created annually by the TSA and 
FEMA GAO, 2009a, p. 8).  TSA initially allocated funds to a metropolitan region based 
primarily on that region’s ridership OIG, 2008, p. 21)  The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
required that recipients of public transportation funds be selected based on risk, and 
outlined permissible use of the funds and limitations on the percentage of funds used for 
operational costs (IRCA, 2007).  Currently, the DHS identifies the highest risk regions 
and the transit agencies within those regions that are eligible for funding based on a risk 
analysis model (GAO, 2009a, p. 12). The model defines risk as a function of three 
elements, threat, vulnerability, and consequence.  The regions are placed into Tiers I or II 
based on their risk scores to determine initial funding allocations (GAO, 2009a, p. 12).  
Tier I is allocated a target allocation based on its share of risk as determined by the risk 
model (GAO, 2009a, p. 12).  Tier II allocations are a set amount of funding for all Tier II 
regions combined (GAO, 2009a, p. 12). Tier II mass transit agencies apply for funding in 
competition with other Tier II agencies (GAO, 2009a, p. 12).   
In 2008, the DHS OIG found the TSA and mass transit agencies in disagreement 
on the best approaches for allocating funds and prioritizing projects.  Changes were made 
without developing a workable solution (OIG, 2008, p. 21).  The TSA has been accused 
of having an inconsistent and unpredictable process including inconsistent priorities, 
unreasonably short deadlines, an unrealistic performance period, and a slow award 
process (OIG, 2008, pp. 22, 23).  Mass transit officials said the risk model did not take 
into account the differences in the infrastructure and specific needs in their cities and 
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transit agencies.  Other problems included inadequate record keeping on how grants were 
prioritized or awarded, and questions arose over whether awards were based on objective 
criteria or were personality driven (OIG, 2008, p. 25).  In 2009, the GAO noted that 
Congress, the President, the DHS, and the GAO have endorsed risk management as a 
way to direct finite resources to regions most at risk of terrorist attack (GAO, 2009a, p. 
9).  However, the GAO found that the DHS risk model used for the TSGP did not 
measure vulnerability for each region and the associated transit agencies (GAO, 2009a, 
pp. 16, 17).  The DHS did not have data on the differences in vulnerability among transit 
agencies, and therefore the DHS held the vulnerability variable as a constant in the risk 
formula 2009a, pp. 16, 17).  The GAO noted that based on this shortcoming, the risk 
model may be limited in that it does not consider important differences in regions and 
transit systems, and that a more precise model could effect the allocations of funds to Tier 
I or Tier II regions 2009a, pp. 16, 17).  With FY ’10 TSGP funding distributions totaling 
$253 million (USDHS, 2010, p. 7). This could have represented a substantial difference 
in funding for mass transit agencies.  The GAO found that a cost effective method for 
incorporating vulnerability information should be incorporated into future iterations of 
the TSGP risk model (GAO, 2009a, pp. 16, 17).  In response, the TSA indicated it would 
consider looking at past vulnerability assessments and its BASE reviews for vulnerability 
information (GAO, 2009a, p. 17). 
Congress requested the NRC of the National Academies to review the DHS’ 
approach to risk analysis to assess its capabilities to inform decision-making (NRC, 2010, 
p. 1).  The results of the review indicate that the DHS’ risk assessment methodology has 
been flawed, and until practices are improved, only low confidence should be placed in 
its risk analysis in relation to terrorism (NRC, 2010, p. 11).  Nor does the DHS appear to 
be on a path for development of its risk assessment methods and capability (NRC, 2010, 
p. 11).  The NRC noted that defining the threat and estimating probabilities are inherently 
challenging because of the lack of experience with such events; the associated absence of 
data on which to base reliable estimates of probabilities; and the effect of an intelligent 
adversary that may seek to defeat preparedness and coping measures (NRC, 2010, p. 4).  
The NRC then recommended that the DHS consider the adaptability of intelligent 
 47
adversaries, consistently include evaluation of non-physical vulnerabilities, characterize 
sources of uncertainty, working toward verification of validation models, improving 
documentation, and by submitting models and analyses to external peer review (NRC, 
2010, p. 5).  Lastly, the NRC recommended that TSA/FEMA, become explicit about 
using population density as the primary determinant for grant allocations (NRC, 2010, 
p. 6).   
Notwithstanding the fact that more than a billion dollars of TSGP funds have been 
distributed based on a faulty risk model and Congress has placed significant limitations 
on the percentage of TSGP funds that can be expended for operations, Tier I and Tier II 
chiefs are in agreement that more of the funds need to be invested in human security than 
are currently allocated.  Tier I and Tier II chiefs are concerned over the security of Tier II 
mass transit agencies and Tier II chiefs believe distribution of funds between Tier I and 
Tier II is out of balance.  Tier I and Tier II chiefs are in agreement that more funds should 
be invested in LEOs because the visible and unpredictable nature of the security, which 
they provide, is the single best tool to address the threat of terrorism.  It was suggested 
that with current economic conditions mass transit agencies could not afford to hire 
LEOs.  Therefore, the TSA needs to convey this message to Congress and should develop 
its own COPS style grant program for mass transit on the order of the COPS grant 
program administered by the DOJ.   
Recognizing that the TSGP’s priority is infrastructure security improvements, the 
data indicates that it may be time to revisit the TSGP’s priorities with a view toward 
increasing the emphasis on human elements of security.  This is particularly critical at 
this time considering that the 9/11 Commission Act requires the funding percentage that 
can be applied to operational costs such as LEOs be reduced in FY ’11 from 20 percent to 
10 percent (IRCA, 2007).  Furthermore, in light of the changing threat environment and 
the problems that have been identified with the DHS risk assessment model, it may also 
be time to revisit whether the allocation between Tier I and Tier II regions is appropriate.  




review of the STSIP can have an impact on the TSGP.  Enabling the TSIs to contribute to 
effective vulnerability studies and threat assessments would improve both the STSIP and 





IV. THE NATIONAL EXPLOSIVES DETECTION CANINE TEAM 
PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into 12 sections.  Section A is the Introduction.  Section B 
is intended to expose the reader to the effectiveness of explosives detection canine teams 
as well as to provide background on the origins of the national program, including an 
overview of the administration of the program and its training requirements.  The 
requirements placed on the DHS-TSA for the National Explosives Detection Canine 
Team Program (NEDCTP) under the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007 are explained in section C.  Section D identifies challenges 
facing the program identified in the DHS OIG’s June 2008 report including feedback on 
the program from stakeholders.  A summary of the GAO’s July 31, 2008 report to the 
Congress on the program pursuant to the 9/11 Commission Act, including the significant 
challenges facing the program are set forth in section E.  Section F provides an account of 
other DHS component agencies that manage their own explosives detection canine team 
programs EDCTPs.   The current status of the program from DHS’ 2010 Bottom-Up 
Report is detailed in section G. Section H is interviewing data of Chiefs of Police of Tier 
I mass transit agencies. Policy implications attributable to interviews of Tier I chiefs is 
described in section I.  Section J is interviewing data of Chiefs of police of Tier II mass 
transit agencies.  Policy implications attributable to interviews of Tier II chiefs are 
described in Section K. Section L is a chapter summary, discussion and conclusions.  
B. BACKGROUND 
On July 22, 2008, John C. Pearce, Associate Director of Training and Operations, 
Canine and Detection Research Institute, Auburn University, testified before the U.S. 
House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Management, Investigations and Oversight.  Pearce testified that a well trained canine  
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detection team is the most capable, readily available, and least expensive tool for the 
detection of explosives—the “gold standard” by which all other detection technology is 
judged (Pearce, 2008, pp. 1, 9). 
Canine detection teams are so effective that the United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) increased its number of explosives detection canines in Afghanistan from 300 to 
647 (Vanden Brook, 2010, p. 1).  The EDCTs were necessary to counter the improvised 
explosives devices (IEDs) planted by insurgents, which during August 2010 numbered 
1,292.  In September 2010, the Pentagon planned to pay up to $34 million to a Virginia 
firm for supplying 400 Labrador Retrievers for consideration by trainers; 200 of the 
canines were to be bought, and 100 of those deemed suitable for training (Vanden Brook, 
2010, p. 1). 
On March 9, 1972, a bomb-sniffing dog located an explosive device, just 12 
minutes before it was timed to explode, on an aircraft destined for Los Angeles from New 
York City.   This incident led to the creation of the NEDCTP in 1973. The program was 
initiated under the direction of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) starting with 
40 canine teams at 20 airports (Transportation Security Administration [TSA], 2010).  By 
1997, the NEDCTP had grown to 87 Explosives Detection Canine Teams (EDCTs) at 27 
airports (TSA, 2010). 
From 1997 until 2005, there was little involvement between the NEDCTP and 
mass transit.  David Kontny, the Director of TSA’s NEDCTP, testified before the U.S. 
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight 
Committee on Homeland Security on September 28, 2005.  He explained that the purpose 
of TSA’s NEDCTP is to deter and detect the introduction of explosives devices into the 
transportation system (HR, 2005, p. 1).  He then described the program in detail.  Each 
NEDCTP canine team is composed of one dog provided by the TSA and one handler 
employed by the local law enforcement or transportation authority that enters into a 
voluntary agreement with the NEDCTP (HR, 2005, p. 1). Under the agreement, the local 
agency agrees to utilize TSA-certified canine teams at least 80 percent of the time in the 
transportation environment (HR, 2005, p. 1).  The local agency agrees to participate in 
the program for five years and to maintain a minimum of three TSA-certified canine 
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teams for incident response for a minimum of three years for each team (HR, 2005, p. 2).  
The TSA provides the dog, training of the handler, explosives training aids, and technical 
assistance at no cost to the participating agency (HR, 2005, p. 2).  In addition, monetary 
reimbursement was provided to the local jurisdiction, in the amount of $40,000 per 
canine team per year to help defray costs such as kennel facilities, transport vehicles, and 
veterinary care (HR, 2005, p. 2).  
Initial training for handlers and canines consists of a 10-week course conducted at 
the TSA’s Explosives Detection Canine Handler Course at the Department of Defense 
(DoD) Military Working Dog School at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas 
(HR, 2005, pp. 2, 3).  During the initial training, the handler develops canine handler 
skills and learns about explosives handling, safety and transportation requirements, 
explosives contamination issues within the operating environment, and administrative 
requirements (HR, 2005, pp. 2, 3). 
After graduation from the initial training course, the team receives a preliminary 
certification for its assigned duty location (HR, 2005, p. 3). Each newly deployed canine 
team is then required to complete a 14-day training mission in its home base operating 
environment before achieving full certification (HR, 2005, p. 3).The training attempts to 
characterize real threats, and is “objective based”—meaning that a training objective 
must be met that enhances the team’s capabilities or is used to correct a discrepancy 
noted during a previous evaluation or training scenario (HR, 2005, p. 3). The training 
results are reported to TSA headquarters where they are reviewed for compliance via the 
TSA Canine Web-site (CWS) (HR, 2005, p. 2).  Each EDCT must also undergo an 
intensive annual certification process designed to evaluate the team’s ability to perform 
its daily mission (HR, 2005, p. 3).  The TSA’s instructors from Texas on site in an 
operational environment over several days conduct these certifications (HR, 2005, p. 3).  
The TSA has partnered with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and National 
Institute of Justice to sponsor the Scientific Working Group on Dog and Orthogonal 
Detection Guidelines (SWGDOG) to enhance the performance of the EDCTs (HR, 2005, 
p. 5).  The SWGDOG was established in January 2005 in an effort to develop consensus-
based guidelines that can be shared across all groups involved in canine detection work 
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(FBI, 2010).  The SWGDOG is managed through Florida International University and 
membership includes representatives from six international, 10 federal, 15 state, and 
local, and eight private canine detection organizations (FBI, 2010).  These guidelines 
include initial training, canine/handler team certification, maintenance training, 
proficiency assessment, and documentation (FBI, 2010).  
According to Kontny, as of September 28, 2005, TSA had deployed 345 EDCTs 
at 66 airports, but at only one mass transit system, the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit 
Authority (MARTA) in Atlanta, Georgia (HR, 2005, p. 1).  Of the $22 million 
appropriated for FY ’05 for the NEDCTP, two million dollars was dedicated for 
expanding the program into mass transit (HR, 2005, p. 3).  TSA’s immediate goal at that 
time was to provide 10 mass transit systems with 3 EDCTs each.  The 10 mass transit 
systems were selected on the basis of passenger ridership, critical infrastructure, threats, 
and other security criteria. In a press release issued by the TSA on September 28, 2005, 
the 10 mass transit and commuter rail systems were identified as follows (TSA, 2005):  
 Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) 
 San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) 
 Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) 
 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) 
 Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH) 
 Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) 
 Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Metro) 
 Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) 
 San Francisco Municipal Railway (Muni)  
 San Diego Trolley, Inc. (SDTI) (TSA, 2005). 
To enhance the program, the TSA adopted a three-prong approach to canine 
procurement to ensure an adequate number of canines are available for the NEDCTP.  
This three-prong approach included partnering with the DOD, which has a larger 
explosives detection canine program than the TSA, using U.S. canine vendors, and 
establishing the TSA’s Puppy Program, modeled after the Australian Customs Service 
National Breeding Program (HR, 2005, p. 2).  TSA’s Puppy Program was started in 1999 
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with six adult female canines and two adult males provided by the Australian Customs 
Service.  The first breeding occurred in January 2002, and the program has produced over 
500 puppies (TSA, 2010). 
C. IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 
COMMISSION ACT OF 2007 
The 9/11 Commission seems to have recognized the value of EDCTs in protecting 
mass transit from the threat of improvised explosive devices.  Public Law 110-53, 
enacted on August 3, 2007, also known as Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007, placed several requirements on the DHS Secretary, TSA 
Administrator, and the NEDCTP (IRCA, 2007).  These requirements, listed below, 
included an increase in the NEDCTs capacity within 180 days after passage of the Act 
(IRCA, 2007): 
1. Begin to increase the number of explosives detection canine teams 
certified by the TSA for the purposes of transportation-related security by 
up to 200 canine teams annually by the end of 2010.  
2. Encourage state, local, and tribal governments and private owners of high-
risk transportation facilities to strengthen security through the use of 
highly trained explosives detection canine teams.   
3. Use the TSA’s NEDCT Training Center, including expanding and 
upgrading existing facilities, procurement and breeding of additional 
canines, and increased staffing and oversight commensurate with the 
increased training and deployment capabilities. 
4. Partner with other federal, state, or local agencies, nonprofit organizations, 
universities, or the private sector to increase the training capacity for 
canine detection teams. 
5. Procure explosives detection canines trained by nonprofit organizations, 
universities, or the private sector provided they are trained in a manner 
consistent with certain standards and requirements or other criteria 
developed by the Secretary.  
6. A combination of the above, as appropriate (IRCA, 2007). 
The Act also required the TSA to establish standards for EDCTs across the 
nation’s transportation network (IRCA, 2007).  The Act further required the DHS 
Secretary through the TSA Administrator to ensure the EDCTs are procured as efficiently 
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as possible, and at the best price, while maintaining the necessary level of quality, 
including, if appropriate, increased domestic breeding (IRCA, 2007).  Funding 
authorization was to be appropriated to the Secretary as necessary to carry out this 
requirement for fiscal years 2007 through 2011 (IRCA, 2007).  Not later than one year 
after the enactment of the Act, the Comptroller General was required to report to the 
appropriate congressional committees on progress toward strengthening the security and 
the capacity of the NEDCTP (IRCA, 2007, Sec. 1307, [A–D]) 
D. DHS’ JUNE 2008 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL’S (OIG) REPORT 
The DHS OIG reviewed TSA’s NEDCTP and identified challenges facing the 
NEDCTP in its June 2008 report entitled TSA’s Administration and Coordination of 
Mass Transit Security Programs.  The report noted that stakeholders consider the TSA’s 
training program to be excellent, but the requirement to send officers to a 10-week 
training course in Texas was found to be burdensome (OIG, 2008, pp. 31–32). The need 
to pay overtime to backfill for the officer who attended training created a financial 
liability for the transit agency (OIG, 2008, pp. 31–32).  Canine handlers who were 
already experienced were required to attend the full 10 weeks of training, even though 
they already possessed many of the skills being taught (OIG, 2008, pp. 31–32). The most 
qualified officers selected as handler candidates were not always willing to leave their 
families for such an extended period (OIG, 2008, pp. 31–32).  Lastly, small transit 
agencies without existing canine programs faced extensive start-up costs, which could 
exceed the TSA stipend (OIG, 2008, pp. 31–32). These start-up costs include spending 
money on first kennels, canine-ready vehicles, and secure containers for storing explosive 
training materials (OIG, 2008, pp. 31–32). The OIG report recommended that TSA 
provide additional start-up grant funds for agencies without existing canine explosive 
detection units (OIG, 2008, p. 18).   
The OIG report further noted that the 9/11 Commission Act states that the TSA 
should develop a certification program for non-TSA explosive dogs and encourages TSA 
to explore ways to expand its canine detection units OIG, 2008, pp. 31–32).  Any 
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measures TSA can take to make this program more widely available would contribute to 
mass transit rail security (DHS, OIG, 2008, pp. 31–32). 
E. GAO’S JULY 2008 REPORT PURSUANT TO THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
ACT OF 2007 
On July 31, 2008, the GAO, pursuant to its responsibilities under the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, issued a report 
entitled TSA’s Explosives Detection Canine Program: Status of Increasing the Number of 
Canine Teams, Briefing for Congressional Committees.  The GAO reported that the TSA 
planned to train, deploy, and certify up to 200 EDCTs annually over the next three years, 
consistent with the requirements of the act (GAO, 2008).  GAO also opined that the Act 
provided the TSA with the flexibility to determine the number of additional EDCTs it 
will deploy, within limits, to satisfy the requirements of the 9/11 Commission Act (GAO, 
2008 
The TSA was appropriated funding under the Iraq Supplemental Act of 2007 for 
no fewer than 170 additional EDCTs to secure air cargo against explosives (GAO, 2008). 
The TSA considered meeting the requirements under this act as satisfying its obligation 
for achieving up to 200 teams for 2008 under the 9/11 Commission Act (GAO, 2008, 
pp.17, 18).  As of June 9, 2008, 430 EDCTs were deployed through the NEDCTP, 
including 370 EDCTs at 69 airports, and 56 EDCTs at 14 mass transit agencies (GAO, 
2008).  TSA planned to have a total of 627 EDCTs deployed by the end of fiscal year 
2008 (GAO, 2008, p. 13).  For 2008, a total of $3.5 million was allocated to support 45 
additional NEDCTs for mass transit (GAO, 2008, pp. 10, 20)     
The July 31, 2008 GAO report identified a number of challenges facing the TSA’s 
NECDTP, including the achievement of the requisite number of canines capable of 
meeting the standards of the program (GAO, 2008).  The report noted that the TSA was 
facing a challenge in trying to obtain sufficient numbers of canines from its own Canine 
Breeding and Development Center as well as from the DoD and from a private kennel 
(GAO, 2008).  Since 2002, the center had provided only 36 canines that had been 
deployed in the NEDCTP (GAO, 2008).  Other challenges to the NEDCTP included 
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hiring additional instructors, noting that they perform a dual role of conducting training, 
as well as traveling to locations where teams are deployed to conduct certifications 
(GAO, 2008).  Another challenge was adjusting the training schedule to increase the 
number of classes without reducing the quality of the training program (GAO, 2008).  
Also noted was the need to manage an outreach program to secure additional canine 
handlers (GAO, 2008).   
F. OTHER DHS COMPONENT AGENCY’S CANINE TEAM PROGRAMS 
Besides the TSA, DHS’s other component agencies independently manage their 
own EDCTPs as follows:   
1. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
The U.S Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Field Operations Canine 
Enforcement Program’s initial explosives detection canine teams were trained in 2002.  
The program’s mission is to prevent terrorists and their weapons from entering the United 
States and to assist other law enforcement agencies GAO, 2008).  The CBP’s Office of 
Field Operations has several dozen explosives detection canine teams that are deployed to 
numerous ports of entries throughout the United States (GAO, 2008, p. 39). 
The CBP EDCTs conduct screening for explosives on tractors, trailers, rail, 
ferries, and passenger cruise ships, at airports on aircraft and in air cargo, on passengers, 
and in luggage and in occupied buildings (GAO, 2008).  CBP handlers must have a 
minimum of three years experience with the agency (GAO, 2008).  The CBP uses 
internally developed standards to train EDCTs at CBP’s canine training center in Front 
Royal, Virginia.  CBP’s EDCTs undergo re-certification evaluations every six months 
(GAO, 2008).  The CBP has its own canine breeding program on-site at its training 
center, and procures canines from private vendors (GAO, 2008, p. 40). 
2. U.S. Coast Guard (U.S.C.G) 
In an example of inter-agency cooperation, the CBP trains and certifies U.S. 
Coast Guard teams and procures canines for U.S. Coast Guard teams (GAO, 2008, p. 40).  
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The USCG’s EDCTs were first fielded in 2003, pursuant to the implementation of the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, to detect explosive substances in support 
of homeland security and law enforcement (GAO, 2008).  The USCG considers the 
number and specific locations of its EDCTs to be sensitive information, but generally 
they are deployed to several ports around the nation (GAO, 2008). The EDCTs conduct 
searches at port facilities and onboard vessels entering port.  USCG’s EDCTs participate 
in interagency partnerships, provide assistance to state and local law enforcement 
agencies, and provide immediate response to interagency needs through Adaptive Force 
Packages (combinations of discrete operational capabilities designed to meet discrete 
mission requirements) (GAO, 2008, p. 41). 
3. U.S. Secret Service (USSS) 
The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) established a canine unit in 1976 to provide a 
safe and secure environment for individuals and locations protected by the USSS (GAO, 
2008).  The USSS EDCTs are based in Washington, D.C. and are deployed to other 
locations as needed (GAO, 2008).  The USSS personnel train EDCTs at the agency’s 
training facility in Maryland using internally developed training standards (GAO, 2008).  
The USSS procures its canines from a private kennel (GAO, 2008, pp. 42, 43). 
4. Federal Protective Service (FPS) 
The Federal Protective Service (FPS) established its canine program in 2003 to 
provide explosives detection capability for the protection of life and property and to 
provide a strong visible and psychological deterrence against criminal and terrorist acts 
(GAO, 2008).  Over 50 canine teams are deployed nationwide with teams in each FPS 
region (GAO, 2008).  The FPS considers the specific number and deployment locations 
to be sensitive information (GAO, 2008).  EDCTs are responsible for conducting routine 
explosives searches of office areas, vehicles, materials, packages, and persons housed in 
federally owned or leased facilities, and responding to bomb threats and unattended 
packages (GAO, 2008).  The FPS canines were procured and trained in partnership with a 
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public university’s canine training center, and as of the date of the GAO report, the FPS 
was examining options for future training providers (GAO, 2008, p. 44). 
G. DHS’ BOTTOM-UP REVIEW REPORT OF JULY 2010 
DHS reported in its July 2010 Bottom- Up Review Report, that TSA, as of that 
date, had a total of 705 EDCTs deployed across the country (DHS, 2010).  Of this 
number, 165 were proprietary, meaning that TSA employees handled the canines, 
typically to secure air cargo against explosives (DHS, 2010).  The remaining 640 were 
agreements with police agencies including both airports and mass transit agencies (DHS, 
2010).  The specific number deployed for mass transit was not reported (DHS, 2010, pp. 
A-1, B-1). The DHS Report also noted that in February 2010 the department published 
the nation’s first comprehensive review of America’s strategy for homeland security, the 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) (DHS, 2010).  The QHSR suggested 
that DHS take the initiative of establishing itself as a center of excellence for canine 
training and deployment (DHS, 2010).  As a result, according to the report, DHS has 
taken on the mission of increasing specialized breeding activities for canines, and 
enhancing its training and certification of canines across the homeland security missions 
(DHS, 2010, p. 8). 
H. INTERVIEWS OF CHIEFS OF POLICE FROM TIER I MASS TRANSIT 
AGENCIES  
In order to conceptualize the issues associated with this apparent lack of progress 
in mass transit, Chiefs of Police from Tier I and Tier II mass transit agencies were 
selected for interview for their first hand subject matter knowledge.  These security 
professionals provided information and expert opinion that expanded upon what was 
available from open source materials. The interviews provided context to the U.S. 
government reports and open source data, and helped to shape the policy options 
presented in a later section of the thesis.  
The three Chiefs of Police of Tier I transit agencies were asked the following 
questions during their interviews: 
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Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s National 
Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) to your agency’s 
Security efforts.  What is good about the program, and how can it be 
improved?  What recommendations can you make to Tier II mass transit 
agencies concerning this program? Follow up questions were asked as 
appropriate for clarification or expansion of the Chief’s response.  
Responses were grouped into five broad categories, Application of the 
program to their own agencies; positive aspects of the program; 
recommendations for Tier II agencies; recommendations for overall 
program improvement; program criticisms; and non-NEDCTP initiatives. 
First, on the broad question of how the agency applies the program to its own 
security efforts, the Tier I Chiefs of Police reported 100 percent participation in the 
program.  Two of the chiefs reported that both of their agencies utilized five NEDCTs.  
The other chief reported that his agency utilized six NEDCTs. The EDCTs are directed to 
support high visibility patrols, to support VIPR operations, and passenger screening in the 
agencies that conduct those types of operations.  Having a robust number of EDCTs 
enables mass transit agencies to quickly assess suspicious packages, thereby reducing the 
number and length in delays of service, while resolving whether the suspicious items 
present a real threat. 
Concerning the positive aspects of the program, each of the chiefs expressed 
general satisfaction with the NEDCTP.  The financial benefits of the program were 
primary motivating factors for their participation in the program.  The NEDCTP has 
enhanced the agency’s explosives detection capabilities without the department incurring 
the financial costs associated with expanding its own programs. Each of the Tier I chiefs 
advised that when their non-EDCTP canines were removed from service NEDCTP 
canines have replaced them.  The burden is lessened by sending officers for training one 
at a time rather than in groups of three at a time.  The TSA stipend pays for program 
expenses, and the remaining funds are applied to the officer’s salary.  The non-EDCTP 
assets are much more expensive to the agency because all of those costs are absorbed by 
the agency, including procurement of the canine, training, veterinary needs, food, and 
kenneling. A concern was also expressed that at some point the TSA may eliminate its 
stipend of $40,000 to $50,000 (GAO, 2008) per team per year and the sustainability of 
the EDCTs will become problematic for the agencies.   
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As far as recommendations for Tier II mass transit agencies, the chiefs were 
agreed that EDCTs improve an agency’s capabilities to detect explosives.  Concern was 
expressed over the “homegrown terrorist threat.”  A Tier I chief noted that the majority of 
mass transit agencies in the nation are bus agencies.  There are many such agencies that 
feed into his system and are thereby linked to his system.  He said that terrorists will look 
for the weakest links in the mass transit network to infiltrate and launch their attack. 
Consequently, Tier II agencies need to be well protected, like Tier I agencies.  The chief 
would divert more TSA resources to Tier II agencies knowing that it will make all mass 
transit agencies better protected.  He said that when assets are shared across jurisdictions, 
the entire community benefits. 
The Tier I chiefs had other recommendations for improvement of the program on 
the whole.  One chief noted that the transit agency does not now but should have a say in 
the type of breed of canine that is assigned by the TSA to the transit agency.  All of the 
non-NEDCTP canines selected by his agency have been Labrador retrievers due to their 
friendly disposition, which the chief views as important for the transit environment; 
however, NEDCTP canines include German shepherds and Belgian Malanois, which are 
more “high-strung” than Labrador retrievers.  TSA’s trainers are often former military 
officers and experienced in training for the aviation side of the house.  These trainers are 
not only less familiar with all of the unique needs in the mass transit environment; they 
are also less open minded about these concerns.  In the chief’s view, each of the breeds 
used by the TSA detects explosives as well as the other, except that the Labrador 
retrievers have a better disposition. The chief advised that appearances are also 
important; the German shepherd breed can represent a less friendly/more intimidating 
presence to his passengers. 
Several criticisms of the program were made.  One Tier I chief advised that his 
agency requested that the TSA fund an additional three teams for his agency; however, 
the TSA was unable to accommodate the request.  Therefore, his agency must maintain a 




months for TSA instructors to visit the agency after graduation from the Texas based 
training center. This is too long a period to wait for certification of the teams in the transit 
agency’s operating environment.   
Lastly, the Tier I chiefs provided information on their non-NEDCTP resources, 
which was particularly helpful in drafting the policy options analysis chapter of this 
study.  Each of the chief’s agencies had EDCTs at their agencies before the NEDCTP 
expanded into mass transit.  One agency’s program has been in place since 1991 and 
another since 1997.  One agency presently has six non-NEDCTs, and another has five.  A 
third agency has four.  The FY 2005 TSGP and other agency funds funded the non-
NEDCTs.  Canines were procured from local breeders or acquired as donation canines. 
One agency trains all of the non-NEDCTP canines to TSA standard, which is becoming 
the industry standard.  Certified trainers performed training for his non-EDCTP assets.  
The handlers were already trained bomb technicians.  The agency’s non-EDCTP canines 
are certified by and meet International Police Working Dog Association standards and 
were previously certified and met North American Police Working Dog Association 
(NAPWDA) standards.  The non-NEDCTP dogs have been trained in the mass transit 
environment and all are high performers.  One Tier I agency has a TSA certified trainer 
on his staff who is also a canine handler and each of the department’s non-NEDCTP 
assets are trained and certified up to TSA and national association standards by this 
trainer.  Training is done on-site for the agency’s EDCTs and other neighboring EDCTs.  
The on-site training itself serves as a visible deterrent. 
I. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO INTERVIEWS OF TIER 
I CHIEFS OF POLICE  
1. Implications for Increasing EDCTs 
The policy implications associated with increasing the number of EDCTs are 
evident from the interview data.  First, the financial benefits of the NEDCTP to the Tier I 
mass transit agencies are of primary importance.  Without the financial support of the 
NEDCTP, even Tier I mass transit agencies that are more likely to have more resources 
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than Tier II mass transit agencies are unable to supply themselves with the requisite 
number of EDCTs to address their security needs.   
Second, the NEDCTP is unable to adequately address the security needs of Tier I 
mass transit agencies, and thus unlikely able to address the security needs of the lower 
priority Tier II mass transit agencies.   
Third, even in agencies where the NEDCTP was unable to supply Tier I mass 
transit agencies with the requisite number of EDCTs to support their security needs, Tier 
I agencies had developed EDCTs independent of the NEDCTP. In fact, Tier I mass transit 
agencies had procured 14 EDCTs by procuring and training canines on their own, to 
nationally recognized standards.  Tier I chiefs also expressed a desire to have more 
control over the breed selected for use on mass transit.  They would have this control if 
they procured the canines themselves rather than sending their officers to the TSA 
training facility in Texas where they would receive whatever breed of canine the TSA 
chose to give them. These factors lend support the concept that mass transit agencies are 
capable of procuring and training EDCTs, if they have the financial means to do so. 
The policy implications associated with increasing resources generally for Tier II 
mass transit agencies were also made clear with the recognition that Tier II mass transit 
agencies are typically bus agencies, which feed into larger Tier I systems.  It was noted 
that terrorists may infiltrate the mass transit network to launch their attack through Tier II 
systems if they do not receive protection like Tier I agencies, especially with the 
development of the “homegrown” terrorism threat. 
J. INTERVIEWS OF CHIEFS OF POLICE FROM TIER II MASS TRANSIT 
AGENCIES  
Of the seven Chiefs of Police of Tier II transit agencies who were interviewed, all 
were asked the following question: 
Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s National 
Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) to your agency’s 
Security efforts.  What is good about the program, and how can it be 
improved?  Follow up questions were asked as appropriate for clarification 
or expansion of the Chief’s response.  Responses were grouped into five 
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broad categories, Application of the program to their own agencies; 
positive aspects of the program; recommendations for overall program 
improvement; program criticisms; and non-NEDCTP initiatives. 
First, on the broad question of how the agency applies the program to its own 
security efforts, of the seven Chiefs of Police of Tier II transit agencies who were 
interviewed, not a single one reported participation by their agency in the NEDCTP.  
Therefore, none could report on the positive aspects of the program from a first hand 
perspective.  Yet, each of the Chiefs of Police reported that they would have preferred 
their agency’s participation in the program.  A common thread reported for lack of 
participation in the program was a shortage of manpower.  One chief advised that he did 
not have enough police officers to dedicate three officers as canine handlers.  TSA’s 
program requires that participating agencies establish at least three teams.  Two chiefs 
advised that they would be unable to dedicate three police officers as canine handlers all 
at one time.  They would all be willing to participate in the program if they were able to 
dedicate one officer at a time over a more extended period.  A chief expressed his view 
that a transit agency can get no better high visibility protection than the EDCTs.  He did 
not believe his department should be penalized just because he was trying to build his 
EDCT capabilities one EDCT at a time.  One chief’s department had been reduced by 15 
percent over the past five years for economic reasons, and another chief’s department was 
reduced by 11 percent in the past 18 months.  Finally, one chief was denied participation 
in the program by the TSA because his police department was too small. 
The Tier II chiefs had recommendations for improvement of the program.  Two of 
the Tier II chiefs advised that borrowing the TSA’s EDCTs from the airports to patrol 
their mass transit agency is not the solution to their needs.  Canines that are trained in a 
closed and somewhat sanitized airport environment are not conditioned to operate in a 
mass transit environment, and therefore are not as effective as those trained exclusively 
on mass transit.  Furthermore, if threat levels increased, the TSA would need the EDCTs 
reassigned to the airport to address its own elevated threat conditions; consequently, the 
EDCTs would no longer be available for his mass transit agency.  It was suggested that 
the TSA do a better job of informing mass transit executives on the value of EDCTs; the 
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program must be made more palatable to them in order for them to dedicate scarce officer 
resources to the program.  If the federal government made it easier for mass transit 
agencies to qualify for the NEDCTP, then it would be sending a signal that the program 
is important, hence making it easier to justify to executive management. 
Several criticisms of the program were made. In some cases, lack of information 
sharing by the TSA was noted.  One Tier II chief said that he was unaware that the TSA 
had an EDCTP until after he had procured his first canine.  Further, no representative of 
the TSA has ever discussed the program with him, or offered it to him. Another chief 
advised that he had only learned of the NEDCTP last year.  A third chief had erroneous 
information about the NEDCTP; he thought that if he participated in the NEDCTP, he 
was required to agree to send his team anywhere at any time in response to a TSA 
request.  This chief decided if such a requirement existed, he would not participate in the 
program because he would run the risk of having his team reassigned when he may need 
it the most.  The chief’s misunderstanding was that sending the teams off to provide 
assistance elsewhere was not a mandatory program requirement.   
Lastly, the Tier II chiefs provided information on their non-NEDCTP resources, 
which, just as with the Tier I chiefs, was helpful in drafting the policy options analysis 
chapter of this study.  The chiefs provided details of how they achieved success in 
addressing the threat of explosives without participation in the NEDCTP.  Four of the 
Tier II chiefs reported that their agencies acquired EDCTs independently of the 
NEDCTP.  Two of the chiefs had procured three canines each; two other chiefs had 
procured one canine each; and all of them were procured and trained locally.  Two of the 
canines, including their training and related equipment, were procured with funding from 
the fiscal year 2005 Transit Security Grant Program.  In all, six of the canine teams were 
certified.  The North American Police Working Dog Association (NAPWDA) provided 
three certifications.  Three others were associated with a Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco 
Firearms and Explosives agency program and certified by that agency and the United 
States Police Canine Association (USPCA).  One of the chiefs planned to increase his 
EDCTs on his own over time independently of the NEDCTP. 
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K. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO INTERVIEWS OF TIER 
II CHIEFS OF POLICE  
1. Implications for Increasing EDCTs 
The policy implications associated with the need for increasing the number of 
EDCTs are evident from the interview data.  First, there is a clear lack of NEDCT 
resources for Tier II mass transit agencies since all Tier II mass transit agencies reported 
no participation in the program.   
Second, Tier II agencies had developed EDCTs in spite of the lack of support 
from the NEDCTP.  In fact, Tier II mass transit agencies had procured eight EDCTs by 
procuring and training canines on their own to nationally recognized standards.  These 
factors support the fact that Tier II mass transit agencies are also capable of procuring 
and training EDCTs without sending officers to the TSA’s Texas facility for training, if 
they have the financial means to do so. 
2 Implications for Increasing LEOs 
Policy implications associated with the need for increasing the number of LEOs 
are also evident from the interview data.  Significantly, the common thread among Tier II 
mass transit chiefs was their lack of LEOs to send to Texas for training, especially in 
groups of three as required by the NEDCTP.  One chief reported a decline in LEOs at his 
agency by 15 percent and another by 11 percent due to declining economic conditions.    
L. CHAPTER SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
EDCTs were created in response to bomb threats in the aviation sector in the 
1970s and introduced to mass transit in 2005 (TSA, 2010).  They are widely considered 
to be the best tool for the detection of explosives, as evidenced by the fact that in 2010 
the Pentagon set aside $34 million for the procurement of canines for this purpose 
(Vanden Brook, 2010, p. 1).  As of September 2005, the TSA had developed 345 EDCTs 
for airports but only one for mass transit (HR, 2005, p.1).  In 2005, $22 million was 
appropriated for the NEDCTP but only two million dollars for mass transit (HR, 2005, p. 
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3).  The goal by the end of 2005 was to have three EDCTs for each of 10 mass transit 
agencies selected on the basis of ridership.  The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 strongly 
encouraged the development of EDCTs, and funding authorization was to be appropriated 
to the Secretary as necessary to expand the NEDCTP by up to 200 canines per year by 
the end of FY 2010 (IRCA, 2007).  The act encouraged a variety of methods to expand 
the program including: expanding the national center; partnering with federal, state, and 
local agencies, not for profits, universities, and the private sector; a combination of these 
resources; and the development of national standards.(IRCA, 2007). When the DHS OIG 
reviewed the NEDCTP, it found that mass transit agencies considered the 10 weeks of 
training in Texas to be a burden on their department (OIG, 2008, pp. 31, 32).  Overtime 
for the backfill for the officers sent to the training was also burdensome (OIG, 2008, pp. 
31, 32).  The travel itself was hard on the officers, and start up costs of the program was 
burdensome on the departments (OIG, 2008, pp. 31, 32).  By June of 2008, the number of 
EDCTs for mass transit had grown to 56 EDCTs at only 14 mass transit agencies GAO, 
2008)  Another $3.5 million was allocated for EDCTs for mass transit to add an 
additional 45 EDCTs (GAO, 2008, pp. 10, 20).  The current number of EDCT’s for mass 
transit that are part of the NEDCTP is estimated at between 100 and 120.  Using the 
larger number of 120, this means that if the EDCTs were equally distributed among the 
nation’s 60 largest mass transit agencies, each agency would have only two EDCTs 
distributed among them.   
Three Tier I mass transit agency chiefs who were interviewed reported that they 
had 16 NEDCTs among them, an average of about five per mass transit agency.  Seven 
Tier II mass transit agency chiefs reported having none. This is woefully inadequate for 
mass transit systems that cover vast areas and that operate on a 24 hour a day, seven day 
a week basis. 
Both Tier I and Tier II mass transit agencies recognize the need for EDCTs with 
or without support of the NEDCTP. Separate from the national program, Tier I mass 
transit agencies had procured 14 EDCTs by buying and training canines on their own and 
training them to nationally recognized standards. Tier II mass transit agencies had 
procured and trained eight EDCTs that were not part of the national program.  Six of the 
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EDCTs met national certification standards.  This suggests that mass transit agencies are 
capable of procuring and training EDCTs on their own, and training those to national 
standards if they have the resources to do so.   
Other concerns included a desire to have more control over the breed selected for 
use on mass transit, and with the development of the “homegrown” terrorism threat, 
whether Tier II mass transit agencies were adequately secured. Borrowing EDCTs from 
airport assignments was recognized as no solution to their needs.  An untapped resource 
that could potentially contribute to the solution of this problem is the four DHS 
component agencies that develop EDCTs for their agencies.  Significantly, and consistent 
with the DHS OIG findings, the common thread among Tier II mass transit chiefs was 
their lack of LEOs to send to Texas for training, especially in groups of three as required 
by the NEDCTP.  One chief reported a decline in LEOs at his agency by 15 percent and 
another by 11 percent due to declining economic conditions.  
EDCTs have been described as the “gold standard” for the detection of explosives 
on mass transit (Pearce, 2008, p. 9).  However, the competing requirements from all 
transportation sectors has resulted in significantly less EDCTs for mass transit than is 
required to adequately provide for their terrorism security needs, considering the size and 
scope of the mass transit industry.  Besides the fact that the NEDCTP is not producing 
EDCTs in sufficient numbers to supply mass transit agencies with what they need, the 
program has other administrative obstacles that stand in the way.  The program is 
burdensome on mass transit agencies with the requirement that agencies must send 
officers in teams of three to attend 10 weeks of training in Texas (OIG, 2008, pp. 31, 32).  
Mass transit agencies have difficulty in fulfilling this requirement.  In addition, 
backfilling for the officers is problematic.  Then, when the officers return from training, 
certification of the teams in the local environment by TSA personnel is delayed due to a 
lack of resources to perform the certification.  The 9/11 Commission Act apparently 
recognized the limitations of the NEDCTP and encouraged the TSA to partner with the 
private sector to increase the training capacity for EDCTs.  The options now available to 
Tier I and Tier II mass transit agencies to increase EDCTs are insufficient, and the need 
for both increased EDCTs and increased LEOs is apparent from this data.   
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V. THE SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INPECTION 
PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into 10 sections.  Section A is the Introduction. Section B is 
intended to provide the reader with an explanation of the origins and evolving mission of 
the program; the three principal functions within the program for mass transit; and 
composition of the program.  The requirements placed on the DHS-TSA for the STSIP 
under the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 are 
explained in section C.  Section D describes the DHS OIG’s June 2008 findings on the 
program.  The DHS OIG’s report to the Congress on the program pursuant to the 9/11 
Commission Act, with specific recommendations is described in section E.  Section F is 
interviewing data of chiefs of police of Tier I mass transit agencies.  Policy implications 
attributable to interviews of Tier I chiefs are provided in section G.  Section H is 
interviewing data of chiefs of police of Tier II mass transit agencies. Policy implications 
attributable to interviews of Tier II chiefs are provided in section I. Section J is a chapter 
summary, discussion, and conclusions.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The STSIP finds its origin in the DHS Appropriations Act of 2005 that called for 
the deployment of up to100 federal rail compliance inspectors (OIG, 2009, p. 3).  These 
inspectors have evolved to what are now known as Surface Transportation Security 
Inspectors (TSIs).  In April 2005, the TSIs primary mission was monitoring stakeholders 
compliance with TSA’s May 20, 2004 Security Directives (OIG, 2008, p. 9). The TSA 
ultimately withdrew plans to enforce the directives through compliance inspections 
because stakeholders complained over not being consulted, and considered the directives 
to be overly broad, costly, and in contradiction of the DOT’s safety standards (OIG, 
2008, p. 9).  Since then, in mass transit, the TSA has pursued a strategy that emphasizes 
collaboration with stakeholders on security enhancements rather than compliance  
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inspections (OIG, 2008, p. 9). Presently, in mass transit, TSIs have three principal 
responsibilities, performing base assessments, increasing domain awareness, and 
participating in VIPR operations (OIG, 2009, p. 2).  
Performing base assessments for Security Enhancement (BASE) reviews is the 
TSI’s primary responsibility in mass transit (OIG, 2008, p. 9). In February 2009, the DHS 
OIG’s report entitled Effectiveness of TSA’s Surface Transportation Security Inspectors, 
described the BASE assessment as TSA’s program to assess the security posture of a 
mass transit or passenger rail system against 17 specific security and emergency 
management action items (GAO, 2009b, p. 21).  These action items were developed by 
TSA and FTA and address current security threats and risks that confront transit agencies 
(GAO, 2009b, p. 21). The action items are also a primary source of vulnerability 
information that identify and prioritize gaps in security and emergency preparedness 
programs (GAO, 2009b, p. 21). A BASE assessment is composed of a series of 
interviews with stakeholders using more than 190 security questions (OIG, 2009, p. 5).  
Stakeholder responses are assigned numerical values and, based on these scores; the mass 
transit agency receives an overall score for each of TSA’s six transit security 
fundamentals (OIG, 2009, p. 5).  To validate the responses of stakeholders, TSIs review 
documents, question personnel, and observe security measures within the transit system 
(OIG, 2009, p. 5).  During a BASE review, TSIs often work with the local agency 
security director to create or improve security plans and protocols, and advise 
stakeholders on ways to address vulnerabilities (OIG, 2009, p. 5).   
In June 2009, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued 
a report entitled, Transportation Security, Key Actions Have been Taken to Enhance 
Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Federal 
Strategy and Programs.  The report highlighted the fact that the first round of BASE 
assessments enabled TSA officials to identify the need for increased security training for 
front line employees at mass transit and passenger rail systems (GAO, 2009b, p. 21).  
Another highlight of the BASE assessment process was the identification of best industry 
practices to serve as effective security models for other mass transit systems (OIG, 2009, 
p. 6).  TSA has produced 55 such smart security practices that have been distributed to 
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mass transit systems for their consideration (OIG, 2009, p. 6).  In the future, the TSA 
plans to use BASE assessments to help formulate security regulations, and allocate 
funding for asset-specific security grants (OIG, 2009, p. 6).  The TSA also plans to 
introduce a performance measure for its BASE review program (GAO, 2009b, p. 32).  It 
plans to calculate this measure by comparing the results from the first and second round 
of BASE reviews for the nation’s top 100 largest mass transit and passenger rail systems 
(GAO, 2009b, p. 32).  It also plans to introduce additional outcome performance 
measures in the future, including an overall risk reduction measure tied to the BASE 
program (GAO, 2009b, p. 32). 
In fiscal year 2007, TSIs conducted BASE reviews at 53 mass transit and 
passenger rail systems, including 44 that were ranked in the top 50 in the nation based on 
ridership (GAO, 2009b, p. 38). As of February 2009, TSIs had conducted Base Reviews 
at 91 mass transit and passenger rail agencies, including 82 of the largest agencies (GAO, 
2009b, p. 35).  As of April 2010, TSIs had conducted security assessments at 142 mass 
transit and passenger rail agencies (GAO, 2010b, p. 15). 
Secondly, TSIs increase TSA’s domain awareness by producing station profiles 
and by acting as liaisons between TSA’s Transportation Security Operations Center 
(TSOC) and transportation systems (OIG, 2009, p. 9).  TSIs produce station profiles that 
emergency responders can use to understand the layout of a mass transit station (OIG, 
2009, p. 9).  The detailed profiles include all of the stations physical characteristics and 
security features including photographs, maps, and points of contact (OIG, 2009, p. 9). 
As of April 2010, TSIs had conducted over 1,350 site visits to mass transit and passenger 
rail stations to complete station profiles (GAO, 2010b, p 15). 
The DHS OIG in its February 2009 report characterized the TSI’s role as 
assessors, advisors, and liaisons, primarily in the mass transit and freight rail modes 
(OIG, 2009b, p. 1).  TSIs also contribute to TSA’s knowledge of bus and rail systems by 
responding to security incidents. TSIs act as liaisons between the TSOC and the mass 




information to TSA headquarters personnel in response to a security incident or other 
emergency (OIG, 2009b, p. 3).  They are available at any hour of the day for response to 
an incident (OIG, 2009b, pp. 2, 9).  
In their liaison capacity, TSIs maintain relationships with more than 2,000 
stakeholders around the nation, including mass transit agencies, freight rail operators, 
local law enforcement, and others (OIG, 2009b, p. 9).  TSIs act as regional liaisons to 
transit system managers and security directors, and they can discuss stakeholder’s use of 
grant funds (OIG, 2009, p. 2).  TSIs conduct thousands of hours of stakeholder outreach 
each year in personal meetings with mass transit officials (OIG, 2008, p. 16). They attend 
stakeholder conferences and events (OIG, 2008, p. 16).  Maintaining good relationships 
with mass transit personnel is an essential part of a TSIs job, and many stakeholders view 
their local TSI as the face of the TSA (OIG, 2008, p. 16).   
Third, TSIs participate in VIPR team operations, which provide an unannounced, 
high-visibility presence in a mass transit or passenger rail environment (OIG, 2009b, p. 
2).  VIPR teams may consist of Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), Behavior 
Detection Officers (BDOs), Federal Air Marshals (FAMs), Explosive Detection Canine 
Teams (EDCTs), Transit Police Officers (TP), and TSIs.  Some VIPR operations are 
coordinated with the local stakeholder by the TSI’s supervisor, the AFSD for Surface 
Transportation (OIG, 2009, p.10).  
DHS’ Inspector General (IG) characterized a TSI as a patroller who monitors 
suspicious activity and whose presence may deter terrorist activity during a VIPR 
operation (OIG, 2009, p. 10).  TSIs add value to VIPR operations but less than other 
participants (OIG, 2009, p. 10).  TSIs have less behavioral detection training than 
Behavior Detection Officers. Unlike FAMS and Transit Police, the TSIs have no law 
enforcement authority.  Moreover, unlike Transportation Security Officers or EDCTs, 
TSIs have no training in passenger screening and are unable to detect explosives (OIG, 
2009, p. 10).  However, TSIs may be more familiar with a transit system than many 




unpredictable presence in a mass transit environment (OIG, 2009, p. 10).  Some TSIs also 
informally educate other VIPR participants about the surface mode or the individual 
transit system (OIG, 2009, p. 10). 
The use of TSIs to support VIPR operations is a controversial subject.  The VIPR 
program Concept of Operations states that VIPR operations should involve passenger 
screening, inspections, and law enforcement in coordinated activities; however, the TSI’s 
role is limited to planning, educating, and patrolling, and the TSIs feel underutilized 
during VIPR operations (OIG, 2009, p. 11).  The IG noted that some transit agencies 
have specific agreements with the TSA on how VIPR exercises will be carried out, and 
other transit agencies have yet to even approve VIPR operations on their systems (OIG, 
2009, p. 11). 
TSA policymakers strongly support the potential role of TSIs in VIPR operations.  
In May 2008, TSA began hiring 75 new TSIs.  This would enable the TSA to increase 
TSI participation in VIPR teams from two percent to 25 percent (OIG, 2009, p. 11).  The 
OIG noted that as of February 2009, the TSA was only conducting 15 VIPR operations a 
month, totaling about 120 hours of monthly VIPR activity.  Hence, there was not enough 
VIPR activity to dedicate 25 percent of 175 TSIs to these operations (OIG, 2009, p. 11).  
From its inception in FY 2005 through FY 2007, the TSA was authorized 100 
full-time TSIs (GAO, 2009b, p. 54).  In June 2008, the TSA reported a staffing level of 
93 TSI positions (GAO, 2009b, p. 54).  The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 authorized the 
TSA to increase the number of TSIs to a maximum of 200 full time positions through FY 
2011 (GAO, 2009b, p. 54).  Based on that authorization, the TSA has more than doubled 
the size of the STSIP to 201 inspectors as of April 2010 (GAO, 2010a, p. 15). The actual 
numbers of TSI’s that are needed for the TSA to carry out its mission in this program is 
unknown (GAO, 2010a, p. 15).  In June 2009, GAO reported that the TSA had no plan 
for the STSIP that explained the optimal workforce size to address its current and future 
program needs GAO, 2009b, p. 55).  By March 2010, the TSA did not have a firm date 
for the completion of the plan (GAO, 2010a, p. 15).  
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TSIs are assigned to field offices.  In April 2008, TSA announced plans to expand 
the number of STSIP field offices nationwide, from 22 to 54 (GAO, 2009b, p. 56).  
Under a new reporting structure the TSA planned to place 31 of 32 new field offices 
under the command of Federal Security Directors (FSD) and Assistant Federal Security 
Directors (AFSD) for Inspections (GAO, 2009b, p. 56).  As of February 2009, TSIs were 
still organized into 11 primary offices and 10 satellite offices in cities with large mass 
transit systems or heavy freight rail traffic.  Primary field offices included Boston, New 
York, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., Jacksonville, Houston, Chicago, Cleveland, 
Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.  Secondary field offices included Anchorage, 
Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Charlotte, Atlanta, Miami, St. Louis, Salt Lake City, and Phoenix, 
and Minneapolis (OIG, 2008, pp. 11, 12).   
The plan for the utilization of the TSIs time was reported in TSA’s FY 2009 
Regulatory Activities Plan (GAO, 2009b, p. 54).  The plan requires TSIs to split their 
time between mass transit and passenger rail and freight, with a minimum of about 40 
percent to mass transit and passenger rail and 60 percent of their time dedicated to freight 
(GAO, 2009b, p. 54). 
C. IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 
COMMISSION ACT OF 2007 
Public Law 110-53-August 3, 2007, also known as Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, states that TSI’s should be used 
to assist surface transportation carriers, operators, entities, and facilities to enhance their 
security against terrorist attacks and other security threats, and to assist the Secretary in 
enforcing applicable surface transportation security regulations and directives (IRCA. 
2007)  
These requirements included requiring TSIs to have the relevant transportation 
experience and other security and inspection qualifications and to conduct compliance 
inspections and enforce applicable security regulations and directives (OIG, 2008, p. 7).  
The security standards and mission must be consistent with agreements between the DHS 
and DOT (OIG, 2008, pp. 7, 8).  The TSA must consult with surface transportation 
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entities on TSIs’ duties, responsibilities, authorities, and mission (OIG, 2008, pp. 7, 8). 
The act also requires consultation on strategies to improve transportation security and 
ensure compliance with security requirements (OIG, 2008, pp. 7, 8). The act prohibits 
DHS from issuing fines to mass transit agencies unless the agency is in violation, and the 
DHS has sought corrective action through written notice, and the agency does not take 
corrective action or propose an acceptable alternative means of compliance within a 
reasonable amount of time (OIG, 2008, pp. 7, 8).  The act also required the DHS 
Secretary to ensure that the TSI’s mission is consistent with any relevant risk assessments 
required by this act (OIG, 2008, pp. 7, 8). 
The act also directed that no later than September 30, 2008, the DHS OIG shall 
transmit a report to the appropriate Congressional committees on the performance and 
effectiveness of surface transportation security inspectors, whether there is a need for 
additional inspectors; and other recommendations (OIG, 2009, p. 26). 
D. DHS’ JUNE 2008 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL’S (OIG) 
FINDINGS ON THE STSIP 
Prior to responding specifically to the reporting requirements of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007, the DHS OIG reviewed TSA’s STSIP and made three findings 
on the program (below). In June 2008, the OIG issued its report on the subject, entitled 
TSA’s Administration and Coordination of Mass Transit Security Programs.   
First, the OIG found that the STSIP mission needs clarification (OIG, 2008, p. 8).  
TSIs are hindered in carrying out their mission for providing formal oversight of mass 
transit agencies because comprehensive security regulations do not exist for mass transit.  
A compliance element would strengthen the TSIs’ BASE assessments (OIG, 2008, p. 9).  
The OIG reported that mass transit agencies questioned the usefulness of BASE 
assessments because their transit systems had insufficient resources to address the 
identified vulnerabilities (OIG, 2008, pp. 9, 10).  Stakeholders also said they were 
uncertain how the TSIs were using the information they were gathering (OIG, 2008, pp. 
9, 10).  Furthermore, unless the assessments were tied to grant funding to address the 
vulnerabilities that BASE assessments identified, then they had limited value (OIG, 2008, 
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p. 10).  TSIs reported to the IG that mass transit agencies’ governing boards are not 
motivated to institute changes to increase security without compliance standards and TSIs 
need the authority to issue citations (OIG, 2008, pp. 9, 10). 
The IG opined that the best option for an effective oversight program is a 
consultative process to develop compliance standards (OIG, 2008, p. 10).  Grant funding 
based upon assessments would provide an incentive to improve security, but compliance 
regulations to go along with the BASE assessments are also necessary (OIG, 2008, p. 11).  
The IG recommended that specific, feasible security standards be developed for mass 
transit systems; that applicable BASE assessments be incorporated into the process; and 
that the TSA consult with DOT; and relevant transit associations like the American 
Public Transportation Association, in the development of the standards (OIG, 2008, pp. 
10, 11, 18). The TSA did not concur with the recommendation and said that it already 
consults with the DOT other federal security partners and the mass transit and passenger 
rail communities in the standards development process (OIG, 2008, p. 20).  The IG 
disagreed that voluntary compliance with security best practices is the same as mandatory 
compliance with security standards and regulation (OIG, 2008 pp. 20–21).  The IG noted 
that the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires compliance inspections and enforcement 
of security regulations and directives and the TSA has not promulgated the regulations 
(OIG, 2008, pp. 20–21).  
Second, the OIG found that the STSIP command structure inhibits TSI 
effectiveness (OIG, 2008, p. 11).  TSI s priorities are set by entities not in their chain of 
command (OIG, 2008, p. 11). They respond to taskings from multiple FSDs, and multiple 
TSA HQ components with divergent objectives (OIG, 2008, p. 11).  TSIs are pulled in 
multiple directions and have difficulty completing long-term objectives in mass transit 
(OIG, 2008, p. 11).  The TSA is not benefitting from, or building on the knowledge and 
expertise of the TSIs (OIG, 2008, p. 11).  TSIs complained to the IG those FSDs had 
moved aviation inspectors with no rail experience into TSI positions and that others were 
hired that did not have sufficient relevant surface transportation experience for the job 
(OIG, 2008, p. 14).  The IG took note of the fact that the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
required that TSIs have relevant transportation experience (OIG, 2008, p. 11).  The IG 
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recommended moving the STSIP away from the FSDs to TSA HQ for supervision for 
improved management, as it was prior to December 2006 (OIG, 2008, pp. 11, 14, 17). 
The TSA disagreed with the recommendation and indicated it would strengthen and 
clarify reporting lines and oversight responsibilities (OIG, 2008, pp. 18–19). The IG in 
turn disagreed with TSA policy makers and maintained that the TSIs should be placed 
under direct headquarters supervision (OIG, 2008, pp. 18–19). 
Third, the OIG found that the TSA needs to coordinate its communication efforts 
(OIG, 2008, p. 15).  Even though TSA policy makers and TSIs conduct substantial 
outreach with mass transit agencies, TSIs were not provided with enough information 
from TSA policymakers for TSIs to be viewed by the stakeholders as a viable 
communications link to TSA headquarters (OIG, 2008, p. 15). The lack of coordination 
between policymakers at TSA headquarters and TSIs in the field has affected the flow of 
information to and from stakeholders (OIG, 2008, p. 16). TSIs agreed and indicated that 
this situation limited their credibility with stakeholders (OIG, 2008, p. 16). The IG 
recommended that policymakers at the TSA headquarters level provide the TSIs with 
information and updates on relevant security programs; that TSIs be invited to local 
meetings with stakeholders; and TSI BASE assessments and station profiles are made 
available to the appropriate personnel at TSA headquarters in order to improve 
communications flow (OIG, 2008, pp. 15–17).  The TSA’s policymakers concurred in 
part with the recommendation and advised that BASE assessments and station profiles 
are provided to appropriate personnel and that dissemination after that is on a need to 
know basis (OIG, 2008, p.19). The IG asked for more proof that the personnel with a 
need to know actually have access to the information (OIG, 2008, pp. 19, 20). 
The OIG noted that TSIs participating in VIPR operations are unarmed and run 
the risk of becoming a target if mistaken for federal law enforcement officers (OIG, 2008, 
p. 28).  TSA screeners and behavioral detection officers deployed on VIPR teams face the 
same risk (OIG, 2008, p. 28).  TSIs considered their participation in VIPR operations to 
be unproductive and one of the least effective uses of their time (OIG, 2008, p. 29).  
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E. DHS’ OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL’S (OIG) FEBRUARY 2009 
REPORT PURSUANT TO THE 9/11 COMMISSION ACT 
In February 2009, the DHS OIG, pursuant to its responsibilities under the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, issued a report 
entitled Effectiveness of TSA’s Surface Transportation Security Inspectors.   The OIG 
reported that, generally, the TSA is improving security in the mass transit mode through 
the inspection program (OIG, 2009, p. 1).  Security gaps are identified through the BASE 
Assessments (OIG, 2009, pp. 1, 5). TSIs increase TSA’s domain awareness by producing 
station profiles and by acting as liaisons between the Transportation Security Operations 
Center and mass transit systems (OIG, 2009, pp. 1, 9).  TSIs also participate in VIPR 
operations, which provide an unannounced, high-visibility presence in the mass transit or 
passenger rail environment (OIG, 2009, pp. 1, 10).  However, challenges in improving 
effectiveness of the TSIs remain (OIG, 2009, p. 1).  The report concluded generally, that 
the STSIP appears understaffed for the long term and an aviation focused command 
structure has reduced the quality and morale of the workforce (OIG, 2009, p. 1). The OIG 
made the following specific recommendations. 
First, the OIG recommended that the TSA administrator assess how VIPR 
operations can better use TSI resources and initiatives, then develop and execute a plan to 
conduct VIPR operations that integrate TSI activities (OIG, 2009, p. 12).  The TSA 
partially concurred with the IG’s recommendation (OIG, 2009, p. 12).  TSA 
policymakers agreed that the TSIs and their unique expertise should be integrated into 
VIPR planning and deployment and they addressed the potential of the TSIs in the VIPR 
Team Capabilities and Operational Deployment Guide (OIG, 2009, p. 12).  The TSA did 
not agree that TSIs’ comprehensive inspection activities, such as the BASE assessment, 
should be integrated into VIPR operations.  It was concerned that doing so would 
fundamentally alter the nature and meaning of VIPR operations (OIG, 2009, pp. 12–13). 
OIG agreed with the TSA that integrating regulatory inspections would alter the 
nature and meaning of VIPR operations (OIG, 2009, p. 31).  Furthermore, the IG 
acknowledged the potential conflicting purposes of conducting an operation while 
simultaneously performing a BASE assessment or compliance inspection, if regulations 
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are enacted (OIG, 2009, p. 13). The IG indicated that TSIs are well positioned to carry 
out station profiles and physical verification during a VIPR operation; however, the OIG 
opined that the TSA will be challenged to increase integration of TSIs in VIPR operations 
(OIG, 2009, p. 13).  Beyond advanced planning and passive operation, the OIG was 
unclear on what extent TSA was willing to have TSIs support VIPR operations (OIG, 
2009, p. 13). The OIG urged the TSA to continue to look critically at how TSI’s fit within 
the VIPR mission (OIG, 2009, pp. 12–13). 
Second, the OIG recommended that the TSA administrator examine how many 
TSIs are needed to perform necessary functions by assessing current and anticipated 
future duties.  The TSI workforce should then be expanded to ensure each field office is 
sufficiently staffed (OIG, 2009, p. 16). The OIG noted that in its June 2008 report, TSA’s 
Administration and Coordination of Mass Transit Security Programs that it had 
recommended that the TSIs play a greater role in TSA’s grant programs (OIG, 2009, p. 
13).  The OIG clarified its vision on how the TSIs would be used to support the grant 
program by noting that TSIs develop considerable asset-specific information through 
routine assessments and consultation with surface stakeholders (OIG, 2009, p. 15).  TSIs 
can physically verify the use of grant funds through direct observation, and TSI 
assessments can provide transparent substantiation for funding decisions (OIG, 2009, 
pp.13, 15). 
TSA has not determined how many inspectors it needs for its future duties, 
although it requested 102 inspectors for FY 2010 (OIG, 2009, p. 14).  The force is small 
in comparison to other federal agencies with inspectors (OIG, 2009, p. 14).  The DOT 
employs 1,350 inspectors to perform safety inspections for the freight rail, pipeline, and 
highway modes (OIG, 2009, p. 14).  The USCG employs approximately 1,000 inspectors 
to perform safety and security inspections in the maritime mode (OIG, 2009, p. 14).  In 
contrast, the TSIs numbered approximately 175 as of the date of the OIG report (OIG, 
2009, p. 14). 
Pending TSA rail regulations will require enforcement by TSIs (OIG, 2009, p. 
14).  The regulations will require rail entities to designate a security coordinator, report 
significant security incidents to TSA, and provide a secure chain of custody for hazardous 
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materials incidents for freight rail (OIG, 2009, p. 14).  The TSA indicated that it was 
waiting for the regulations to be published before assessing its TSI resource needs (OIG, 
2009, p. 14).  The TSA also has plans to assign responsibilities to the TSIs in the 
pipeline, highway, and motor carrier modes (OIG, 2009, pp. 14, 15).  The IG noted that 
the STSIP needs additional TSIs at most field offices (OIG, 2009, p. 16).  Of the 54 field 
offices, 30 had only two TSIs and 4 field offices had one (OIG, 2009, p. 16).  On most 
assignments the TSIs are engaged in, two TSIs are required to work together for safety 
and accuracy reasons (OIG, 2009, p. 16).  When leave and training time are taken into 
consideration, there are large gaps in TSI resources (OIG, 2009, p. 16). 
The TSA concurred with the IG’s recommendation (OIG, 2009, p. 17). They 
indicated that they were addressing the need to maintain 2 TSIs per field office by using a 
TSI from another field office to fill in, or by borrowing cross trained Inspectors from the 
aviation and cargo modes to assist the TSIs (OIG, 2009, p. 17).  The IG took note of the 
fact that it had been informed by the TSIs supervisors, AFSDs-surface that aviation and 
cargo inspectors are incapable of performing most surface TSI duties, and that it would 
be unsafe to use them for this assignment (OIG, 2009, p. 17).  The IG further noted that 
FSDs have exacerbated the problem by hiring surface TSIs without mass transit or freight 
rail experience (OIG, 2009, p. 17). 
Third, the OIG recommended that the TSA administrator eliminate practices that 
undermine efforts to establish a more transparent chain of command (OIG, 2009, pp. 18, 
23). The STSIP office should also direct new policies and procedures to FSDs to require 
them to solicit comments from AFSDs-surface prior to hiring surface inspectors (OIG, 
2009, p. 23). Specifically, the OIG reported that the STSIP command structure inhibits 
program effectiveness (OIG, 2009, p. 18).  In December 2006, TSI’s were moved from 
reporting directly to surface transportation-focused supervisors to aviation-focused 
supervisors (OIG, 2009, p. 18). Consequently, TSIs have been hired without appropriate 
surface experience and TSIs have been tasked with non-surface related tasks (OIG, 2009, 
p. 18).  The OIG reported that FSDs, who are TSIs superiors in the field, are aviation 
oriented; the surface mode is a second-tier priority for them; and they generally lack a 
surface transportation background (OIG, 2009, p. 20).  FSDs have hired people who do 
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not have enough surface experience for TSI positions (OIG, 2009, p. 21). Between 
December 2006 and February 2009, FSDs had hired 18 TSIs (OIG, 2009, p. 21). Of the 
non entry-level positions, 69 percent were filled with individuals with no rail or mass 
transit experience (OIG, 2009, p. 21).  Those who lacked the relevant experience 
included a TSI who was aviation trained, security instructors, security officers 
(screeners), and a hazmat truck driver (OIG, 2009, p. 21).  FSD’s have also tasked TSIs 
with non-surface related tasks, often at airports, such as handing out plastic bags at the 
security checkpoints, or monitoring the checkpoint exit lane during periods when there 
was no exigency like a heightened security threat (OIG, 2009, pp. 22, 23). 
The TSA policymakers disagreed with the IG and stated that the TSA had chosen 
its present command structure because FSDs are best suited to interact with the local law 
enforcement community and local mass transit agencies (OIG, 2009, p. 24).  The TSA 
policy makers also believe TSI communication and reporting lines are clear (OIG, 2009, 
p. 24).  The IG noted that consistent with its finding in June 2008, TSIs should be placed 
under direct headquarters supervision, and again tried to convince TSA management of 
the need to do so without success (OIG, 2009, p. 25).  Consequently, the IG withdrew its 
original recommendation to place the TSIs under headquarters command, in lieu of its 
present recommendation, to eliminate practices that undermine efforts to establish a more 
transparent chain of command (OIG, 2009, p. 25). 
F. INTERVIEWS OF CHIEFS OF POLICE FROM TIER I MASS TRANSIT 
AGENCIES  
In order to conceptualize the issues associated with this program, Chiefs of Police 
from Tier I and Tier II mass transit agencies were interviewed for their first hand subject 
matter knowledge.  These security professionals provided information and expert opinion 
that expanded upon what was available from open source materials. The interviews 
provided context to the U.S. government reports and open source data and helped to 
shape the policy options presented in a later section of the thesis.  
The three Chiefs of Police of Tier I transit agencies were asked the following 
questions during their interviews: 
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Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s Surface 
Transportation Security Inspection Program (STSIP) to your agency’s 
Security efforts.  What is good about the program, and how can it be 
improved? What recommendations can you make to Tier II mass transit 
agencies concerning this program? Follow up questions were asked as 
appropriate for clarification and/or expansion of the Chief’s response.  
Responses were grouped into five broad categories:  Application of the 
program to their own agencies; Positive aspects of the program; 
Recommendations for Tier II agencies; Program criticisms; and 
Recommendations for overall program improvement. 
First, on the broad question of how the agency applies the STSIP to its own 
security efforts, the Tier I Chiefs of Police all reported using the TSIs to conduct BASE 
reviews at their mass transit agencies.  The BASE reviews were coupled with threat and 
vulnerability studies.  The results enabled the mass transit agencies to identify security 
gaps.  When the security gaps could not be addressed by agency funds alone, the results 
of the BASE reviews were used as justification for security grant proposals.  
Concerning VIPR operations however, only one of three Tier I mass transit chiefs 
reported using the TSIs to support VIPR operations.  In that one agency, the TSIs 
coordinated their activities with the Transit Police.  The TSIs participated in the VIPR 
operations as non-law enforcement observers in civilian clothing.  Regarding the positive 
aspects of the program, the Tier I chiefs were unanimous in their praise for TSIs for their 
performance in conducting BASE reviews.  The TSIs were credited with being 
cooperative with mass transit agencies and explaining the process clearly.  The BASE 
reviews assisted the mass transit agency in meeting DOT-FTA safety and security 
requirements.  The BASE review was also used by one Chief to report back to the 
executive management of the mass transit agency on security deficiencies.  In the one 
Tier I mass transit agency where the TSIs participated in VIPR operations, the TSIs 
coordinated their activities with the transit Police department closely.   
The only specific recommendation for Tier II mass transit agencies was that 
training should be provided for the TSIs on the mass transit agency’s system to help 
insure the TSIs’ safety.  
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Several criticisms of the program were made.  The duties of the TSIs were 
considered overly broad, encompassing air, mass transit, and ports.  TSIs are 
understaffed, with a vague mission, and have too “many balls in the air to be effective.”  
The STSIP was never given a clear direction or a mission.  The TSIs’ overall mission is 
not understood, except for the BASE review.  One chief does not see a role at his agency 
for TSIs at this time beyond the BASE reviews.  The TSIs were created with the idea of 
performing a regulatory function, which did not happen.  The chief views the STSIP as 
having two problems, mission and authority.  The chief does not see clear authority in the 
legislation for the TSIs.  The chief cooperates with TSIs but does not allow them on his 
agency’s property without permission.   
The Tier I chiefs had several observations and recommendations for improvement 
in the STSIP.  One chief advised that because the TSI role is not well defined; he “frankly 
does not know what they do.”  The STSIP needs a clear mission and scope of work.  
Having TSIs report to FSDs instead of the TSA’s Mass Transit Division contributes to 
the problem.  One chief is unable to convince his Board that passenger screening is a 
good idea for improving security and thinks that the TSA could do a better job of 
outreach concerning security priorities with transit agency executives and members of the 
governing boards.  Mass transit is one of the most desirable of targets for terrorists and a 
balance needs to be struck between public sensitivities toward passenger screening and 
their security from terrorism.  The TSA has a role in communicating this message and 
influencing the leadership of mass transit agencies.  
G. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO INTERVIEWS OF TIER 
I CHIEFS OF POLICE 
1. Implications for STSIP Effectiveness for Tier I 
Policy implications associated with the overall effectiveness of the STSIP for Tier 
I agencies are evident from the interview data. All Tier I chiefs reported using TSIs to 
conduct BASE reviews, which were combined with vulnerability studies.  The results 
identified security gaps, and BASE reviews were used to justify security grants to fill 
those security gaps. However, the data calls into question the effectiveness of other 
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elements of the STSIP, specifically in relation to TSIs’ participation in VIPR operations.  
Noteworthy was that TSIs were used to support VIPR operations at only one Tier I mass 
transit agency. One Tier I chief questioned the TSIs’ authority to perform their operations 
in the local setting. Other concerns also contribute toward diminished effectiveness such 
as the overly broad mission of the TSIs.  One Tier I chief acknowledged that he did not 
know what TSIs do.   
2. Implications for TSGP 
If TSIs are not being utilized to their full capacity to support VIPR operations, 
perhaps they can be used more effectively to assist in conducting vulnerability 
assessments that are comparable across regions and mass transit agencies thereby 
strengthening the Risk methodology the TSA uses to allocate TSGP funding.  Likewise, 
perhaps TSIs can be trained to assist in developing threat data that can also be used to 
better inform the TSA risk formula.  Chiefs were praiseworthy of the TSIs in this regard 
and the BASE reviews were coupled with threat and vulnerability studies. 
H. INTERVIEWS OF CHIEFS OF POLICE FROM TIER II MASS TRANSIT 
AGENCIES 
Of the seven Chiefs of Police of Tier II transit agencies who were interviewed, all 
were asked the following question: 
Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s Surface 
Transportation Security Inspection Program (STSIP) to your agency’s 
Security efforts.  What is good about the program, and how can it be 
improved?  Follow up questions were asked as appropriate for clarification 
and/or expansion of the Chief’s response.  Responses were grouped into 
five broad categories: Application of the program to their own agencies; 
Positive aspects of the program; Program criticisms; and 
Recommendations for overall program improvement. 
First, on the broad question of how the agency applies the program to its own 
security efforts, six of the seven Chiefs of Police of Tier II transit agencies reported that 
their agencies participated in BASE reviews conducted by TSIs.  Concerning VIPR 
operations, six of seven chiefs reported that TSIs participated in VIPR operations.  The 
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seventh chief advised that he is uncertain if TSIs participated in VIPR operations because 
he interacts with so many TSA representatives with different job titles he is uncertain 
which TSA employees were involved.  One chief reported that TSIs have been invited to 
and have participated in drills and exercises with his mass transit agency.   
Concerning the positive aspects of the program, the TSIs have been generally well 
regarded and the BASE reviews have contributed to improved security.  One chief 
reported that he was in communication with a STSIP supervisor several times a week.  
The TSIs’ supervisor accompanies the TSIs in their duties often, but not always, because 
the supervisor is sometimes in travel status.  The TSIs have performed the BASE 
assessments for his agency twice and have shared the results with the chief.  The TSIs 
have reviewed the progress on construction projects and provided security feedback.  The 
TSIs have performed unannounced inspections of rail stations and reported the results of 
their inspections back to the chief for appropriate follow up action.  The TSIs have 
enjoyed notable success by identifying at least two instances of possible terrorist 
planning.  These and other suspicious matters have been referred to the local Joint 
Terrorism Task Force.  The TSIs have reinforced security issues that his department was 
already aware of.  Even though the transit agency’s executive management does not 
always accept recommendations from his own department, they seem be more interested 
in listening to security recommendations from an independent outside source like the 
TSA.  One agency’s BASE review results have improved from 2006 until 2010, and the 
TSIs have been effective in driving the mass transit agency to make security 
improvements.    
Several criticisms of the STSIP were made.  A chief advised that he has never 
seen the results of any of the BASE reviews conducted for his mass transit agency.  Some 
TSIs come from a railroad safety background and not a security background and, 
therefore, do not understand that a written procedure cannot exist for every eventuality in 
security the way that written procedures exist for safety requirements.  The TSIs now 
answer to an AFSD rather than the TSA’s Mass Transit Division.  The AFSD has worked 
diligently to smooth out relations between the TSIs and the transit agency, which initially 
had a rocky start.  The chief was not pleased with the BASE review process.  The chief 
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thought that the BASE review process was inadequately explained to him, and the TSIs 
were not true to their word on how the reviews were to be conducted.   TSIs were also 
overbearing in relation to VIPR operations, demanding access to security cameras, 
without prior discussion, and demanding information about security sensitive areas of the 
agency without adequate explanation. 
Concerns particular to VIPR operations included the fact that TSIs are not law 
enforcement officers participating in what is considered a law enforcement mission.  TSIs 
typically have not had law enforcement backgrounds, and the TSIs’ level of security 
training is questionable.  One chief noted that the TSIs do not report to their superiors 
through the Federal Air Marshals, often do not bring supervisors with them on VIPR 
operations, and, therefore, lack effective command and control.  Another concern raised 
was the TSIs’ lack of communications capability.  A chief noted that he has been unable 
to provide TSIs with police radios used by his department because they are restricted to 
law enforcement use.  The chief characterized the TSIs as in essence unarmed security 
officers without direct supervision, and he is concerned that his department has become 
responsible for their safety and security. 
Another chief expressed concerns over a lack of coordination between TSIs and 
the law enforcement side of the TSA.  The two do not coordinate well and have 
attempted to schedule VIPR operations independently of one another.  It has been 
difficult to get them to communicate with each other.  The chief would like to see better 
coordination, and combining of forces for greater efficiency.  The chief also expressed 
concerns that TSIs have not been law enforcement officers and have not had law 
enforcement training or been empowered with arrest authority.  TSIs lack the sixth sense 
that law enforcement officers develop for recognizing problems and threats.  On the 
positive side, the TSIs provide an extra set of eyes. 
Another chief was not particularly concerned that the TSIs are not law 
enforcement officers, and had no radio communications.  He did express concern 




an incident involving an explosive or a shooting because of their lack of law enforcement 
backgrounds and training.  The chief expressed a desire for a higher confidence level in 
the TSIs’ training. 
The Tier II Chiefs had recommendations for improvement of the program.  Their 
top concern was the TSIs’ lack of law enforcement background and training and the need 
for such a background.  One chief suggested that TSIs be removed from VIPR operations 
since they add so little to the mission, in contrast to the other participants.  It was further 
suggested that, if TSIs are involved in VIPR operations; they hold the status of sworn law 
enforcement officers.  At minimum, TSIs should be required to have a security 
background, in order to engender confidence in their findings and make 
recommendations during BASE reviews.  Communications capabilities of TSIs need to 
be improved, and TSA needs to clear up the confusion over who is participating in the 
VIPR operations. 
As far as specific recommendations on the BASE review process, TSA and FTA 
requirements need to be better coordinated.  Since mass transit agencies with rail service 
already answer to state oversight agencies, they cannot be expected to “serve two 
masters.”  There should be better coordination between state safety oversight and the 
TSIs. Further, there needs to be only one national standard for the security plan.  TSIs 
should present findings on BASE reviews formally and in person to mass transit 
executive management personnel.  Presentations should be made to executive 
management the way APTA peer review briefings are provided.  Executive management 
of mass transit agencies should hear about security concerns directly from the TSA since 
it will have a greater impact than hearing about concerns second hand.  
I. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO INTERVIEWS OF TIER 
II CHIEFS OF POLICE 
1. Implications for STSIP Effectiveness for Tier II 
Policy implications associated with the overall effectiveness of the STSIP for Tier 
II agencies are evident from the interview data. Most Tier II chiefs reported using TSIs at 
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their mass transit agencies to conduct BASE reviews, and at one agency the TSIs 
participate in drills and exercises.  TSIs were generally but not uniformly well regarded 
by Tier II chiefs in regard to BASE reviews. TSIs have been effective in driving the mass 
transit agencies to make security improvements. Administratively, the process could be 
improved with better coordination between the TSA and FTA over safety and security 
requirements, and TSIs could do a better job of communicating the results of their 
reviews to transit agencies’ executive management.     
However, as with Tier I mass transit agencies, the data calls into question the 
effectiveness of other elements of the STSIP, specifically in relation to TSIs’ 
participation in VIPR operations.  The concerns included the TSI’s lack of law 
enforcement status, training, lack of command and control, and communications 
capabilities. If TSIs are not qualified to participate in VIPR operations, it raises the 
question of how TSIs could be better utilized.  
2. Implications for TSGP 
If TSI’s are not being utilized to their full capacity to support VIPR operations, 
perhaps they can be used more effectively to assist in conducting vulnerability 
assessments that are comparable across regions and mass transit agencies, thereby 
strengthening the Risk methodology the TSA uses to allocate TSGP funding.  Likewise, 
perhaps TSIs can be trained to assist in developing threat data that can also be used to 
better inform the TSA risk formula. 
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The STSIP originated in the 2005 DHS Appropriations Act, which called for the 
deployment of up to100 federal rail compliance inspectors; positions that evolved into 
Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs.) (OIG, 2009, p. 3)  The TSI’s mission 
evolved from one of compliance inspection to collaboration with stakeholders on security 
enhancements (OIG, 2008, p. 9).  TSIs have three principal responsibilities; performing 
base assessments; increasing domain awareness; and participating in VIPR operations 
(OIG, 2009, p. 2).  
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Performing base assessments for security enhancement (BASE) reviews is the 
TSI’s primary responsibility in mass transit (OIG, 2008, p. 9) and involves assessing the 
security posture of a mass transit or passenger rail system against 17 specific security and 
emergency management action items developed by TSA and FTA (GAO, 2009b, p. 21). 
Action items are a primary source of vulnerability information, which identify and 
prioritize gaps in security and emergency preparedness programs (GAO, 2009b, p. 21).  
TSIs increase domain awareness by producing station profiles and by acting as liaisons 
between the TSA’s TSOC and transportation systems, particularly during security 
incidents (OIG, 2009, p. 21).  TSIs maintain liaisons with more than 2000 stakeholders 
around the nation, discussing the use of grant funds, and conducting outreach at meetings 
with mass transit officials (OIG, 2009, p. 9). TSIs also participate in VIPR operations that 
provide an unannounced, high visibility presence in mass transit (OIG, 2009, p. 2).  The 
DHS IG characterized the TSI as a patroller who monitors suspicious activity and whose 
presence may deter terrorist activity during a VIPR operation (OIG, 2009, p. 10).  The IG 
further noted that the TSIs add value to the VIPR operation, but less than other 
participants (OIG, 2009, p. 10).  TSIs reported feeling underutilized during VIPR 
operations (OIG, 2009, p. 11).  TSA policy makers strongly support the role of TSIs in 
VIPR operations.  There are approximately 200 TSIs nationwide (GAO, 2009b, p. 54.) 
however, the TSA has not said how many positions are necessary for the TSA to carry 
out its mission in this program (GAO, 2010b, p. 15).  TSIs split their time between mass 
transit, passenger rail and freight rail, with a minimum of about 40 percent to mass transit 
and passenger rail and 60 percent of their time dedicated to freight rail (GAO, 2009b, 
p. 54).   
The DHS OIG reviewed the STSIP and found the program mission in need of 
clarification (OIG, 2008, p. 8). The OIG recommended that specific, feasible security 
standards be developed for mass transit systems; that applicable BASE assessments be 
incorporated into the process; and that the TSA consult with DOT and other relevant 
associations like APTA on the development of standards (OIG, 2008, pp. 10, 11, 18)  The 
IG noted that the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires compliance inspections and 
enforcement of security regulations and directives (OIG, 2008, pp. 20, 21)..  The IG also 
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found that the STSIP command structure inhibits effectiveness, and communications in 
need of improvement, which includes stakeholders who are confused on a number of 
TSA programs and guidelines (OIG, 2008, p 18).  The IG took note that TSIs 
participating in VIPR operations are unarmed and run the risk of becoming a target if 
mistaken for federal law enforcement officers (OIG, 2008, p. 28), and that TSIs 
considered their participation in VIPR operations to be unproductive and one of the least 
effective uses of their time (OIG, 2008, p. 29).   
In February 2009, the DHS OIG reviewed the STSIP pursuant to requirements of 
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The IG found continued confusion and disagreement 
over the role of TSIs in VIPR operations (OIG, 2009, p. 12), and that the TSA had yet to 
determine the appropriate staffing level for the TSI position (OIG, 2009, p. 14).  The IG 
noted that the TSI position was significantly understaffed when compared to similar 
inspector positions with other federal agencies (OIG, 2009, p. 14).  For example, the 
DOT employed 1,350 inspectors to perform safety inspections for the freight rail, 
pipeline and highway modes (OIG, 2009, p. 14).  In contrast, the TSA had only 175 TSIs 
under employment at the time of the review (OIG, 2009, p. 14).   
All Tier I chiefs reported using TSIs to conduct BASE reviews, and most Tier II 
chiefs reported using TSIs at their mass transit agencies to conduct BASE reviews.  Tier I 
and Tier II chiefs were generally praiseworthy of TSIs in regard to BASE reviews, but 
there were some continuing coordination problems.  BASE reviews were coupled with 
threat and vulnerability studies.  The results identified security gaps, and BASE reviews 
were used to justify security grants to fill those security gaps. TSIs have been effective in 
driving the mass transit agencies to make security improvements 
Both Tier I and Tier II chiefs were critical of TSIs.  TSIs were considered to be 
understaffed; with an overly broad mission, and TSIs could do a better job of 
communicating the results of their reviews to the executive management of mass transit 
agencies.  The process could be improved with better coordination between the TSA and 
FTA over safety and security requirements.  The results of TSI’s reviews could be better 
communicated to the executive management of mass transit agencies. 
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Regarding VIPR operations, TSIs were used to support those operations at only 
one Tier I mass transit agency.  Tier II chiefs who were more likely to have TSIs 
participate in VIPR operations on their property raised concerns over TSI’s participation 
in VIPR operations.  The concerns included the TSI’s lack of law enforcement status, 
training, lack of command and control, and communications capabilities.   
The TSIs appear to perform a valuable mission in regard to BASE reviews, but 
beyond that their mission is confusing.  Perhaps that accounts for TSA’s uncertainty over 
the appropriate staffing level for the position.   
TSIs role in VIPR operations is controversial. TSA management strongly supports 
the use of TSIs in VIPR operations; however, TSIs feel underutilized (OIG, 2009, p. 11), 
and consider the activity to be least effective use of their time (OIG, 2008, p. 29).  Tier I 
mass transit agencies do not uniformly use TSIs and Tier II mass transit agencies are 
generally concerned over their use in VIPR operations due to their lack of training and 
law enforcement background.  The DHS IG even raised concerns over their safety if they 
were mistaken as a federal agent (OIG, 2008, p. 28).   
Given that using TSIs to perform VIPR operations is of questionable merit, the 
question arises as to how TSIs can be best utilized.  The TSA has indicated an intention 
to use TSIs to support mass transit agencies with grant projects for infrastructure security 
improvements.  Considering the fact that the risk methodology used by the TSA has been 
characterized by the NAC as flawed and unreliable (NAC, 2010), perhaps the TSI 
positions could assist in addressing the DHS risk model’s weaknesses.  Since the risk 
model does not compare and contrast vulnerabilities in mass transit systems across 
regions due to a lack of data, and consistent methodologies of gathering that data are not 
being used (GAO, 2009a, pp. 16–17), TSIs could be trained to work with mass transit 
agencies to address this weakness.  TSI’s could also be trained and used to address 
current weaknesses in developing terrorism threat data for the risk analysis model. 
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VI. THE VISIBLE INTERMODAL PREVENTION AND 
RESPONSE TEAM PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into 10 sections.  Section A is the Introduction.  Section B 
is intended to provide the reader with an explanation of the origins and evolving mission 
of TSA’s VIPR Program.  The requirements placed on the DHS TSA for the VIPR 
program under the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
are detailed in section C.  Section D describes the DHS OIG’s June 2008 findings on the 
program.  A summary of a GAO report to Congress on feedback about the VIPR program 
from mass transit agencies and an analysis of VIPR after Action Reports is described in 
section E.  Section F is interviewing data of Chiefs of Police of Tier I mass transit 
agencies. Policy implications attributable to the Tier I chiefs is detailed in section G. 
Section H is interviewing data of Chiefs of Police of Tier II mass transit agencies. Policy 
implications attributable to the Tier II chiefs is detailed in section H. Section J is a 
chapter summary, discussion, and conclusions. 
B. BACKGROUND 
According to the former TSA administrator Kip Hawley, the VIPR program was 
formally introduced to mass transit in December 2005 (OIG, 2008, p. 48).  The DHS OIG 
reported that the TSA has provided VIPR teams for mass transit since July 2004, starting 
with support of the Democratic National Convention in Boston, Massachusetts. (OIG, 
2008, p. 6).  The GAO reported in July 2009 that VIPR teams provide security 
nationwide for all modes of transportation (GAO, 2009c, p. 4).  VIPR teams were created 
after the terrorist attack on the Madrid transit system in March 2004 in order to enhance 
security on U.S. rail and mass transit systems nationwide (GAO, 2009c, p. 4).     
The purpose of the VIPR team program is to provide a random, unannounced, 
unpredictable, high-visibility presence in a mass transit or passenger rail environment 
(OIG, 2008, p. 6).  VIPR teams vary in size and composition. Teams consist of TSA 
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personnel and may include other federal, state, or local assets (OIG, 2008).  The FAMS 
has been designated as the primary law enforcement entity within the TSA to be the lead 
agency for coordinating VIPR operations (OIG, 2008).  On July 23, 2009, the GAO 
issued a report entitled Federal Air Marshal Service, Actions Taken to Fulfill Core 
Mission and Address Workforce Issues.  The GAO reported that the FAMS was originally 
established within the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation 
Administration as the Sky Marshal program in the 1970s to counter aircraft hijackers  
(GAO, 2009c, p. 3).  The program was expanded significantly after September 11, 2001 
(GAO, 2009c, p. 3).  Other VIPR team personnel from the TSA may include TSIs, 
EDCTs, and Behavioral Detection Officers (BDOs,) who are specially trained to detect 
high risk individuals based on involuntary physical or psychological behavior (GAO, 
2009b, p. 44).  TSA’s Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the Effective Employment of 
VIPR teams in Mass Transit and Passenger Rail, issued in October 2007, identifies 10 
core components that form the foundation of effective collaboration on VIPR programs 
(GAO, 2009b, p. 45).  These core components are coordination, mission focus, active 
deterrence, planning, force composition, consistency, training, communications, 
authority, and continuous improvement (GAO, 2009b, p. 45).  
VIPR operations are voluntary and mass transit agencies do not run the risk of 
losing grant funding by not participating in the program (OIG, 2008).  Local mass transit 
agencies have the power to decide where VIPR operations are deployed on their systems 
and how the resources are used such as a plain clothes assignment, or in uniform or TSA 
emblazoned jackets that are visible to the public (OIG, 2008). At the present time, VIPR 
operations are intended to be planned and scheduled weeks in advance (OIG, 2008).  
VIPR operations are typically conducted along side transit agency police or security 
personnel; however, at some transit agencies TSA personnel may operate without 
participation of local personnel (OIG, 2008, p. 30).  
Beginning in July 2007, TSA significantly increased the number and frequency of 
VIPR deployments, from an average of one exercise per month nationwide, to one or two 
exercises a week (OIG, 2008).  In June 2009, the TSA reported that the frequency of 
VIPR operations had increased to over 800 VIPR operations at mass transit and 
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passenger rail systems as of that date (GAO, 2009b, pp. 44–45).  Almost all of the 
operations were intended to enhance security at special events or on holidays rather than 
in response to specific threats (GAO, 2009b, pp. 44–45). 
The GAO reported that during the first quarter of fiscal year 2009, the TSA 
conducted 483 VIPR operations, with about 60 percent dedicated to ground based 
aviation facilities (GAO, 2009c, p. 5).  The remaining VIPR operations were dedicated to 
the surface domain, which includes highways, freight rail, pipelines, mass transit, and 
maritime (GAO, 2009c, p. 5). In all of 2009, TSA conducted more than 1,050 VIPR 
operations with mass transit and passenger rail systems across the nation (OIG, 2010, p. 
19).  In 2009, VIPR positions totaled 225.  In fiscal year 2010, 338 positions were to be 
added supporting an additional 15 VIPR teams, at a cost of $50 million (GAO, 2009c, 
pp. 5–6). 
It is too soon to assess the success of VIPR operations.  The GAO issued a report 
to Congress in April 2010, entitled Surface Transportation Security, TSA Has Taken 
Actions to Manage Risk, Improve Coordination, and Measure performance, but 
Additional Actions Would Enhance its Efforts.  The report noted that the TSA had 
measured its performance in terms of the number of VIPR operations conducted, but had 
not developed measures to report on the effectiveness of the operations themselves until 
April 2010 (GAO, 2010a, pp. 13–15).  The four measures are, total VIPR asset 
deployments; completion percentage at high risk locations; percentage of national special 
security events; and percentage of primary stakeholders with repeat deployments (GAO, 
2010a, pp. 13–15). 
C. IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 
COMMISSION ACT OF 2007 
The TSA was authorized to deploy VIPR teams by the 9/11 Commission Act, 
Public Law 110-53, enacted on August 3, 2007, also known as Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (IRCA, 2007). 
The act authorized the Secretary of DHS, acting through the TSA administrator, 
to develop VIPR teams to augment the security of any mode of transportation at any 
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location within the United States (IRCA, 2007). In forming the VIPR teams, the TSA was 
authorized to use any asset of the department including FAMs, TSIs, EDCTs, and 
advanced screening technology (IRCA, 2007).  The TSA was authorized to determine 
when a VIPR team shall be deployed, and for what duration (IRCA, 2007).  
The act required the TSA to consult with local law enforcement officials for the 
development of operational plans, and to coordinate on relevant information before and 
after deployment (IRCA, 2007). 
D. DHS’ JUNE 2008 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL’S (OIG) 
FINDINGS ON THE VIPR PROGRAM 
In June 2008, the DHS OIG issued a report entitled TSA’s Administration and 
Coordination of Mass Transit Security Programs.  During the July 4, 2007, holiday 
week, simultaneous VIPR operations were launched from TSA headquarters for mass 
transit operations in New York, Boston, San Francisco, Chicago, Washington, D.C. and 
several other cities (OIG, 2008, p. 27). The OIG reported that TSA’s initial VIPR 
deployments could have benefitted from more precise planning, better consultation, and 
more use of local expertise and knowledge (OIG, 2008, p. 27).  The initial deployments 
of VIPR operations occupied local law enforcement resources and strained relations with 
state and local homeland security officials (OIG, 2008, p. 27).  The TSA administrator 
considered the criticism unfair because TSA headquarters was responding to overseas 
terrorist activity and decided to move quickly with the deployment of VIPR operations in 
order to provide security resources for mass transit (OIG, 2008, p. 49).  However, based 
on that experience, TSA has taken measures to improve coordination (OIG, 2008, p. 27).  
The OIG recommended the development of Memorandums of Agreement between the 
TSA and individual transit agencies to enhance VIPR program effectiveness (OIG, 2008, 
p. 27). 
The OIG opined that the TSA failed to communicate the timing, procedures or 
rationale of the July 2007 VIPR deployments either with its own personnel or with the 
personnel of the mass transit agencies (OIG, 2008, p. 27).  Notice of the operations was 
only received by TSA field offices on the weekend before the event (OIG, 2008, p. 27).  
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Field offices were reluctant to ask transit police officials to accommodate the request 
knowing that police deployment schedules are set well in advance (OIG, 2008, p. 28).  
Complicating the issue was the fact that some Federal Security Directors and the Special 
Agents in Charge of Federal Air Marshal’s offices were at odds over who was in charge 
of the operations (OIG, 2008, pp. 27–28). As a result, the TSA’s first deployments of the 
program generated controversy among TSA field offices, state and homeland security 
officials, and mass transit agencies (OIG, 2008, p. 27). 
For these initial deployments TSA had little to no experience on the mass transit 
systems where they were deployed (OIG, 2008, p. 28).  They also had no means of 
communicating with transit police or security personnel (OIG, 2008, p. 28).  This resulted 
in increased use of transit police personnel who had to partner with TSA personnel, 
thereby increasing the use of Transit Police, and consequently increasing financial costs 
for mass transit agencies (OIG, 2008, p. 28). 
Transit agencies complained that FAMS were not familiar with local laws, local 
police procedures, or the behavior of individuals encountered on public transportation, or 
even the scope of their own authority as federal law enforcement officers in the mass 
transit environment (OIG, 2008, p. 28).  The lack of pre-planning also resulted in friction 
with police unions (OIG, 2008, p. 28).  Unions interpreted the introduction of federal 
agents onto their mass transit systems as a replacement of transit police officers or an 
acknowledgement that the mass transit agency lacked sufficient police resources to 
address their security needs (OIG, 2008, pp. 27, 29). 
Another problem associated with the initial deployments was the lack of planning 
coordination between TSA headquarters and the local FAMS field personnel and mass 
transit personnel (OIG, 2008, p. 29).  TSA HQ personnel assigned VIPR operations to 
rail stations, which conflicted with local transit agency patrol strategies (OIG, 2008, p. 
29).  Some transit agencies refused some of TSA’s VIPR resources and other transit 
agencies refused all of TSA’s VIPR resources (OIG, 2008, p. 29). 
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E. GAO’S JUNE 2009 REPORT ON THE VIPR PROGRAM 
In June 2009, the GAO issued a report entitled Transportation Security; Key 
Actions have been taken to Enhance Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security, but 
Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Federal Strategy and Programs.  The GAO reported 
mixed opinions by mass transit agency officials over the effectiveness of VIPR 
operations conducted on their systems (GAO, 2009b, p. 45).  Thirty mass transit agencies 
were contacted including Tier I and Tier II mass transit agencies (GAO, 2009b, pp. 45, 
46) and five indicated generally that they welcomed the additional resources that the 
VIPR operations provided to their agencies.  Four other agencies indicated that because 
they were already providing for their own security that VIPR team activities added no 
significant added security value especially in light of the additional planning and 
operational costs (GAO, 2009b, p. 45).  These four agencies also looked in disfavor of 
the fact that the VIPR teams were largely unarmed (GAO, 2009b, p. 45).  
For its study the GAO reviewed the after-action reports of 104 VIPR operations 
conducted between November 2007 and July 2008 on mass transit and passenger rail 
(GAO, 2009b, p. 46).  Almost half of the reports identified a lack of interoperable radio 
communications as a key challenge faced during many VIPR operations (GAO, 2009b, p. 
46).  This deficiency placed challenges on the ability of TSA members of VIPR 
operations to communicate information on potential threats, essential for a safe and 
effective VIPR operation and program (GAO, 2009b, p. 45).  Communications in a mass 
transit environment are more challenging than in an aviation environment in part due to 
the presence of tunnels and underground systems (GAO, 2009b, p. 46).  The GAO took 
note of the fact that this problem existed despite the issuance of a concept of operations 
(CONOPS) in October 2007 in which communications was identified as one of 10 core 
components that form the foundation of effective collaboration (GAO, 2009b, p. 46). 
TSA officials acknowledged the challenges the VIPR program was facing due to program 
expansion into mass transit and was taking measures to improve communications, 
coordination and training of TSA personnel to operate in a mass transit environment 
(GAO, 2009, pp. 45-47). 
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F. INTERVIEWS OF CHIEFS OF POLICE FROM TIER I MASS TRANSIT 
AGENCIES  
In order to conceptualize the issues associated with this program, Chiefs of Police 
from Tier I and Tier II mass transit agencies were interviewed for their first hand subject 
matter knowledge.  These security professionals provided information and expert opinion 
that expanded upon what was available from open source materials. The interviews 
provided context to the U.S. government reports and open source data, and helped to 
shape the policy options presented in a later section of the thesis.  
The three Chiefs of Police of Tier I transit agencies were asked the following 
questions during their interviews: 
Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s Visible 
Intermodal Prevention and Response team program (VIPR) to your 
agency’s Security efforts.  What is good about the program, and how can 
it be improved?  What recommendations can you make to Tier II mass 
transit agencies concerning this program? Follow up questions were 
asked as appropriate for clarification and/or expansion of the Chief’s 
response.  Responses were grouped into five broad categories:  
Application of the program to their own agencies; Positive aspects of the 
program; Recommendations for Tier II agencies; Program criticisms; and 
Recommendations for overall program improvement. 
First, on the broad question of how the agency applies the program to its own 
security efforts, all three Tier I Chiefs of Police reported participation in the VIPR 
program, but with limitations.  One mass transit agency performs VIPR operations in 
cooperation and coordination with the Federal Security Director’s resources, but without 
the participation of FAMS. They perform random passenger screening inspections using 
explosives trace detection equipment.  
A second Tier I chief reported participation by his agency in VIPR operations on 
average once a week.  He considers this frequency to be more than enough to achieve the 
mission of the program.  The operations are always performed with transit police 
department special operations tactical law enforcement officers.  
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A third Tier I chief reported participation in VIPR operations three to four times a 
year, in connection with special events, or during periods of elevated threat conditions.  
The VIPR operations are controlled by the transit police department. 
Concerning the positive aspects of the program, besides increased security, one 
chief noted that VIPR operations contribute to a good relationship with the TSA, which 
he thinks is important to maintain.  The chief recognizes the TSA’s desire to conduct 
these missions, and he wants to assist the TSA.  Another chief also noted the importance 
of assisting the TSA in conducting its mission.  A third chief acknowledged the 
development of better customer service skills by his officers by working with FSD’s 
personnel.   
As far as recommendations for Tier II mass transit agencies, one chief noted that 
the VIPR operations raise a lot of eyebrows by the public due to the significant number of 
persons assigned to the operations.  The chief is unsure of the deterrence and overall 
effectiveness of the VIPR operations.  Another chief noted that training with the FAMS 
during periods of lower threat levels is important in order to be prepared to work together 
effectively during periods of increased threat levels. The Tier I chiefs had no other 
recommendations for improvement of the program on the whole.   
Several criticisms of the program were made.  One Tier I chief challenges the 
FAMS’ law enforcement authority on his agency’s property.  The chief has concerns with 
FAMS being armed. For this reason, he has requested that FAMS not patrol on to his 
agency’s property and the TSA has honored his request.  The chief suspects that the 
FAMS suffer from mission creep in respect with their aviation related responsibilities and 
simply no longer want to be limited to security of airplanes.    
Another chief noted that VIPR operations require the assignment of TP personnel 
to accompany the TSA personnel for safety reasons.  This is an inefficient use of 
resources because these TP personnel would be performing other important assignments 
if they were not engaged in the VIPR operation. 
 101
G. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO INTERVIEWS OF TIER 
I CHIEFS OF POLICE 
1. Implications for VIPR Effectiveness for Tier I 
Policy implications associated with the overall effectiveness of the VIPR program for 
Tier I agencies are evident from the interview data. While all three Tier I mass transit 
agencies reported some participation in the VIPR program, from a high frequency of one 
operation a week to a low of three to four times a year, the data calls into question how 
effective the VIPR program really is for Tier I mass transit agencies.  For example, one 
Tier I chief does not use VIPR operations in the traditional sense but does use VIPR 
operations for passenger screening.  Two chiefs reported the desire to maintain good 
relations with the TSA in performing VIPR operations.  One Tier I chief even questioned 
the overall effectiveness of the program, and another questioned the FAMS’ authority to 
perform their operations in the local setting. 
2. Implications for Increasing LEOs 
Policy implications associated with increasing the number of LEOs are also 
evident from the interview data.  If the VIPR program is not as effective for Tier I mass 
transit agencies as it could or should be, would the resources be better directed to another 
program?  Can the resources be better directed by funding LEO positions for mass transit 
agencies that do not have the resources to perform high visibility patrols on an 
unpredictable basis for their own mass transit agencies?    
H. INTERVIEWS OF CHIEFS OF POLICE FROM TIER II MASS TRANSIT 
AGENCIES  
Of the seven Chiefs of Police of Tier II transit agencies who were interviewed, all 
were asked the following question: 
Please describe how your mass transit agency applies the TSA’s Visible 
Intermodal Prevention and Response team program (VIPR) to your 
agency’s Security efforts.  What is good about the program, and how can 
it be improved?  Follow up questions were asked as appropriate for 
clarification and/or expansion of the Chief’s response.  Responses were 
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grouped into five broad categories: Application of the program to their 
own agencies; Positive aspects of the program; Program criticisms; and 
Recommendations for overall program improvement. 
First, on the broad question of how the agency applies the program to its own 
security efforts, all seven Chiefs of Police of Tier II transit agencies reported participation 
by their agency in the VIPR program.  The range of participation started with a high 
frequency of one VIPR operation a week to a low frequency of 4 to 5 VIPR operations a 
year.  Four chiefs reported one to two VIPR operations a month.  One chief reported that 
his agency participated in approximately three VIPR operations a month.   
One Tier II chief noted that national intelligence reports have identified mass 
transit as a high profile target for terrorism.  In the past year, his mass transit agency has 
been involved in three incidences when persons listed on TSA’s “watch list” were located 
on his mass transit system. Some of these individuals were found to also be engaged in 
suspicious behavior while on the system.  Based on this personal firsthand experience, 
the chief considers VIPR operations to be an important element of his mass transit 
agency’s security strategy.  On his system, VIPR operations are conducted on average 
once a week when TSA personnel are teamed with three to five of his transit police 
officers.  In addition to VIPR operations, his department expends six hours of overtime 
daily to enable officers to perform saturation patrols during morning and evening rush 
hours.   
Several chiefs noted that VIPR operations are conducted mostly to coincide with 
holidays or special events during surges in ridership.  VIPR venues include bus terminals, 
bus parking at major league stadiums during sporting events or major concerts, and at 
transit centers. 
Concerning positive aspects of the VIPR operations, one chief characterized the 
program as fantastic.  He considers the random nature of the program to be a deterrent 
and the additional TSA resources to be a force multiplier. 
Another Tier II chief noted that VIPR operations on his mass transit systems 
started out poorly; however, since the TSA reached the understanding that it could not 
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conduct VIPR operations independently without the transit agency’s participation, VIPR 
operations have become very positive.  To overcome the initial problems, meetings were 
held with the Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Air Marshal’s Service and the 
FAMs were partnered with transit police officers. VIPR operations are now conducted 
one or more times per month on the mass transit agency’s schedule rather than at the 
convenience of the TSA.  FAM resources for VIPR operations are also on the increase. 
The chief’s mass transit agency has no plans to conduct passenger screening as a part of 
VIPR operations because the chief does not consider rail platforms to be conducive for 
effective screening procedures. 
Another Tier II chief reported that the VIPR operations have been a positive 
influence on the security of his mass transit agency.  The chief and the members of his 
department have developed an excellent relationship with the FAMs. Monthly meetings 
are held for planning and coordination of VIPR operations. 
One other Tier II chief expressed pleasure with VIPR operations at his mass 
transit agency.  He considers the VIPR program to be a very valuable security service.  
VIPR operations are conducted on average about one to two times a month and have been 
especially effective in increasing security during special events.  The TSA has done a 
very good job of coordinating the scheduling of VIPR operations with his mass transit 
agency. 
As far as criticisms of the program, a chief reported that in his opinion, TSA’s 
VIPR program resources are spread too thin with insufficient resources to cover such a 
broad geographic area. 
Another chief noted that his agency’s first VIPR operation was conducted in 2007 
using screening inspectors, FAMs, BDOs, TSIs and transit police.  The passenger 
screening did not work well.  The screeners were not experienced in working in a mass 
transit environment and seemed to be uneasy in the new environment.  The screening 
personnel had no direct supervision on site.  The TSIs did not have supervision on scene 
either, nor communications capabilities.  The VIPR operations were thereafter modified 
to exclude passenger screening.  Significant training and orientation was conducted by 
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the mass transit agency’s personnel to familiarize the TSA with the mass transit 
environment.  As a result of that investment, the FAMs and BDOs have developed into 
the TSA’s most effective assets for VIPR operations.  The chief considers the TSIs who 
participate in VIPR operations to be “tag alongs” who do not provide much added value. 
At another mass transit agency TSIs have more influence over VIPR operations 
than the FAMS.  The TSI supervisor schedules all VIPR operations, in coordination with 
the mass transit agency’s Chief of Police.  Although six FAMS are designated for mass 
transit, three are still assigned to the aviation sector. As a result, FAMS are not available 
to participate in all VIPR operations.  The chief noted that some communications 
problems still exist between TSA headquarters and the field.  Surge requests have been 
made from TSA Mass Transit Division, Washington, D.C., and neither the FAMS nor the 
TSIs have been aware of the requests.  The TSA’s EDCTs are more than likely not 
available to participate in VIPR operations. 
A chief pointed out that, although VIPR operations are force multipliers, because 
of the need to team transit police with FAMs they also come at a financial expense to 
transit agencies with limited resources, which must also work within operating budgets.  
The TSGP generally does not allow funding for transit police agencies to pay for 
overtime to support VIPR operations.  The chief noted that his agency has been unable to 
apply grant funding to support the overtime payments for transit police personnel since 
2005. 
Another chief advised that VIPR operations are manpower intensive from the 
mass transit agency’s perspective.  The chief has many special events to address and his 
resources need to be directed to those particular events as opposed to the random patrols, 
which VIPR operations tend to focus on.  He advised that his agency’s security patrols 
need a focus and a purpose.  His view is that TSA’s VIPR operations are in essence 
created and designed to meet Congressional mandates. He noted that the FAMS were 
pulled away from security for mass transit and redirected to aviation after one of the more 
recent attempted terror plots involving an aircraft. Therefore, they cannot be counted on 
for mass transit when the aviation threat level increases.   
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A chief noted that he appreciates the VIPR’s security value provided by visible 
unpredictable deterrence and prevention of terrorism, but is concerned over the 
perception of excessive and inefficient use of security resources.  He has observed the 
TSA to sometimes over apply security resources at rail stations and platforms.  On one 
occasion, he counted 17 officers on a rail platform, which he found to be excessive. The 
TSA showed an understanding of the issues when this problem was explained to them, 
but they need to continue to work on establishing an appropriate balance of resources 
during VIPR operations. As far as recommendations for improving the VIPR program, a 
chief recommended that TSA increase VIPR operations beyond once a week.  The chief 
would like to see a daily presence. 
A second chief noted that VIPR operations on his mass transit system received a 
large boost in security this year when his agency was approved by the TSA for a grant to 
fund an anti-terrorism team operations package.  The OPack included funding for four 
police officers for three years, training and equipment to support the team.  The anti-
terrorism team is used to support VIPR operations.  The chief believes that more funding 
for these teams would be of great benefit.  The chief also recommends that the TSA 
improve command and control procedures and communications capabilities of VIPR 
teams particularly with regard to TSIs. 
A chief recommended that the TSA increase the number of FAMS available to 
VIPR operations on mass transit.  He also recommended improvement in coordination 
between TSA HQ Mass Transit Division and the FAMS and TSI units assigned to mass 
transit and improved communications capabilities for VIPR team participants. He also 
recommended an increased deployment of EDCTs in VIPR operations. 
Another chief recommended that TSGP funds be made available to mass transit 
agencies to pay for overtime funding of transit police in support of VIPR operations.  He 
recommends that mass transit agencies with small transit police agencies be authorized to 
apply for anti-terrorism teams, which could be used to participate in VIPR operations, 




like to see an increase of VIPR operations to address the security of bus operations. 
Another chief’s only recommendation for improvement in the VIPR program was that 
more VIPR operations be conducted. 
A chief recommended that if TSI’s are going to continue to participate in VIPR 
operations that they need to be armed law enforcement officers in order to protect 
themselves.  There need to be more dedicated FAM resources.  VIPR operations need to 
be better coordinated with mass transit agencies.  VIPRs operations need to be focused 
and structured.  More advanced planning needs to be conducted to insure the best 
application of time and resources, rather than the haphazard approach that is taken.  
Threats and targets need to be considered rather than just choosing dates, although he 
appreciated the value that randomness of scheduling brings to VIPR operations. 
A chief recommended that if TSIs participate in VIPR operations that they are 
provided with a certain level of training, and that VIPR operations be scaled to fit 
circumstances.  He also would like to see VIPR operations be more available than the one 
to two times per month, which is presently available.  He noted that he understands the 
personnel limitations that the TSA faces. 
I. POLICY IMPLICATIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO INTERVIEWS OF TIER 
II CHIEFS OF POLICE 
1. Implications for VIPR Effectiveness for Tier II   
Policy implications associated with the overall effectiveness of the VIPR program 
for Tier II agencies are evident from the interview data, even though VIPR operations 
have resulted in documented success. While all Tier II chiefs reported participation in 
VIPR operations, the limited range of frequency of VIPRs from one operation a week to 
four or five a year, calls their overall effectiveness into question.  Tier II chiefs 
consistently comment that they would prefer more VIPR operations and the frequency of 
the operations is spread too thin, with VIPR operations’ timing often focused on special 
events and holidays.  Tier II chiefs are also concerned that VIPR operations cannot be  
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relied upon during periods of increased threat levels if FAMs have dual responsibilities in 
aviation and mass transit, because the resources will be pulled away from mass transit 
security to support aviation security. 
Administrative problems also contribute toward diminished effectiveness.  VIPR 
operations add expenses to Tier II mass transit agencies that cannot be recovered because 
transit agencies must assign personnel to VIPR operations, and TSA does not reimburse 
for these costs.    
Operational problems also contribute toward diminished effectiveness.  There is a 
continued need to work out coordination and communications problems between mass 
transit agencies and the TSA.  There is also a concern that TSIs do not add value to VIPR 
operations, and that they need additional training and should be armed if they are to 
continue to participate in these operations.   
2. Implications for Increasing LEOs 
Policy implications associated with increasing the number of LEOs are also 
evident from the interview data, and are the same as those raised from the interviews of 
Tier I chiefs.  If the VIPR program is not as effective for Tier II mass transit agencies as 
it could or should be, would the resources be better directed to another program?  Can the 
resources be better directed by funding LEO positions for mass transit agencies that do 
not have the resources to perform high visibility patrols on an unpredictable basis for 
their own mass transit agencies?  If VIPR program funding was re-directed to fund the 
hiring of LEOs by mass transit agencies could the frequency of these types of patrols be 
increased, and could the administrative and operational concerns be eliminated?   
A Tier II mass transit agency received a large boost in security this year when his 
agency was approved by the TSA for a grant to fund an anti-terrorism team operations 
package. This was a supplemental grant that was paid for through the American Recovery 
and Re-Investment Act.   The operations package included funding for four police officers 
for three years, training and equipment to support the ATT.  The anti-terrorism team is 
used to support VIPR operations.  
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3. Implications for Increasing EDCTs 
The interview data also suggested that more EDCTs would also improve VIPR 
operations.   
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
VIPR teams for mass transit were created in response to the 2004 Madrid terrorist 
attack on mass transit and were formally introduced for mass transit in 2005 (GAO, 
2009c, p. 4).  The VIPR program was authorized by the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 for 
the purpose of providing a random, unannounced, high visibility presence on mass 
transit, and passenger rail (IRCA).  The act authorized the TSA to decide when and 
where to deploy VIPR teams and for mass transit agencies to be consulted (IRCA).  The 
VIPR program got off to a rocky start in 2007 when TSA HQ deployed teams nationwide 
in response to overseas terrorist activity, with inadequate local coordination OIG, 2008, 
pp. 27, 28).  Strained relations with local authorities resulted OIG, 2008, pp. 27, 28).  
Complaints from local authorities included overall lack of coordination, inadequate 
communications capabilities between the TSA and local law enforcement, and friction 
with police unions over taking local jobs (OIG, 2008, p. 46).  A review of after action 
reports of VIPR activity in 2009 revealed continuing concerns over the lack of 
communications capabilities between the TSA, VIPR members, and local law 
enforcement (GAO, 2009b, p. 46).  Mass transit agencies were split over the perceived 
value of the VIPR operations, and some concerns were raised that some TSA members of 
VIPR teams were unarmed (GAO, 2009b, pp. 45, 46). VIPR operations have steadily 
been increasing (OIG, 2010, p. 19). 
VIPR operations are clearly a more valuable security resource to Tier II mass 
transit agencies than Tier I mass transit agencies.  This is likely due to the fact that Tier I 
mass transit agencies have more security resources at their disposal than Tier II mass 
transit agencies.  Tier II mass transit agencies would like to see more VIPR operations, 
recognizing that these operations cannot always be relied upon, when security needs arise 
elsewhere like in the aviation sector. VIPR operations add administrative costs and 
burdens to mass transit agencies, and they continue to have operational coordination and 
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communications problems.  TSIs add little value to VIPR operations and require more 
training.  When a Tier II mass transit agency was able to acquire an anti terrorism team 
through an ATT OPack it was able to increase its agency’s LEOs by four positions for 
three years.  The ATT OPack contributed significantly to VIPR operations.  An increase 
in EDCTs would also improve VIPR effectiveness.   
Combined, the data calls into question the overall effectiveness of the VIPR 
program, particularly for tier I agencies, and raises the question as to whether mass transit 
agencies could perform high visibility patrols on an unpredictable basis more effectively 
if they had the resources to do the patrols themselves.  This then raises the question that if 
VIPR program resources for mass transit was re-programmed to fund LEOs for mass 
transit agencies to perform these high visibility patrols, could they be performed more 
frequently,  with less administrative and operational problems than are now associated 
with the VIPR program?      
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VII. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will evaluate policy options to accomplish two broad goals.  
1. Increasing LEOs for Tier II mass transit agencies  
2. Increasing EDCTs for Tier II mass transit agencies 
The chapter will be divided into two main sections, goal one for increasing LEOs 
for Tier II mass transit agencies; and goal two for increasing EDCTs for Tier II mass 
transit agencies.   
For the analysis of goal one, three policy options will be enumerated, followed by 
detailed descriptions of each policy option. The policy options will then be evaluated on 
the basis of four evaluative criteria, effectiveness, cost, level of effort, and political 
acceptability. 
Effectiveness will be evaluated in relation to the increase in the number of LEOs 
that can be produced based on a given budget.  The budget figure that was chosen for 
comparison was $5.46 million, which was 20 percent of the $27.3 million that was 
budgeted for Tier II mass transit agencies in the FY ’10 TSGP (DHS, 2009b, p. 7).  
Cost will be evaluated in relation to the estimated monetary expense associated 
with implementing the recommended changes. Cost will be calculated by dividing the 
budgeted amount used for comparison purposes by the number of LEOs produced.   
Level of effort will be evaluated in relation to whether energy or exertion is 
required to implement the recommended changes.  This will be estimated on the basis of 
two factors.  First, will the policy option work within the existing legal framework, or 
will it require new legislation? Second, will the policy option add increased 
administrative burden on the Tier II mass transit agency?  A binary code will be used to 
calculate the factors with one used to indicate change in legislation is required or 
administrative burden is increased, zero applied if no new legislation is required, and or 
the administrative burden is not increased.   
 112
Lastly, political acceptability will be evaluated in relation to the acceptability of 
any proposed options to the mass transit industry, the TSA, and the Congress.  Political 
acceptability or not, on the part of the mass transit industry will be estimated based on the 
data from the interviews of Chiefs of Police of mass transit agencies.  Political 
acceptability or not, on the part of the TSA will be estimated on the basis of whether the 
policy option is or is not a part of the existing policy.  If so, it will be estimated as 
politically acceptable.  If not, it will be estimated as not politically acceptable.  Political 
acceptability or not, on the part of the Congress will be estimated on the basis of whether 
or not the 9/11 Commission Act prohibits the policy option.  A binary code will be used to 
calculate the factors with one used to indicate political acceptability and zero to indicate 
not politically acceptable.   
The analysis will be summarized using a policy options matrix to record and 
contrast the analysis results.  
B. GOAL 1:  INCREASE LEOS FOR TIER II MASS TRANSIT AGENCIES 
The three policy options for analysis under goal one are: 
1. The exception to the status quo; OPacks to fund LEOs that are available 
only to Tier I mass transit agencies, are made available to Tier II mass 
transit agencies with limitations, as exceptions to the status quo like the 
FY 09 American Recovery and Re-investment Act (ARRA) supplemental 
funding to the TSGP. (DHS, 2009a)  
2. Authorize Tier II mass transit agencies to apply for the ATT OPacks that 
are available to Tier I mass transit agencies. 
3. Create a new program administered by the TSA within the TSGP to fund 
LEOs for Tier II mass transit agencies within the TSGP 
1. Description of the Options 
a. Policy Option 1: The Exception to the Status Quo  
Policy option one is for TSA to make an occasional exception to the status 
quo in regard to its funding for law enforcement positions.  Presently, only the TSGP has 
a provision that allows for the funding of law enforcement officers (LEOs) for mass 
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transit and only available to Tier I mass transit agencies, through operational packages 
(OPacks).  An exception was made under the FY 09 TSGP grant cycle, and an OPack 
was available to fund the hiring of LEOs, specifically referred to as an Anti-Terrorism 
Teams (ATT) OPack (DHS, 2009a). The ATT OPack is described as follows, along with 
restrictions and requirements:  
The ATT OPack consists of funding for four individuals, all of whom can 
be LEOs, including two overt elements such as uniformed officers, a canine team, or 
mobile screener, plus two discreet observer elements.  The performance period is 36 
months.  The funding for the ATT OPack is $500,000 per team, per year (DHS, 2009b). 
The total funding for the 36-month performance period is $1,500,000 per team.  The 
grant funding covers salary and fringe benefits for the personnel, training and 
certification, equipment costs, purchase and training of the canine and canine expenses 
(DHS, 2009b). 
Restrictions and requirements under option one include the following: 
OPacks are limited to eligible Tier I mass transit agencies that have a dedicated transit 
security/police force, a transit security operations dispatch center, and a daily unlinked 
ridership of 200,000 passengers or greater.  Recipient mass transit agencies must also 
show how the agency proposes to implement capital projects that will sustain the 
operational activities and/or demonstrate how the agency will sustain the operational 
investments after the grant funding has been expended.  OPacks are also available to law 
enforcement agencies as sub-recipients that serve as the primary security provider for 
mass transit agencies in Tier I regions, provided those sub-grantees use the funding to 
support transit-related security activities and not other departmental operations. Any sub-
recipient also must approve the mass transit agency’s security plan (DHS, 2009b).  
Other restrictions require that OPack funds apply exclusively to 
counterterrorism activities, and the funds may not be used to supplant existing agency 
programs already supported by the mass transit agency.  OPacks may only be used for 
new capabilities and or programs and only on a full time basis for their intended purpose 
(DHS, 2009b). 
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Other general eligibility requirements apply, including that the mass 
transit agency has undergone a security assessment by DHS, or developed a security plan, 
both within the past three years, and that grant funds be used to address items in the 
security assessment or the security plan.  Compliance with National Incident 
Management System is also a requirement as it is for any recipient of federal 
preparedness assistance (DHS, 2009b). 
b. Policy Option 2: Authorize Tier II Mass Transit Agencies to 
Apply For ATT OPacks Available to Tier I Mass Transit 
Agencies   
Policy option two is for the TSA to authorize Tier II mass transit agencies 
to apply for the ATT OPacks that are available to Tier I mass transit agencies. All of the 
restrictions and requirements that apply to Tier I mass transit agencies will apply to Tier 
II mass transit agencies, except that daily unlinked ridership of 200,000 passengers will 
not be required.   
The ATT OPack consists of funding for four individuals, all of whom can 
be LEOs, including two overt elements such as uniformed officers, a canine team, or 
mobile screener, plus two discreet observer elements.  The performance period is 36 
months.  The funding for the ATT OPack is $500,000 per team, per year.  The total 
funding for the 36 month performance period is $1,500,000 per team.  The grant funding 
covers salary and fringe benefits for the personnel, training and certification, equipment 
costs, and purchase and training of the canine and canine expenses (DHS, 2009b). 
Restrictions and requirements under option one include the following: 
OPacks are limited to eligible Tier I mass transit agencies that have a dedicated transit 
security/police force, a transit security operations dispatch center, and a daily unlinked 
ridership of 200,000 passengers or greater.  Recipient mass transit agencies must also 
show how the agency proposes to implement capital projects that will sustain the 
operational activities, and/or demonstrate how the agency will sustain the operational 
investments after the grant funding has been expended.  OPacks are also available to law 
enforcement agencies as sub recipients that serve as the primary security provider for 
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mass transit agencies in Tier I regions, provided those sub-grantees use the funding to 
support transit-related security activities and not other departmental operations. Any sub-
recipient also must approve the mass transit agency’s security plan (DHS, 2009b).   
Other restrictions require that OPack funds apply exclusively to 
counterterrorism activities and the funds may not be used to supplant existing agency 
programs already supported by the mass transit agency.  OPacks may only be used for 
new capabilities and or programs and only on a full time basis for their intended purpose 
(DHS, 2009b). 
Other general eligibility requirements apply, including that the mass 
transit agency has undergone a security assessment by DHS, or developed a security plan, 
both within the past three years, and that grant funds be used to address items in the 
security assessment or the security plan.  Compliance with National Incident 
Management System is also a requirement as it is for any recipient of federal 
preparedness assistance (DHS, 2009b). 
c. Policy Option 3: Create a New Program Administered by the TSA 
Within the TSGP to Fund LEOs for Tier II Mass Transit 
Agencies  
Policy Option Three is to create a new program administered by the TSA 
within the TSGP to fund LEOs for Tier II mass transit agencies.  This option would focus 
grant funds on operational costs rather than infrastructure security improvement costs and 
equipment costs, which are the focus of TSGP.  This new program would be modeled 
after a grant program the U.S. Attorney General created and the DOJ has administered 
since 1994 known as the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grant 
program (COPS, 2011).  This new grant program proposed under option three will fund 
100 percent of the salary, benefits, and training for entry level LEO positions.  Like 
options one and two, the performance period is 36 months. 
Restrictions and requirements under option three mirror those of options 
one and two, and include the following: option three will be limited to eligible Tier II 
mass transit agencies that have a dedicated transit security/police force, a transit security 
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operations dispatch center.  Recipient mass transit agencies must also show how the 
agency proposes to implement capital projects that will sustain the operational activities, 
and/or demonstrate how the agency will sustain the operational investments after the 
grant funding has been expended.  This option will also be available to law enforcement 
agencies as sub-recipients that serve as the primary security provider for mass transit 
agencies in Tier II regions, provided those sub-grantees use the funding to support transit-
related security activities and not other departmental operations. Any sub-recipient also 
must approve the mass transit agency’s security plan.   
Other restrictions will require that option three funds apply exclusively to 
counterterrorism activities, and the funds may not be used to supplant existing agency 
programs already supported by the mass transit agency.  Option three funds may only be 
used for new capabilities and or programs and only on a full time basis for their intended 
purpose. 
Other general eligibility requirements apply, including that the mass 
transit agency has undergone a security assessment by DHS, or developed a security plan, 
both within the past three years, and that grant funds be used to address items in the 
security assessment or the security plan.  Compliance with National Incident 
Management System is also a requirement as it is for any recipient of Federal 
preparedness assistance. 
2. Evaluation of Policy Options Analysis for Increasing LEOs for Tier II 
Mass Transit Agencies 
The analysis of these policy options will be based on the criteria described in the 
methodology section of Chapter I.  As a reminder, effectiveness here refers to the 
increase in the number of LEOs 
a. Policy Option 1: The Exception to the Status Quo  
(1)  Effectiveness.  The exception to the status quo is an ineffective 
option for increasing the number of LEOs for Tier II mass transit agencies.  Presently, 
only the TSGP has a provision that allows for the funding of law enforcement officers 
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(LEOs) for mass transit, and that provision is only available to Tier I mass transit 
agencies, through OPacks. There has been an exception made in the past, which has 
enabled Tier II mass transit agencies to apply for LEOs through OPacks.  This exception 
was in FY 09 under the ARRA supplemental funding (DHS, 2009a); however, even with 
that exception, Tier II mass transit agencies were required to have law enforcement 
staffing levels of at least 100 sworn officers (DHS, 2009a).  Since this option cannot be 
relied on, it is an ineffective option for increasing the number of LEOs for Tier II mass 
transit agencies. This option is likely to result in no increase in LEOs. 
(2)  Cost.  The exception to the status quo has no to low cost 
associated with it since this option is only available to Tier II mass transit agencies under 
exceptional circumstances.  Even when the option was available, it was on a limited basis 
since Tier II mass transit agencies were required to have law enforcement staffing levels 
of at least 100 sworn officers. Zero costs are estimated and will be applied to this cost.  
(3)  Level of Effort.  The exception to the status quo has no to low 
levels of effort associated with it, since it would require no new statutory authority and is 
not likely to increase the administrative burden on Tier II mass transit agencies. 
(4)  Political Acceptability.  The exception to the status quo would 
likely be politically acceptable to two of the three entities considered, the TSA, since it is 
part of an existing program, and the Congress, since it falls within the statutory 
limitations of the 9/11 Commission Act.  The option is unlikely to be politically 
acceptable to Tier II mass transit agencies based on the interviews of Chiefs of Police.   
b. Policy Option 2: Authorize Tier II Mass Transit Agencies to 
Apply for ATT OPacks Available to Tier I Mass Transit Agencies  
(1)  Effectiveness.  Given that a $27.3 million budget that was 
available to Tier II mass transit agencies in the FY ’10 TSGP grant cycle; and 20 percent 
of that budget could be used for operational costs (DHS, 2009b); then $5.46 million was 
available for OPacks.  Therefore, 3.6 ATT OPacks, consisting of four LEOs each, or a 
total of 14.4 LEOs, could be procured within that budgeted amount. 
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(2)  Cost.  The cost per LEO is computed by dividing the $5.46 
million budgeted amount, by the 14.4 LEOs that could be procured, for an average cost of 
$379,166 per LEO for the three year grant life.   
(3)  Level of effort.  Authorizing Tier II mass transit agencies to 
apply for OPacks available to Tier I mass transit agencies would require no new statutory 
authority, but would increase the administrative burden on Tier II mass transit agencies 
since they would be required to hire, and train the LEO’s and administer the grant.   
(4)  Political Acceptability.  Authorizing Tier II mass transit 
agencies to apply for OPacks available to Tier I mass transit agencies would likely be 
acceptable to two of the three entities considered, the Tier II mass transit agencies, since 
they would be the recipients of the LEOs, and the Congress since the option is not 
prohibited by the 9/11 Commission Act.  However since it is not already part of the grant 
guidance it is likely to be politically unacceptable to the TSA.  
c. Policy Option 3: Create a New Program Administered by the TSA 
Within the TSGP to Fund LEOs for Tier II Mass Transit 
Agencies  
(1)  Effectiveness.  Given that $27.3 million budget was available 
to Tier II mass transit agencies in the FY ’10 TSGP grant cycle, and 20 percent of that 
budget could be used for operational costs (DHS, 2009b), then $5.46 million was 
available and will be used as the basis for comparison of this option. 
Given that a $298 million budget was available in FY 10 for the 
U.S. DOJ’s COPS grant cycle, and that 1,388 LEOs were hired (DOJ, 2010d), then the 
average cost per LEO under the COPS grant program can be computed by dividing the 
budgeted amount of $298 million by 1,388 (DOJ, 2010d); resulting in an average cost of 
$214,697 per officer for the COPS program. 
Given that $5.46 million was available to Tier II mass transit 
agencies in the FY '10 TSGP grant cycle for operational costs (DHS, 2009b), this figure 
will be used for comparison purposes and divided by the average cost of a LEO under the 
U.S. DOJ COPS program, which is $214,697 per officer. This figure will be used for 
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comparison purposes and divided by the average cost of a LEO under the U.S. DOJ 
COPS program, which is $214,697 per officer.  Therefore, $5.46 million divided by 
$214,697, results in the equivalent of 25.43 LEOs if a grant program similar to the U.S. 
DOJ COPS program was used.   
(2)  Cost.  For comparison purposes, the cost per LEO is computed 
by dividing the $5.46 million budgeted amount, by 25.43 LEOs, resulting in an average 
cost of $214,697 per LEO for the three year grant life. 
(3)  Level of Effort.  Creating a new program administered by the 
TSA within the TSGP to fund LEOs for Tier II mass transit agencies would require new 
statutory authority. The new program would also increase the administrative burden on 
Tier II mass transit agencies since they would be required to hire and train the LEO’s as 
well as administer the grant.   
(4)  Political Acceptability.  Creating a new program administered 
by the TSA within the TSGP to fund LEOs for Tier II mass transit agencies would likely 
be acceptable to one of the three entities considered, namely the Tier II mass transit 
agencies, since they would be the recipients of the LEOs, and the interviews of Chiefs of 
Police support this option.  However since it is not already part of the grant guidance this 
option is likely to be politically unacceptable to the TSA.  Nor is the policy option within 
the authority of the 9/11 Commission Act and therefore judged as not politically 
acceptable to the Congress.     
3. Summary 
The following policy options matrix captures the results of the analysis for easy 
reference (Table 1). 
Table 1.   Policy Options Matrix for LEOs 
Policy Option Effectiveness Cost Level of Effort Political 
Acceptability 
1 0  0  L=0, A=0 MT=0, TSA=0, 
C=0 
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Policy Option Effectiveness Cost Level of Effort Political 
Acceptability 
2 14.40 LEOs $379,166 / LEO L=0, A=1 MT=1, TSA=0, 
C=1 
3 25.43 LEOs $214,697 / LEO L=1, A=1 MT=1, TSA=0, 
C=0 
Policy option one, which is the exception to the status quo, is the least desirable 
option.  It is ineffective because the option is available to Tier II mass transit agencies 
only occasionally (DHS, 2009a), has required Tier II mass transit agencies to have law 
enforcement staffing levels of at least 100 sworn officers (DHS, 2009a), and, therefore, is 
unlikely to result in an increase in LEOs for Tier II mass transit agencies.   
Policy option two, which would authorize Tier II mass transit agencies to apply 
for ATT OPacks that are available only to Tier I mass transit agencies (DHS, 2009b), is 
the second best option.  Given the budget that was available to Tier II mass transit 
agencies in FY 10, this policy option would result in an increase of 14.40 LEO positions 
for Tier II mass transit agencies, which is less than the number of LEOs for policy option 
three.  The average cost per LEO would be $379,166, which is higher than the average 
cost per LEO under policy option number three.  Policy option two does not require any 
new statutory authority, but it does increase the administrative burden on Tier II mass 
transit agencies, since they would be required to hire and train the LEOs and administer 
the grant.  Policy option two would likely be acceptable to Tier II mass transit agencies 
since they would be able to apply for the ATT OPacks and benefit from the increase in 
the number of LEOs for their mass transit agencies, as supported by the interviews of 
Chiefs of Police.  This policy option was considered likely not acceptable to the TSA, 
otherwise it would have already been available in the grant guidance.  Since the policy 
option is not prohibited by the 9/11 Commission Act, and would not require legislation, it 
was judged as acceptable to Congress.  
Policy option three, which would create a new program, to be administered by the 
TSA within the TSGP to fund LEOs for Tier II mass transit agencies is considered to be 
the best and recommended policy option. Given the budget that was available to Tier II 
mass transit agencies in FY 10, this policy option would result in an increase of 25.43 
LEO positions for Tier II mass transit agencies, which is more than the number of LEOs 
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for policy option two. The average cost per LEO would be $214,697, which is less than 
the average cost per LEO under policy option number two.  Unlike policy option two, 
policy option three would essentially be a new program and would therefore require new 
statutory authority.  Like policy option two, policy option three would increase the 
administrative burden on Tier II mass transit agencies, since they would be required to 
hire and train the LEOs and administer the grant.  Like policy option two, policy option 
three would likely be acceptable to Tier II mass transit agencies since they would be able 
to apply for the ATT OPacks and benefit from the increase in the number of LEOs for 
their mass transit agencies, as supported by the interviews of Chiefs of Police.  Policy 
option three is considered likely not acceptable to the TSA, otherwise it too would have 
already been included in the grant guidance.  Since the policy option is not prohibited by 
the 9/11 Commission Act, and would require legislation, it was judged not to be 
acceptable to Congress.  Although this policy option requires statutory authority, the 
significant increase in the number of LEOs over the other policy options, and the 
significantly less cost per LEO in comparison to policy option two make this option the 
best and recommended option. 
C. GOAL 2:  INCREASE EDCTS FOR TIER II MASS TRANSIT AGENCIES 
For the analysis of goal two, three policy options will be enumerated, followed by 
detailed descriptions of each policy option. The policy options will then be evaluated on 
the basis of four evaluative criteria, effectiveness, cost, level of effort, and political 
acceptability. 
Effectiveness will be evaluated in relation to the increase in the number of EDCTs 
that can be produced based on a given budget.  The budget figure that was chosen for 
comparison was $5.46 million, which was 20 percent of the $27.3 million that was 
budgeted for Tier II mass transit agencies in the FY ’10 TSGP (DHS, 2009b).   
Cost will be evaluated in relation to the estimated monetary expense associated 
with implementing the recommended changes. Cost will be calculated by dividing the 
budgeted amount used for comparison purposes by the number of EDCTs produced.   
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Level of effort will be evaluated in relation to whether energy or exertion is 
required to implement the recommended changes.  This will be estimated on the basis of 
two factors.  First, will the policy option work within the existing legal framework, or 
will it require new legislation? Second, will the policy option add increased 
administrative burden on the Tier II mass transit agency?  A binary code will be used to 
calculate the factors with one used to indicate change in legislation is required or 
administrative burden is increased, and zero applied if no new legislation is required and 
or the administrative burden is not increased.   
Lastly, political acceptability will be evaluated in relation to the acceptability of 
any proposed options to the mass transit industry, the TSA, and the Congress.  Political 
acceptability or not, on the part of the mass transit industry will be estimated based on the 
data from the interviews of Chiefs of Police of mass transit agencies.  Political 
acceptability or not, on the part of the TSA will be estimated on the basis of whether the 
policy option is or is not a part of the existing policy.  If so, it will be estimated as 
politically acceptable.  If not, it will be estimated as not politically acceptable.  Political 
acceptability or not, on the part of the Congress will be estimated on the basis of whether 
or not the 9/11 Commission Act prohibits the policy option.  A binary code will be used to 
calculate the factors with one used to indicate political acceptability and zero to indicate 
not politically acceptable.   
The analysis will be summarized using a policy options matrix to record and 
contrast the analysis results. 
The three policy options for analysis are: 
1. Maintain the status quo by tier II mass transit agencies continuing to 
acquire Explosives Detection Canine Teams (EDCTs) through the 
National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP). 
2. Authorize Tier II mass transit agencies to apply for the ATT OPacks that 
are available to Tier I mass transit agencies through the TSGP. 
3. Modify the NEDCTP to authorize funding for Tier II mass transit agencies 
to procure canines and training to TSA standards 
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1. Description of the Options 
a. Policy Option 1 - Maintain the Status Quo 
Policy option one is for the TSA to maintain the Status Quo.  The only 
current way to provide explosives detection canines for Tier II mass transit agencies is 
through the NEDCTP, and that is why it is presented as an option. Under the NEDCTP, 
each canine team is composed of one dog provided by the TSA and one handler 
employed by the local law enforcement or transportation authority that enters into a 
voluntary agreement with the NEDCTP (HR, 2005, pp. 1–3).  Under the agreement the 
local agency agrees to utilize TSA-certified canine teams at least 80 percent of the time in 
the transportation environment (HR, 2005, pp. 1–3).  The local agency agrees to 
participate in the program for five years and to maintain a minimum of three TSA-
certified canine teams for incident response for a minimum of three years for each team 
(HR, 2005, pp. 1–3). The TSA provides the dog, training of the handler, explosives 
training aids, and technical assistance at no cost to the participating agency (HR, 2005, 
pp. 1–3).  In addition, monetary reimbursement is provided to the local jurisdiction, in the 
amount of $50,000 (GAO, 2008) per canine team per year to help defray costs such as 
kennel facilities, transport vehicles, and veterinary care.  The dog handler, who is 
provided by the agency, is sent to Texas where the training is conducted (HR, 2005, pp. 
1–3).   
b. Policy Option 2: Authorize Tier II Mass Transit Agencies to 
Apply for EDCT OPacks Now Available Only to Tier I Mass 
Transit Agencies Through the TSGP  
Policy option two is for the TSA to authorize Tier II mass transit agencies 
to apply for EDCT OPacks that are now available only to Tier I mass transit agencies 
through the TSGP (DHS, 2009b).  All of the restrictions and requirements that apply to 
Tier I mass transit agencies will apply to Tier II mass transit agencies under option two, 
except that daily unlinked ridership of 200,000 passengers will not be required (DHS, 
2009b). 
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The EDCT OPack is composed of one canine and one handler.  The 
performance period for this grant is 36 months.  The funding for the EDCT is $150,000 
per team, per year.  The total funding for the 36 month performance period is $450,000 
per team.  The grant funding covers salary and fringe benefits for the LEO, training and 
certification, equipment costs, purchase and training of the canine and canine expenses 
(DHS, 2009b).  
Restrictions and requirements under option two include the following: 
EDCT OPacks are limited to eligible Tier II mass transit agencies that have a dedicated 
transit security / police force, a transit security operations dispatch center (DHS, 2009b).  
Recipient mass transit agencies must also show how the agency proposes to implement 
capital projects that will sustain the operational activities, and/or demonstrate how the 
agency will sustain the operational investments after the grant funding has been expended 
(DHS, 2009b). EDCT OPacks are also available to law enforcement agencies as sub 
recipients that serve as the primary security provider for mass transit agencies in Tier II 
regions, provided those sub-grantees use the funding to support transit-related security 
activities and not other departmental operations (DHS, 2009b).Any sub-recipient also 
must approve the mass transit agency’s security plan (DHS, 2009b).   
Other restrictions require that EDCT OPack funds apply exclusively to 
counterterrorism activities and the funds may not be used to supplant existing agency 
programs already supported by the mass transit agency (DHS, 2009b).  EDCT OPacks 
may only be used for new capabilities and or programs and only on a full time basis for 
their intended purpose (DHS, 2009b). 
Other general eligibility requirements apply, including: that the mass 
transit agency has undergone a security assessment by DHS or developed a security plan, 
both within the past three years, and that grant funds be used to address items in the 
security assessment or the security plan (DHS, 2009b).  Compliance with National 
Incident Management System is also a requirement as it is for any recipient of Federal 
preparedness assistance (DHS, 2009b). 
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c. Policy Option 3: Modify the NEDCTP to Authorize Funding for 
Tier II Mass Transit Agencies to Procure Canines and Training 
to TSA Standards  
Policy option three is proposed for consideration under the NEDCTP.  
This option is for mass transit agencies to procure canines on their own and to provide for 
their own training of the explosives detection canine teams.  Under this alternative, the 
TSA will reimburse mass transit agencies for all start up costs, including canine, training, 
and equipment.  The TSA will reserve the right to insure that the canine teams perform to 
a specified standard and meet all TSA certification requirements. 
Procurement and training would be required to meet certification 
standards of qualified organizations such as the National Police Canine Association 
(NPCA), the United States Police Canine Association (USPCA), or the International 
Explosive Detection Dog Association (IEDDA), and be endorsed by the TSA under the 
standards of the TSA’s NEDCTP.  Additionally, mass transit agencies would be required 
to maintain certification, utilization, and training data to show compliance with 
guidelines set by the Scientific Working Group on Dog and Orthogonal Detection 
Guidelines (SWGDOG).  Other requirements may be imposed such as guaranteeing a 
response capability by the mass transit agency on a 24 hours a day, seven days a week 
basis.   
The TSA would have the option to adopt the trained EDCTs into the 
NEDCTP if all of the above requirements were met and if funding permits. 
2. Evaluation of Policy Options Analysis for Increasing EDCTs for Tier 
II Mass Transit Agencies 
The analysis of these policy options will be based on the critera described in the 
methodology section of Chapter I.  As a reminder, effectiveness here refers to the 
increase in the number of EDCTs. 
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a. Policy Option 1: Maintain the Status Quo  
(1)  Effectiveness.  Maintaining the status quo is an ineffective 
option for increasing the number of EDCTs for Tier II mass transit agencies.  Presently, 
within the NEDCTP, there are estimated to be no more than 120 EDCTs for mass transit 
nationally.  For the nation’s 60 largest mass transit agencies, this averages out to only two 
EDCTs per mass transit agency. Of the three Tier I chiefs of mass transit agencies who 
were interviewed, among them, there were 16 EDCTs that were within the NEDCTP.  
Yet of the seven Tier II chiefs who were interviewed, there was not a single EDCT 
among them who was within the NEDCTP.  Therefore, the effectiveness of this policy 
option is estimated to be low.   
(2)  Cost.  The costs associated with developing EDCTs within the 
status quo of the NEDCTP are difficult to ascertain.  Considering that the fixed and 
administrative costs of the NEDCTP are spread among the EDCTs that are produced for 
multiple modes of transportation including aviation, it is difficult to estimate the average 
cost to produce an EDCT for a Tier II mass transit agency.  However, there are some 
estimates that can be made based on known data.  For example, in 2005, two million 
dollars of a $22 million budget was set aside to produce three EDCTs each, for 10 mass 
transit agencies (HR, 2005, p. 3).  Therefore, two million dollars can be divided by 30 for 
an average cost of $66,666 per EDCT in 2005.  Then in June 2008, $3.5 million was 
budgeted for the production of 45 EDCTs for mass transit. An average cost to produce an 
EDCT can be estimated by dividing $3.5 million by 45, resulting in an average cost of 
$77,777 per EDCT in 2008. 
The EDCTP also awards the mass transit agency that contracts 
with the NEDCTP $50,000 (GAO, 2008) per canine team per year to help defray costs 
such as kennel facilities, transport vehicles, and veterinary care.  Therefore, for 
comparison purposes, the three year cost of an EDCT under this program can be 




training aids, and technical assistance not adjusted for inflation, and adding the three 
annual payments, (3 x $50,000/yr = $150,000) and arriving at a three year total estimated 
cost of $227,777. ($77,777 + $150,000 = $227,777) 
(3)  Level of Effort.  Maintaining the status quo has no new levels 
of effort associated with it, since it would require no new statutory authority and would 
have no significant increase the administrative burden on Tier II mass transit agencies. 
(4)  Political Acceptability.  Maintaining the status quo would 
likely be politically acceptable to two of the three entities considered, the TSA, since it is 
their existing program, and the Congress, since it is authorized by the 9/11 Commission 
Act.  The policy option is likely not to be politically acceptable to Tier II mass transit 
agencies because it results in minimal EDCTs, and based on the results of the interviews 
of Chiefs of Police, the program is not satisfying their security needs.   
b. Policy Option 2: Authorize Tier II Mass Transit Agencies to 
Apply for EDCT OPacks Now Available Only to Tier I Mass 
Transit Agencies Through the TSGP  
(1)  Effectiveness.  Given that $27.3 million budget that was 
available to Tier II mass transit agencies in the FY ’10 TSGP grant cycle; and 20 percent 
of that budget could be used for operational costs (DHS, 2009b); then $5.46 million was 
available for OPacks.  Since the three year budget for one EDCT OPack is $450,000 
(DHS, 2009b), then 12.13 EDCT OPacks, can be funded consisting of 1 EDCT each. 
Therefore, a total of 12.13 EDCTs could be funded within the $5.46 million budget. 
(2)  Cost.  The cost per EDCT is computed by dividing the $5.46 
million budgeted amount, by the 12.13 EDCTs that could be funded, for an average cost 
of $450,000 per EDCT for the three year grant life.   
(3)  Level of effort.  Authorizing Tier II mass transit agencies to 
apply for OPacks that are now available to Tier I mass transit agencies would require no 
new statutory authority, but it would increase the administrative burden on Tier II mass 
transit agencies. The administrative burden would increased because Tier II mass transit 
agencies would be required to procure the canine, train the team and administer the grant.   
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(4)  Political Acceptability.  Authorizing Tier II mass transit 
agencies to apply for OPacks that are now available to Tier I mass transit agencies would 
likely be acceptable to, the Tier II mass transit agencies, since they would be the 
recipients of the EDCTs, and the interview data indicates they would be interested in 
having EDCT OPacks made available to their agencies.  However, this policy option is 
likely not politically acceptable to the TSA since it is not already part of the grant 
guidance.  The policy option is judged to be politically acceptable to the Congress since 
the option is not prohibited by the 9/11 Commission Act. 
c. Policy  Option 3: Modify the NEDCTP to Authorize Funding for 
Tier II Mass Transit Agencies to Procure Canines and Training 
to TSA Standards  
(1)  Effectiveness.  Given that $27.3 million budget that was 
available to Tier II mass transit agencies in the FY 10 TSGP grant cycle; and 20 percent 
of that budget could be used for operational costs (DHS, 2009b);  then $5.46 million was 
available and will be used as the basis for comparison of this option. 
The estimated amount that the TSA would likely budget for this 
policy option can be deduced by examining the amount that the TSA budgeted for the 
cost of EDCT OPacks, and comparing it to the amount the TSA budgets to pay mass 
transit agencies on an annual basis under the NEDCTP.  The EDCT OPack, composed of 
one canine and one handler, was budgeted at $150,000 per team, per year (DHS, 2009b). 
The grant funding covers salary and fringe benefits for the LEO, training and 
certification, equipment costs, purchase and training of the canine and canine expenses 
(DHS, 2009b).  In contrast, Under the NEDCTP program The TSA provides the dog, 
training of the handler, explosives training aids, and technical assistance at no cost to the 
participating agency.  Afterwards, monetary reimbursement is provided to the local 
jurisdiction, in the amount of $50,000 (GAO, 2008) per canine team per year to help 
defray costs such as kennel facilities, transport vehicles, and veterinary care.  Therefore, 
it can be deduced that under policy option three, the TSA would pay the upfront cost of 
the dog, training of the dog and handler, explosives training aids and technical assistance, 
which we can reasonably estimate at a one-time cost of $100,000 plus an annual payment 
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of $50,000 (GAO, 2008) in the following years.  Therefore, for comparison purposes the 
three year cost of the program can be estimated as $100,000 for year one, plus $50,000 
(GAO, 2008) for year two, plus $50,000 (GAO, 2008) for year three; for a three year total 
of $200,000.   
Given the $5.46 million that was available to Tier II mass transit 
agencies in the FY 10 TSGP grant cycle for operational costs (DHS, 2009b).  This figure 
will be used for comparison purposes and divided by the average cost of an EDCT under 
policy option three, which is $200,000 per EDCT.  Therefore, $5.46 million divided by 
$200,000 results in the equivalent of 27.3 EDCTs. 
(2)  Cost.  The cost per EDCT is computed by dividing the $5.46 
million budgeted amount, by the 27.3 EDCTs that could be funded, for an average cost of 
$200,000 per EDCT for the three year grant life. 
(3)  Level of Effort.  Modifying the NEDCTP to authorize funding 
for Tier II mass transit agencies to procure canines and training to TSA standards would 
require no new statutory authority, but it would increase the administrative burden on 
Tier II mass transit agencies. The administrative burden would increase because Tier II 
mass transit agencies would be required to procure the canine, train the team, and 
administer the grant.   
(4)  Political Acceptability.  Modifying the NEDCTP to authorize 
funding for Tier II mass transit agencies to procure canines and training to TSA standards 
would likely be acceptable to two of the three entities considered.  The policy option 
would likely be politically acceptable to Tier II mass transit agencies since they would be 
the recipients of the EDCTs; interview data of Chiefs of Police supports this judgment.  
However since this policy option is not already part of their policy, then it is likely not 
politically acceptable to the TSA. The policy option is judged to be politically acceptable 
to the Congress since it is not prohibited by the 9/11 Commission Act, and this direction 
is contained in the language of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (IRCA, 2007).  
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C. SUMMARY 
The following policy options matrix captures the results of the analysis for easy 
reference (Table 2). 
Table 2.   Policy Options Matrix for EDCTs 
Policy Option Effectiveness Cost Level of Effort Political 
Acceptability 
1 Low $227,777 / 
EDCT 
L=0, A=0 MT=0, TSA=1, 
C=1 
2 12.13 EDCTs $450,000 / 
EDCT 
L=0, A=1 MT=1, TSA=0, 
C=1 
3 27.3 EDCTs $200,000 / 
EDCT 
L=0, A=1 MT=1, TSA=0, 
C=1 
 
Policy option one, maintaining the status quo, is the least desirable option for Tier 
II mass transit agencies because of its lack of effectiveness. The status quo results in low 
numbers of EDCTs and particularly few for Tier II mass transit agencies.  As previously 
indicated, only an estimated 100 to 120 EDCTs have been produced thus far for mass 
transit agencies.  This is an average of only two EDCTs for each of the nations 60 largest 
mass transit agencies, which is far less than needed considering the vastness in size of 
mass transit systems and their 24 hour per day, seven day a week basis of operations.  
Furthermore, not one of the seven Chiefs of Police of Tier II mass transit agencies who 
were interviewed had received an EDCT through the NEDCTP.  Interestingly, for the 
NEDCTP, the cost to produce and maintain an EDCT for a mass transit agency for three 
years is estimated to be somewhat higher than the three-year cost for a mass transit 
agency to procure and train the EDCT on its own.   
Policy option two, which would authorize Tier II mass transit agencies to apply 
for EDCT OPacks that are available only to Tier I mass transit agencies, (DHS, 2009b) is 
the second best option.  Given the budget that was available to Tier II mass transit 
agencies in FY 10, this policy option would result in an increase of 12.13 EDCT 
positions for Tier II mass transit agencies, which is less than the number of EDCTs for 
policy option three.  The average cost per EDCT would be $450,000, which is higher 
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than the average cost per EDCT under policy option number three.  Policy option two 
does not require any new statutory authority, but does increase the administrative burden 
on Tier II mass transit agencies, since they would be required to procure the canines, train 
the canines and handlers, and administer the grant.  Policy option two would likely be 
acceptable to Tier II mass transit agencies since they would be able to apply for the 
EDCT OPacks and benefit from the increase in the number of EDCTs for their mass 
transit agencies, and the interview data of police chiefs supports this likelihood.  This 
policy option is considered likely not politically acceptable to the TSA, since it is not 
now a policy.  The policy option is judged to be politically acceptable to the Congress 
since it is not prohibited by the 9/11 Commission Act.  
Policy option three, which would modify the NEDCTP to authorize funding for 
Tier II mass transit agencies to procure canines and training to TSA standards, is 
considered to be the best and recommended policy option. Given the budget that was 
available to Tier II mass transit agencies in FY ’10, this policy option would result in an 
increase of 27.3 EDCT positions for Tier II mass transit agencies, which is more than the 
number of EDCTs for policy option two. The average cost per EDCT would be $200,000, 
which is less than the average cost per EDCT under policy options numbers one and two.  
Like policy option two, policy option three would increase the administrative burden on 
Tier II mass transit agencies, since they would be required to procure canines, train the 
canines and handlers, and administer the grant.  Like policy option two, policy option 
three would likely be politically acceptable to Tier II mass transit agencies since they 
would be the recipients of the EDCTs and benefit from the increase in the number of 
EDCTs for their mass transit agencies.  Policy option three is also likely to be acceptable 
to the Congress, since it would not be prohibited by the 9/11 Commission Act, but the 
recommendation to take this direction is contained in the language of the 9/11 
Commission Act (IRCA, 2007).  However since it is not already part of their policy, then 
it is not likely to be politically acceptable to the TSA.  The significant increase in the 
number of LEOs over the other policy options, and the significantly less cost per EDCT 
in comparison to policy option two make this option the best and recommended option.   
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D. CONCLUSION 
1. Increasing LEOs for Tier II Mass Transit Agencies 
To increase LEOs for Tier II mass transit agencies, policy option three, which 
would create a new program to fund LEOs modeled after the DOJ’s COPS grant program 
(COPS, 2011), is clearly the best and recommended option.  Policy option one, 
maintaining the status quo, is the least desirable option for Tier II mass transit agencies 
because of its lack of effectiveness. Policy option two, which would make OPacks that 
are presently available only Tier I mass transit agencies (DHS, 2009b) also available to 
Tier II mass transit agencies is an inefficient way provide LEOs.  Fewer LEOs can be 
funded under this option because the cost per LEO is higher.   
Under policy option three, if the $27.3 million that was allocated to Tier II mass 
transit agencies from the TSGP in FY 10 (DHS, 2009b) could be used to fund LEOs, at a 
3 year cost of $214,697 per LEO, then 127 LEOs could be funded for Tier II mass transit 
agencies.  If the grant is administered so that the distribution of the positions to mass 
transit agencies is in groups of four officers each, then 31.75 teams of four LEOs each 
could be funded for Tier II mass transit agencies.  These teams could perform high 
visibility, unpredictable anti terrorism patrols.   
2. Increasing EDCTs for Tier II Mass Transit Agencies 
To increase EDCTs for Tier II mass transit agencies, policy option three, which 
would modify the NEDCTP to authorize funding for Tier II mass transit agencies to 
procure canines and training to TSA standards is considered to be the best and 
recommended policy option.  Policy option one, maintaining the status quo, is the least 
desirable option for Tier II mass transit agencies because of its lack of effectiveness.  
After all, not one of the seven Tier II Chiefs of Police who were interviewed had any 
NEDCTP assets for his mass transit agency.  Policy option two, which would authorize 
Tier II mass transit agencies to apply for EDCT OPacks that are available only to Tier I 
mass transit agencies is the second best option. However, policy option two is inefficient.  
Fewer EDCTs can be funded under this option because the cost per EDCT is higher. 
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Since the NEDCTP provided its first EDCT for mass transit in 2005 (HR, 2005, 
p. 1) the program has produced an estimated 100 to 120 EDCTs for mass transit.  Using 
the recommended policy option of modifying the NEDCTP to authorize funding for Tier 
II mass transit agencies to procure their own canines, and training to TSA standards, the 
number of EDCT’s for mass transit could be doubled to 240 EDCTs (using the high 
estimate of 120 developed to date), at a three year funded cost of $24 million (120 x 
$200,000 = $24 million).  Moreover, 120 EDCTs could be developed and the top 51 Tier 
II mass transit agencies, on average could each be immediately allocated 2.3 EDCTs.  As 
a point of reference, the $24 million spent would be less than the $27.3 million that was 
allocated to Tier II mass transit agencies under the FY 10 TSGP. 
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VIII. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Even though the TSA was formed in November 2001, the security of the nation’s 
mass transit system did not become a national priority until December 5, 2006 with the 
issuance of Executive Order 13416 (Bush, 2006), despite extremists’ attacks on mass 
transit systems worldwide. On August 3, 2007 with the passage of Public Law 110-53, 
also known as the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 
the framework for protecting mass transit was established IRCA, 2007).  The 9/11 
Commission Act and TSA’s  four major security programs for mass transit were 
influenced not only by the spectacular attacks of September 11, 2001, but also the attacks 
on large cities passenger train systems between 2004 and 2006 in Madrid, London, and 
Mumbai.  Recognizing that the U.S. mass transit system is massive, the application of the 
finite resources of TSA’s security programs is risk based (GAO, 2009a, p. 8).  To 
prioritize the distribution of resources the DHS designates eight major urban areas with 
mass transit systems as Tier I and the rest of the country’s urban areas as Tier II (OIG, 
2008, p. 2).  All transit agencies fall into Tiers I or II, based on their terrorism risk scores 
(OIG, 2008, p. 2).  The 9/11 Commission Act required that TSGP recipients be selected 
based on risk (IRCA, 2007).  The risk model is calculated as a function of threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences, or expressed as a mathematical formula, R = f(T x V x 
C) (GAO, 2009a, p. 51). 
Consequently, the resources of the TSGP, whose purpose is to provide funds to 
transit agencies to protect critical infrastructure and the riding public, are distributed on 
this basis.  Between fiscal years 2006 and2009 inclusive, $1.156 billion of TSGP funds 
were allocated to transit agencies for security (GAO, 2009a, p. 7); 90 percent of this 
funding was awarded to transit agencies in eight Tier I urban areas (GAO, 2009a, pp. 17–
18).  The remaining 10 percent of the funds were allocated between 51 transit agencies in 
Tier II urban areas on a competitive basis (GAO, 2009a, pp. 17–18).  In FY 2008, $13.7 
million was transferred from Tier II back to Tier I transit agencies for various reasons 
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(GAO, 2009a, pp. 17–18).  TSA’s distribution of other major security program resources 
to Tier II mass transit agencies is similarly skewed. For example, in the case of the 
NEDCTP, only about 120 EDCTs have been developed for the entire nation’s mass 
transit system with few for Tier II agencies.  In the STSIP, Surface Transportation 
Security Inspector (TSI) positions are understaffed, and VIPR operations are conducted at 
Tier II mass transit agencies on a less frequent basis than desired. 
After more than a billion dollars of expenditures in one TSA security program 
alone, the risk model used to allocate security program resources across Tier I and Tier II 
regions has been determined to be flawed (NRC, 2010).  The GAO found that the DHS 
risk model does not measure variations in vulnerability across regions, or transit systems, 
due to a lack of consistent data, which limits the model’s overall ability to assess risk 
(GAO, 2009a, pp. 16–17). Of even greater concern though, the National Research 
Council (NRC) of the National Academies concluded that the DHS risk analysis practices 
and risk methodology are flawed (NRC, 2010).  The NRC found that concerning 
infrastructure risk analysis in relation to the risk from terrorism, defining the threat and 
estimating probabilities are inherently challenging because of the lack of experience with 
such events, the associated absence of data on which to base reliable estimates of 
probabilities, and the effect of an intelligent adversary that may seek to defeat 
preparedness and coping measures (NRC, 2010, p. 4).  The NRC concluded that until 
deficiencies in the methodology are improved, only low confidence should be placed in 
most of the risk analyses conducted by DHS (NRC, 2010, p. 11). 
While more than a billion dollars has been spent preparing for a spectacular 
terrorist attack on major U.S. regions’ mass transit systems, the terrorism threat has been 
evolving.  DHS Secretary Napolitano indicated that homegrown terrorists represent a new 
and changing facet of terrorist threat (DHS, 2010).  She defined “homegrown” as terrorist 
operatives who are U.S. persons who were radicalized in the United States and who 
learned terrorist tactics either in the United States or in foreign training camps (DHS, 
2010). Secretary Napolitano observed that now, virtually anything is a potential target 
(DHS, 2010).  As if to support the DHS Secretary, the Mineta Transportation Institute 
reported that between September 12, 2001 and the end of 2009, 44 cases of domestic 
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radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism were reported in the United States 
(Mineta, 2010, p. 15).  Thirty two cases were reported between 2002 and 2008, an 
average of four a year (Mineta, 2010, p. 15).  By contrast, in 2009 there were 12 cases, a 
considerable increase (Mineta, 2010, p. 15). A review of the specific cases reveals 
extensive terrorist activity in Tier II regions.   
The authors of the Mineta report considered whether the nation should be 
concerned about the possibility of Tier II type public bus transportation becoming a 
potential target for terrorist attacks (Mineta, 2010, p. 16).  The report concluded that a 
public bus, bus station, or bus stop in the United States provides an adequate body count 
for terrorists, and they have been attacked repeatedly elsewhere outside the U.S .with 
success (Mineta, 2010, p. 16). These targets might reasonably appear on the radar screens 
of radical jihadist groups seeking an operational success, particularly if heavy rail mass 
transit targets become hardened in anticipation of attacks or in response to them (Mineta, 
2010, p. 15). 
As the thesis title suggests, this research focused on TSA’s four major security 
programs for mass transit, and how they can be improved to better serve the terrorism 
security needs of mass transit agencies classified as Tier II.  The research revealed that 
TSA’s four major security programs had already been reviewed by both the DHS OIG 
and the GAO.  Recommendations for improving TSA’s security programs were made by 
both of these government agencies.  Rather than repeat their work, this thesis set out to 
address a more strategic need, increasing LEOs and increasing EDCTs, which if 
accomplished, may result in a significant leap toward improving the security of Tier II 
mass transit agencies.  While these two strategic goals were researched, at a more tactical 
level several other possible improvements of TSA’s four major security programs for 
mass transit were revealed.  These strategic goals and tactical considerations will be 
discussed in Section B. 
 138
B. DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC GOALS 
1. Goal One, Increasing LEOs for Tier II Mass Transit Agencies  
Goal one was to increase LEOs for Tier II mass transit agencies.  The best and 
recommended policy option was found to be for the TSA to create a new program 
administered by the TSA, within the TSGP, to fund LEOs for Tier II mass transit 
agencies.  This new program would be modeled after the DOJ’s Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grant program (COPS, 2011).  This proposed new 
grant program will fund 100 percent of the salary, benefits, and training for entry level 
LEO positions with a performance period of 36 months.  Under the DOJ’s COPS 
program in FY 10, 1,388 LEOs were funded nation wide at a cost of $298 million (DOJ, 
2010), an amount that was close to the $288 million allocated for the FY ’10 TSGP, that 
included the Tier I, Tier II, Amtrak, and freight rail allocations (DHS, 2009). 
This recommended policy option would focus grant funds on operational costs 
rather than infrastructure security improvements, which are priorities of the TSGP; 
however, by statute, the TSGP places limits on the amount of funding that can be applied 
to operational costs because the grant program is intended first and foremost to fund 
infrastructure security improvements (IRCA, 2007).  As Chiefs of Police noted though, 
more funding needs to be directed at the human elements of security, particularly high 
visibility patrols conducted on an unpredictable basis.  While no one is recommending 
that the entire TSGP budget be shifted from infrastructure security improvements to 
human sources of security, perhaps it is time to re-examine the optimum balance between 
the two alternatives.  This is a timely question since, pursuant to the 9/11 Commission 
Act, the allocation of TSGP funding for operational costs versus infrastructure security is 
scheduled to be reduced from 20 percent to 10 percent in FY 11 (IRCA, 2007).  If we are 
to increase the number of LEOs for mass transit, then the TSGP allocation of funding 
between infrastructure security improvements and operational costs must be changed.  
For this to occur, legislative change will have to be sought after and approved.   
While the allocation of TSGP funding between infrastructure security 
improvements and operational costs is set by statute, the allocation of funding between 
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Tier I and Tier II mass transit agencies is risk based (GAO, 2009a).  Perhaps it is also 
time to re-examine how that distribution is calculated.  First, consider that the DHS risk 
model and methodology has been called into question by both the GAO (GAO, 2009a) 
and the NAC (NRC, 2010).  The GAO discovered that the DHS risk model has not been 
comparing differences in vulnerabilities across regions and mass transit agencies (GAO, 
2009a, p. 16).  The NAC has characterized the DHS risk analysis as unreliable (NRC, 
2010, p. 11), particularly due to its inability to accurately assess the threat component of 
the risk model (NRC, 2010, p. 4).  The second factor to consider is the changing threat 
environment.  In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and the attacks on mass transit in 
Madrid, London, and Mumbai, no one would reasonably question the need to prioritize 
security resources for major city mass transit systems that carry high volumes of 
passengers through underground tunnels.  The need to continue to focus resources on 
these potential targets is clear; however, with the development of the “homegrown threat” 
and the increased level of terrorist activity that has recently been identified in Tier II 
regions, we should re-examine if Tier II regions are receiving an appropriate allocation of 
resources, and whether our limited security resources are being used as effectively as 
possible.    
2. Goal Two, Increasing EDCTs for Tier II Mass Transit Agencies  
Goal two was to increase EDCTs for Tier II mass transit agencies. The best and 
recommended policy option was found to be for the TSA to authorize mass transit 
agencies to procure canines on their own and to provide for their own training of the 
explosives detection canine teams.  The proposed policy option would be administered 
within the NEDCTP. Under this option, the TSA will reimburse mass transit agencies for 
all start up costs, including canine, training, and equipment.  The TSA will reserve the 
right to insure that the canine teams perform to a specified standard and meet all TSA 
certification requirements. 
Procurement and training would be required to meet certification standards of 
qualified organizations such as the National Police Canine Association (NPCA), the 
United States Police Canine Association (USPCA), or the International Explosive 
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Detection Dog Association (IEDDA), and be endorsed by the TSA under the standards of 
the TSA’s NEDCTP.  Additionally, mass transit agencies would be required to maintain 
certification, utilization, and training data to show compliance with guidelines set by the 
Scientific Working Group on Dog and Orthogonal Detection Guidelines (SWGDOG).  
Other requirements may be imposed such as guaranteeing a response capability by the 
mass transit agency on a 24 hours a day, seven days a  week basis.   
TSA would pay the upfront cost of the dog, training of the dog and handler, 
explosives training aids and technical assistance, which we can reasonably estimate at a 
one time cost of $100,000 plus an annual payment of $50,000 (GAO, 2008) in the 
following years. The TSA would have the option to adopt the trained EDCTs into the 
NEDCTP, if all of the above requirements were met and if funding permits. 
EDCTs are recognized as the best tool for the detection of IEDs (Pearce, pp. 1, 9), 
and the NEDCTP is probably the best program in the nation for the development of 
EDCTs outside of the Department of Defense.  The shortcoming of the program is that 
the NEDCTP does not produce EDCTs at a rate sufficient to meet the security needs of 
mass transit, apparently due to competing demands from other transportation sectors.  
Since 2005, only about 120 EDCTs have been produced for mass transit with inadequate 
numbers of EDCTs for Tier II mass transit agencies.  This is in light of the fact that none 
of the seven Chiefs of Police who were interviewed from Tier II mass transit agencies 
had received any EDCTs through the program.   
There is no reason to doubt the potential for success of this recommended policy 
option since mass transit agencies have already displayed a limited capability of 
procuring and training EDCTs to national standards without assistance from the 
NEDCTP.  However, due to limited resources and harsh economic conditions, mass 
transit agencies cannot be expected to produce these EDCTs without financial assistance 
from the TSA.  If the recommended policy option is adopted, the number of EDCTs 
could be doubled from the estimated 120 that are now assigned to mass transit, to 240 at a 
three year cost of $24 million.  As a point of reference, the $24 million spent would be 
less than the $27.3 million that was allocated to Tier II mass transit agencies under the 
FY 10 TSGP (DHS, 2009b). 
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It is not known what role DHS’s flawed risk analysis model (NRC, 2010) has 
played in the allocation of NEDCTP resources to Tier II mass transit agencies, if any.  As 
in the first goal, with the development of the “homegrown threat” and the increased level 
of terrorist activity that has recently been identified in Tier II regions, perhaps it is time to 
re-examine how the resources of the NEDCTP are allocated, and if the NEDCTP can be 
modified to enable Tier II regions to acquire EDCTs under this policy option.     
C. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
While the two strategic goals were researched, other tactical level issues were 
revealed that bear consideration regarding their potential for improving other of TSA’s 
major security programs for mass transit. 
1. Improving the STSIP 
There is general agreement that TSIs perform a valuable mission in regard to 
BASE reviews within this program (OIG, 2008), but TSIs’ role in VIPR operations is 
controversial and deserving of attention.  Although TSA management seems to support 
the use of TSIs in VIPR operations, other involved parties have raised concerns, 
including the TSIs themselves (OIG, 2008).    
TSIs have described themselves as underutilized in VIPR operations and do not 
consider the activity to be an effective use of their time (OIG, 2008, p. 29).  Tier I mass 
transit agencies do not uniformly use TSIs, and Tier II mass transit agencies are generally 
concerned over TSIs’ lack of training and law enforcement background.  Important to 
note is that the DHS IG voiced concerns for the safety of an unarmed TSI if the TSI were 
mistaken as a federal agent during a VIPR operation (OIG, 2008, p. 28).   
Given that using TSIs to perform VIPR operations is of questionable merit, the 
question arises as to how TSIs can be best utilized.  Considering the fact that the risk 
methodology used by the TSA has been characterized by the NAC as flawed and 
unreliable NRC, 2010), perhaps the TSI positions could assist in addressing the DHS risk 
model’s weaknesses.  Since the DHS risk model does not compare and contrast 
vulnerabilities in mass transit systems across regions due to a lack of data, and consistent 
 142
methodologies of gathering that data are not being used (GAO, 2009a, pp. 16–17), 
perhaps TSIs could be trained to work with mass transit agencies to address this 
weakness.  Perhaps TSI’s could also be trained and used to address current weaknesses in 
developing terrorism threat data for the risk analysis model.  If TSIs were trained and 
used to assist in addressing the weaknesses found in the DHS risk model, they could have 
a profound impact on improving other major security programs where decisions have to 
be made on the appropriate allocation of program resources. 
2. Improving the VIPR 
There is general agreement among chiefs of police of mass transit agencies that 
VIPR operations perform a valuable mission with their high visibility patrols performed 
on an unpredictable basis.  These operations have resulted in notable accomplishments 
for Tier II mass transit agencies.  There are, however, some continued operational 
problems that contribute toward diminished effectiveness of the program.  For example, 
there are still a handful of locations where coordination between the TSA and the mass 
transit agency remains an issue.  There is also a continued need to address 
communications problems between mass transit agencies and the TSA.  From an 
administrative perspective, VIPR operations add expenses to Tier II mass transit agencies 
that cannot be recovered.  This is due to the fact that transit agencies must assign 
personnel to VIPR operations and TSA generally does not reimburse these costs.    
On a broader note though, the level of participation by Tier I mass transit agencies 
in VIPR operations, as reflected in interviews of Tier I chiefs, raises the question of how 
effective the VIPR program really is for those agencies.  Regarding Tier II mass transit 
agencies, from the perspective of the Tier II chiefs who were interviewed, the limited 
range of frequency of VIPR operations from one operation a week to four or five a year, 
raises the question of how effective the program is for those agencies as well. Tier II 
chiefs consistently comment that they would prefer more VIPR operations, and the 
frequency of the operations is spread too thin.  VIPR operations’ timing is often focused 
on special events and holidays.   
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If the VIPR program is not as effective for mass transit agencies as it could or 
should be, should consideration be given to directing that funding to another security 
program?  Can the resources be better utilized by funding LEO positions for mass transit 
agencies similar to the DOJ’s COPS grant program?  Can the resources be better directed 
by funding LEO positions for mass transit agencies that do not have the resources to 
perform high visibility patrols on an unpredictable basis for their own mass transit 
agencies?  If VIPR program funding was re-directed to fund the hiring of LEOs by mass 
transit agencies, could the frequency of these high visibility patrols be increased, and 
could the administrative and operational concerns be eliminated? 
D. TRANSIT POLICING AND SECURITY PEER ADVISORY GROUP 
John M. Bryson, a professor of planning and public affairs and author of Strategic 
Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations says that public organizations operate 
in environments that have become increasingly uncertain and more tightly connected 
(Bryson, 2004). This statement certainly applies to the uncertain world of mass transit 
security and the interconnected mass transit systems used to transport millions of 
passengers in this nation each day.  To address this challenge, Bryson says that 
organizations need to adopt a fourfold response.  They must think, act, and learn 
strategically (Bryson, 2004).  Their response must also translate insights into effective 
strategies to cope with changed circumstances (Bryson, 2004).  They must develop 
rationales that lay the groundwork for the adoption and implementation of their strategies 
(Bryson, 2004).  Lastly, they must build coalitions, large and strong enough to adopt and 
implement their strategies (Bryson,, 2004, pp.1–61). 
In order to address these security challenges, Bryson suggests that we must build 
coalitions, large and strong enough to adopt and implement our strategies (Bryson, 2004). 
The Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group (PAG) is this sort of coalition.  
The PAG was formed to bring together Transit Police Chiefs and Security Directors from 
mass transit systems across the nation to serve as a means of communication and liaison 
between transit security professionals, the TSA, and other government agencies. Its 
mission includes reducing the risk of terrorism through the exchange of effective 
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practices, and advancing effective transit specific security initiatives to include the six 
transit security fundamentals as outlined in the Transportation Sector-Specific Plan.   
This thesis will be shared with the PAG, based on its mission to reduce the risk of 
terrorism by advancing effective transit specific security initiatives.  The PAG is well 
suited to review the strategic policy recommendations for increasing LEOs and EDCTs.  
If the PAG considers the recommendations to have merit, they may choose to adopt them 
as their own, or modify them and then develop an effective implementation strategy with 
the TSA.  The PAG is also well suited to review the tactical considerations for improving 
the STSIP and VIPR program.  As with the strategic goals, if the PAG considers the 
tactical considerations to have merit, they may likewise develop an implementation 
strategy with the TSA.  The anticipated outcome is to improve TSA’s four major security 
programs for Tier II mass transit agencies.  
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APPENDIX.  TERRORISM CASES WITH TIES TO TIER II 
REGIONS 
On June 03, 2008 Christopher Paul, also known as Abdul Malek, a native of 
Columbus, Ohio, pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court in the Southern District of Ohio, 
Columbus, Ohio, to count two of a three count indictment charging him with conspiracy 
to provide material support and resources to terrorists; conspiracy to use a weapon of 
mass destruction (explosives); and providing material support and resources to terrorists 
(DOJ, 2009f).  Paul had joined Al Qaeda in the early 1990s, fought in Bosnia, and 
conspired with others to target Americans both at home and abroad (DOJ, 2009f). 
On June 18, 2008, Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed, a resident of Tampa, 
entered a guilty plea in U.S District Court, Middle District of Florida on a charge of 
providing material support to terrorists (DOJ, 2008). Mohamed’s vehicle had been 
stopped by sheriff’s deputies in Berkeley County, South Carolina and a search of the car 
located explosives materials that had been transported from Florida (DOJ, 2008). 
On June 13, 2008 Mohammad Zaki Amawi and Marwan Othman El-Hindi were 
found guilty in U.S. District Court in the Northern District of Ohio of conspiring to kill or 
maim persons outside the United States, conspiracy to provide material support to 
terrorists, and distributing information on improvised explosive devices and suicide bomb 
vests (DOJ, 2009i)  Amawi is a citizen of Jordan and El-Hindi is a naturalized U.S. 
citizen born in Jordan (DOJ, 2009i). 
On April 30, 2009 Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, a dual national of Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar (DOJ, 2009a), pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court, Central District of Illinois to 
conspiracy to provide material support to the al-Qaeda terrorist network. (DOJ, 2009g).  
Al-Marri was described by the Attorney General as “an al-Qaeda sleeper agent captured 
in the United States” (DOJ, 2009g).  Al-Marri entered the United States on September 10, 
2001, purportedly to pursue a bachelor’s degree at Bradley University in Peoria, Illinois 
(DOJ, 2009a). 
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On May 20, 2009 Mohammed Abdullah Warsame, a resident of Minneapolis 
Minnesota pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court in the District of Minnesota to conspiring 
to provide material support and resources to al-Qaeda (DOJ, 2009e). Warsame, a 
naturalized Canadian citizen of Somali descent, traveled to Afghanistan in March 2000 
where he attended an al-Qaeda training camp and later to the al Al Faruq training camp 
where he met Osama Bin Laden (DOJ, 2009e). Upon returning to Minneapolis, Warsame 
maintained his relationship with al-Qaeda associates and provided information to them 
(DOJ, 2009e). 
On June 10, 2009 Syed Haris Ahmed, was found guilty in U. S. District Court in 
the Northern District of Georgia of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists 
(DOJ, 2009c).  Ahmed is a naturalized U.S. citizen, was born in Pakistan and raised in 
Marietta and Dawsonville GA (DOJ, 2009c).  Ahmed provided videos of potential U.S. 
targets of terrorism to members of the terrorist organizations al-Qaeda in Iraq, and 
Pakistan-based terrorist organizations Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammed (DOJ, 
2009c). 
On August 12, 2009 Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, was found guilty in U. S. District 
Court in the Northern District of Georgia of conspiracy to provide material support to 
terrorists (DOJ, 2009b).  Sadequee was born in Fairfax Virginia and attended schools in 
the United States, Canada, and Bangladesh (DOJ, 2009b).  Sadequee was a co-
conspirator of Syed Haris Ahmed, who provided videos of potential U.S. targets of 
terrorism to members of the terrorist organizations al-Qaeda in Iraq, and Pakistan-based 
terrorist organizations Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed (DOJ, 2009b). 
On May 26, 2010 Hosam Maher Husein Smadi pleaded guilty in U.S. District 
Court in the Northern District of Texas to a felony offense of attempted use of a weapon 
of mass destruction for the attempted bombing of a downtown Dallas, Texas skyscraper 
in September 2009 (DOJ, 2010b).  Smadi is a Jordanian citizen who worked in Italy, 
Texas (DOJ, 2009d).  Smadi had repeatedly espoused his desire to conduct terror attacks 
in the United States and serve as a soldier for Usama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda (DOJ, 
2010d). 
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On August 5, 2010, the U.S. Attorney General announced the indictments of 14 
individuals on terrorism violations for providing money, personnel, and services to al-
Shabaab, a terrorist group operating in Somalia with ties to al-Qaeda (DOJ, 2010a).  The 
indictments were returned in Minnesota, Alabama, and southern California (DOJ, 2010a).  
The charges relate to what was described as a “deadly pipeline” that has routed funding 
and fighters to al-Shabaab from cities across the U.S (DOJ, 2010a).  In the District of 
Minnesota alone, a total of 19 defendants have been charged in connection with the 
investigation (DOJ, 2010a).  The Attorney General described the situation as a disturbing 
trend of radicalization with increasing numbers of individuals including U.S. citizens 
who have become captivated by extremist ideology and who have taken measures to 
carry out terrorist objectives, either at home or abroad (DOJ, 2010a). 
On November 27, 2010 Mohamed Osman Mohamud was arrested on charges of 
attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction (explosives) at an annual Christmas tree 
lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon (DOJ, 2010c).  The charges were based upon a 
criminal complaint filed in the District of Oregon.  Mohamud is a naturalized U.S. citizen 
from Somalia and a resident of Corvallis, Oregon (DOJ, 2010c).  While Mohamud was 
plotting his planned attack with an undercover FBI operative he said, “It’s in Oregon; 
and Oregon like you know, nobody ever thinks of it [emphasis added]” (DOJ, 2010c). 
On February 23, 2011, Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, a citizen of Saudi Arabia and 
resident of Lubbock, Texas, was arrested by special agents of the FBI in Texas (DOJ, 
2011). He was charged with the attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction in 
connection with his purchase of chemicals and equipment necessary to make an 
improvised explosives device (DOJ, 2011).  Aldawasari was lawfully admitted into the 
United States in 2008 on a student visa and is enrolled at South Plains College near 
Lubbock (DOJ, 2011).   Evidence recovered from Aldawasari’s personal computer 
revealed that he had researched possible targets in Tier II regions (DOJ, 2011).  
On September 22, 2010, Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, appeared before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs (Mueller, 2010).  Director Mueller indicated that domestic 
radicalization and homegrown extremism is becoming more pronounced (Mueller, 2010).  
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Director Mueller characterized the primary sources of terrorist plots against the United 
States as emanating from al Qaeda, al Qaeda’s associates, and homegrown extremists 
(Mueller, 2010). 
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